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Hoe meet je de zwaarte van een klap die nooit kwam,  
zoek je de fiets waar niets mee is, die er nog staat?  
De brand in een leegstaand schoolgebouw,  
nooit uitgebroken, laat geen sporen na.  
 
Hier is de eindeloze lijst van dingen die niet zijn gebeurd, 
hier is de nooit betaalde prijs voor toeval, dronkenschap, 
loslippigheid. Hier is het dodelijke ongeluk, de schade 
die je nooit veroorzaakt hebt. 
 
Hier klinkt de niet geslaakte kreet van twee 
uit bed gebelde ouders. De stad zwermt 
van ongehoord geluid. Je luistert 's nachts 
naar de zachte voetstap van de dochter die  
onaangetast de trap op sluipt.1  
 
Ester Naomi Perquin (2018). Lange armen: Gedichten over de politie. Uitgeverij van Oorschot. 
  
 
1 Dit gedicht is special voor de Nederlandse Nationale Politie geschreven over de kracht van het voorspellen en 





How do you measure the gravity of a blow that never came, 
do you look for the bicycle that is not taken, that is still there? 
The fire in an empty school building, 
never broken out, leaves no traces. 
 
Here's the endless list of things that didn't happen, 
here is the price never paid for coincidence, drunkenness, 
indiscretion. Here's the fatality, the damage 
that you never caused. 
 
Here is the unspoken cry of two 
parents called out of bed. The city is swarming 
of unheard-of sound. You listen at night 
to the soft footstep of the daughter who 
sneaks up the stairs unaffected.2 
 
Ester Naomi Perquin 
Dutch Poet Laureate  
 
2 This poem was written for the Dutch National Police about the power of predicting and preventing crime.  
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This dissertation is the result of my four-year Ph.D. research into how artificial intelligence 
(AI) is changing work and organizing. One of the key messages of this dissertation is the 
importance of understanding the technology we study. Before I start with the formal part 
of this dissertation, let me emphasize that this key message was something that I had to 
find out over time. To be fair, when I started the dissertation research, I knew nothing 
about AI (or data, or algorithms). When initially presenting my research setting of the 
Dutch police in academic settings, I failed many times to explain exactly how the system I 
studied was AI, or even why I considered it to be so. It came to a point where I decided to 
respond to any technology-related question with: “I’m not a computer scientist, so I don’t 
really know.”  
Luckily, something clicked. The more time I spent at my field site, while at the same 
time starting to write some first academic drafts, the more I realized that there is no way 
to tell a story of AI implementation and use without fully understanding what the 
technology is about. So, I called one of the police data scientists and asked him everything 
I wanted to know about the AI system. Funny enough, him sharing technical details and 
me sharing experiences from the field made us realize that we should write a reflection 
piece on the myths of AI, which we eventually did. The point is, when I finally got into 
the technical details of the AI system, I could not stop anymore. I wanted to know more 
and more about what AI is and can do. I kept on reading and reading about the topic, 
which helped me to gain insights into a variety of contexts.  
By then, everyone in my surroundings also knew about my near-obsession with the 
topic, so they started sending my mainstream articles, forwarding videos, and so on. And 
then another pivotal moment happened, as I was asked to co-author a managerial book on 
AI implementation. From then on, I could dive even deeper into the topic and write as 
much about AI as possible. It also gave me access to contexts other than the police, which 
helped me gain a broader perspective of what AI means in practice. While at first trying 
to get away from any technology-related question, after four years of “personal 
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development” on the topic of AI, I ended up recording a video to explain the different 
types of machine learning techniques to practitioners.3   
The pages that follow comprise the result of this journey. A journey that was fueled by 
much enthusiasm and love for the topic, as well as for the people I studied and who have 
so generously invited me into their organizational “life.” Luckily, as AI technologies 
continue to learn, so can I. Let this dissertation therefore not only be the end of a journey 
















1.1 A practice perspective on the influence of technology on  
work and organizing 
 
From the first emergence of technology in everyday life, scholars have been fascinated by 
its role in and influence on human practice. For example, intrigued by the potential power 
of fast-moving trains, philosopher Oswald Spengler asked who amongst the present-day 
scholars realized that “between the space perspective of Western oil painting and the 
conquest of space by railroad [...] there are deep uniformities?” (Spengler, 1991 [1926], p. 7). 
In other words, Spengler argued that using trains that moved at high speed through terrain 
that one previously experienced from a horse-and-carriage changed the perception of the 
environment into stretched patches of color, which ultimately served as a trigger for the 
modernist painting style. As time progressed and technology became increasingly 
prevalent in everyday life, organizational scholars were surprised to see that, not only did 
technology influence human behavior but the same technology could be adopted in 
completely different ways, depending on the context (e.g., Azad & King, 2008; Barley, 1986; 
Boudreau & Robey, 2005; Orlikowski, 2000). This insight gave rise to what has become 
known as the “technology-in-practice” perspective (Orlikowski, 2000, Sergeeva et al. 2017) 
to understand the situated and embedded nature of technology use (Oborn, Barrett, & 
Davidson, 2011).  
The technology-in-practice perspective finds its roots in “practice theory” (e.g., 
Gherardi, 2006; Feldman & Orlikowksi, 2011, Orlikowski, 2000). Practice theory builds on 
the fields of philosophy and sociology, with scholars such as Bourdieu, Giddens, Foucault, 
Garfinkel, Latour, Taylor, and Schatzki, and generally aims to understand how practices 
emerge and change and to uncover intended and unintended consequences of these 
changes (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011). Scholars taking a practice theory approach go 
beyond an individual perspective to look at work practices as interdependent, mutually 
constitutive, and routinized types of behaviors (Bradbury & Lichtenstein, 2000; Giddens, 
1984; Østerlund & Carlile, 2005; Reckwitz, 2002) through which social orders evolve and 
change over time (Gherardi, 2006; Reckwitz, 2002).  
Introduction 
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 Scholars taking a practice-based perspective on technology consider how specific 
patterns of technology use emerge through an ongoing interaction between technology 
and its users (e.g., Barrett et al., 2012; Oborn, Barrett, & Davidson, 2011; Orlikowski, 2000; 
Sergeeva et al., 2017). In contrast to more deterministic approaches, the technology-in-
practice perspective considers technology as “instantiated in and through the activities of 
human agents” (Giddens, 1984, p. 256). Zooming in on the micro-practices through which 
different properties of technologies become important for work and organizing, the 
technology-in-practice perspective has been largely influential for organizational and 
information systems scholars (e.g., Azad & King, 2008; Boudreau & Robey, 2005; Hevner 
et al., 2004; Jasperson, Carter, & Zmud, 2005; Leonardi, Treem, & Jackson, 2010; 
Mazmanian, 2013; Mazmanian, Orlikowski, & Yates, 2013; Orlikowski & Scott, 2014; Sein 
et al., 2011). For example, Azad and King (2008) studied how a pharmacy dispensing system 
was used in practice by a group of pharmacists and how they, in their interactions with 
the technology, eventually developed workarounds that allowed them to let go of the 
system altogether.    
By looking at the meaning of specific technological features in particular contexts, 
scholars taking a technology-in-practice perspective how uncovered, for example, how 
collective patterns of technology use emerge and stabilize, or how unexpected patterns of 
technology use emerge (Azad & King 2008; Burton-Jones & Gallivan 2007; Leonardi 2013; 
Oborn et al. 2011; Orlikowski 2000; Schultze & Orlikowski 2004; Stein et al. 2015; Vaast & 
Walsham 2005). As technologies evolve and contexts change, the technology-in-practice is 
as relevant today as it was when it first emerged. This becomes especially clear when we 
consider recent technological developments such as large-scale digitization and 
datafication that have stirred great debate about the potentially extensive consequences of 
“artificial intelligence” (AI). Although existing research now suggests that work and 
organizing are bound to be altered by the introduction of AI systems (e.g., Faraj, Pachidi, 
& Sayegh, 2018; Kellogg, Valentine, & Christin, 2020), they are still a “new but poorly 
understood phenomenon” (Von Krogh, 2018, p. 408) both regarding their unique features 
and their meaning, as well as their consequences in practice. It is thus time to take a deep 
Chapter 1 
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dive into the implementation of AI systems in organizations or, in other words, to take a 
technology-in-practice perspective and look “behind the scenes of AI.”  
1.2 A brief history of AI 
 
In 1950, Alan Turing asked the infamous question: “Can machines think?” (Turing, 1950, 
p. 433) and with that, a new era was born in which computer scientists tried to create 
technologies that could think for themselves. Not only would such technologies have the 
potential to shape existing world views, but they would also independently generate 
insights that no human had ever done before or could potentially ever do (Wooldridge, 
2020). In short, computer scientists’ quest for artificial intelligence had started. Today, AI 
refers to a field in computer science that is concerned with creating systems that can 
accomplish tasks that normally require human intelligence (Nilsson, 1971; Pesapane, 
Codari, & Sardanelli, 2018). These tasks can include, for example, facial or voice 
recognition and generating decisions or predictions. As mentioned above, AI has been in 
development since the 1950s. Across the 70 years to now, it has seen many milestones, but 
computer scientists also encountered several periods in which its development came to a 
halt, which are also known as “AI winters” (Cariani, 2010; Wooldridge, 2020). Because the 
field of AI has been in development for such a long time and has encountered victories as 
well as bottlenecks,!the definition has altered and different techniques have been used over 
time. For example, in the 1990s it was common to refer to AI when talking about expert 
systems; i.e., systems for which computer scientists had to extract the expert rules from 
human experts and manually code these rules into logical sequences (e.g., Forsythe, 1993). 
Now, about 20 years onwards, researchers agree that the ability to learn distinguishes AI 
from other “intelligent technologies” (Bailey & Barley, 2020; Faraj et al., 2018).4 
The 1950s are considered the birth period of AI, with mathematician, philosopher, and 
inventor Alan Turing as its founding father (who is also known for his skills at deciphering 
 
4 Parts of paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 are based on chapters of my book: Waardenburg, L., Huysman, M., & Agterberg, M. 
(2021). Managing AI wisely: From development to organizational change in practice. Edward Elgar Publishing. These 
paragraphs have been fully rewritten to fit the aims and style of this dissertation. 
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the encrypted messages of the German forces in World War II). Turing believed that 
human decision-making is based on specific, explicit factors, which could be extracted so 
that a machine should be able to learn these factors too. Building on this belief, he created 
the “Turing test” – which, due to the movie that has been made about his life, is widely 
known as the “imitation game” – through which one should be able to determine whether 
a machine is intelligent or not. The test consists of three players: one, two, and three. Let 
us say that player one is the interrogator, who asks direct questions to players two and 
three, while one of these players is actually a machine. Communicating via text messages, 
the interrogator has to distinguish the machine from the human in these messages. If the 
interrogator fails to make the distinction, Turing argued, the machine can be considered 
“intelligent” (Turing, 1950).  
The Turing test was mainly adopted for chatbots, but the biggest problem with the test 
was humans themselves, as it turned out that people are quite lenient when it comes to 
written text and consider something to be “intelligent” rather quickly. For example, 
“Eliza,”5 the first talking bot ever, simulated a psychologist who responded to written chat 
messages. All her answers were pre-programmed, which meant that if you kept chatting 
with her long enough, she would start repeating herself. Eliza was considered a great 
achievement, people even willingly shared secrets with her, but was she really intelligent? 
After Eliza, a number of pre-programmed bots followed. Chatbot Parry performed the 
role of a patient with schizophrenia6 and chatbot Catherine was a very pleasant 
conversation partner, as long as you only talked about Bill Clinton. The first chatbot to 
really pass the Turing test was Ukrainian-speaking “Eugene Goostman.”7 Though 
developed in 2001, it took 13 years for the bot to convince a significant part of a jury that 
Eugene was a “real” Ukrainian boy (Shah et al., 2016). Interestingly, the human jury 
attributed his stiff way of talking and his grammatical errors to the culture and language 
barrier, rather than to the possibility of Eugene being a machine (Waardenburg, Huysman, 
& Agterberg, 2021).  
 
5 Developed by Joseph Weizenbaum at the MIT AI Laboratory in 1966.!
6 Psychiatrist Kenneth Colby wrote its script.  
7 Built in 2001 by Vladimir Veselov and Eugene Demchenko.!
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A major change in the performance of AI systems occurred in the late 1980s when 
computer scientists discovered the possibilities of machine learning. Machine learning 
became a research area in the field of AI, in which computer scientists aim to construct 
algorithms – i.e., a sequence of coded instructions which are aimed to solve a 
computational problem – that can autonomously improve through experience and 
therefore have the capacity to learn (Tegmark, 2017; Wooldridge, 2020). In 1988, using 
machine learning resulted in the first self-driving car “ALVINN” (Autonomous Land 
Vehicle In a Neural Network). In the years that followed, machine learning has become 
increasingly central in our understanding of AI.  
Using machine learning gave rise to what is now called “affective computing” (Picard, 
1995), in which a computer learns to recognize, understand, and simulate human emotions. 
Most generally known, though, is the application of machine learning in the field of 
Natural Language Processing (NLP). When in 2011 IBM’s Watson defeated its human 
opponents in the American television show “Jeopardy!” there seemed to be no turning 
back from AI systems becoming increasingly “intelligent.” In this game show, one needs to 
give the right question to a given answer. To be able to do this, and win the show, Watson 
was given a huge amount of “reading material,” namely 200 million pages of text which 
included all of Wikipedia and the World Book Encyclopedia (Best, 2013). During the game, 
Watson’s algorithms searched for a number of questions for each answer, assigned a score 
to each of the options, and the question with the highest score won. And so did Watson.  
Another AI achievement came with Google DeepMind’s “AlphaGo” in 2014. The game 
Go is one of the most complex board games in the world, which therefore seemed to be an 
excellent opportunity to test the possibilities of machine learning. At the start of the game, 
one can choose between 361 moves (compared to 20 moves in chess). After the first move, 
there are 129 960 new options. After two moves, this becomes about 17 billion, and so on 
(Susskind, 2020; Wooldridge, 2020). For the AI system to learn to play Go, it used 30 
million previous Go games and played against itself until it could predict a good move. In 
2016, the AI system defeated human world champion Lee Sedol.  
Introduction 
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Since 2011, AI systems are no longer only the research domain of computer scientists to 
see what such systems can potentially do. Instead, they are increasingly implemented in 
everyday life. Voice assistants such as Sire, Google Now, and Cortana are increasingly used 
on smartphones, which can adapt to new situations remarkably quickly. The potential 
market value and practical applications of AI systems have also been noticed by 
organizations, where the impact of AI is also increasing. For example, machine learning is 
now not only important for self-driving cars, but also for analyzing medical scans (Kim et 
al., 2021). However, before turning to the increased prevalence of AI systems as an 
organizational phenomenon, I first explore more technical details about the most common 
techniques used for machine learning today.  
1.3 Techniques used for machine learning 
 
In machine learning, learning algorithms are developed that can improve through 
experience (Tegmark, 2017; Wooldridge, 2020). Using large amounts of data and advanced 
computational and statistical methods, learning algorithms can autonomously generate 
decisions, classifications, or predictions (Faraj et al., 2018) that can potentially go beyond 
what is possible for humans alone (Leavitt et al., 2020; Tshitoyan et al., 2019). For example, 
AI systems can detect tumors that are sometimes invisible to the human eye (Aerts, 2018; 
Beck et al., 2011; Kim, Rezazade Mehrizi, & Huysman, 2020), they can predict where and 
when a crime is most likely to occur (Brayne, 2020; Waardenburg, Sergeeva, & Huysman, 
2018), or they can dig through lengthy legal documents and find the right information only 
seconds after asking for it (Zhang et al., 2020). Generally, there are three different machine 
learning techniques that can be used for training learning algorithms today: supervised 
learning, unsupervised learning, and reinforcement learning.  
1.3.1 Supervised learning 
The term “supervised learning” refers to the nature of the data sets used. In the case of 
supervised learning, each data point in the data set needs to be labeled, meaning that it 
Chapter 1 
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should be indicated what each data point entails. For example, data point X should be 
labeled as Y, so that the supervised learning algorithm can learn to categorize all X as Y 
(Yeung et al., 2017). Suppose that data point X is an image of a fork, then this data point 
should be labeled (Y) “fork.” By feeding the learning algorithm with a data set containing 
as many labeled images of forks as possible, it can learn to distinguish forks from other 
objects.  
Because the data set used for supervised learning always contains the intended result 
(in this case, an image is either a fork or not), with this technique you can always compare 
the predictions with reality, which also makes it possible to calculate the accuracy of the 
model. For this purpose, in the case of supervised learning, the original data set is usually 
split into 80 percent training data (for the algorithm to learn) and 20 percent test data (to 
calculate the accuracy and quality of the learning algorithm). The most common methods 
used for constructing supervised learning algorithms are regression and classification. 
Regression is used when a value or number needs to be predicted, classification when the 
outcome should be a group or category. Rule-based classification is not part of supervised 
learning, as explicating rules does not involve any further “learning.”  
The first learning algorithms used in AI systems were based on supervised learning, in 
which the algorithms were trained to learn a mapping between given characteristics and a 
known outcome. To this day, the majority of AI systems being developed still work based 
on supervised learning. A well-known example is Facebook’s friend-tagging in photos. In 
this case, we provide the characteristics and the labels used in the data set ourselves, by 
uploading photos and tagging our friends. Using all of this data to learn from, Facebook’s 
friend-tagging algorithm now autonomously offers suggestions regarding who is present 
in our photos.  
1.3.2 Unsupervised learning 
In the case of unsupervised learning, the data set does not contain labels, but the algorithm 
autonomously sorts data on the basis of underlying patterns through clustering, 
dimensionality reduction, or association. In clustering, the learning algorithm sorts data 
Introduction 
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based on common characteristics. For example, the algorithm clusters objects with three 
teeth as “forks” and objects with a smooth blade as “knives.” As objects with three teeth 
have more in common with other objects with three teeth than with smooth-bladed 
objects, the learning algorithm autonomously clusters objects with similar characteristics 
together. Dimensionality reduction is about lowering the number of properties in a data 
set. For example, by sorting “brown-black coat,” “triangular ears,” “long nose,” and “long 
tail” into the category “shepherd,” four traits present in a data set are reduced to one. 
Association is used to relate different data points together, which is mainly used in 
transaction data. A common example is a recommendation system.  
Unsupervised learning algorithms thus try to find hidden underlying structures in data 
sets and use these structures for sorting out data points. Because unsupervised learning 
requires an even larger amount of data than what is necessary for supervised learning, and 
because there is no way to measure its reliability, it is more difficult to apply this technique 
in practice and it is thus not yet as widely used. Currently, the main examples of 
unsupervised learning are recommendation systems used in online shops and on social 
media.  
1.3.3 Reinforcement learning 
Reinforcement learning is yet another technique that is unique in its use of “reward” and 
“punishment” or, in computer science terms, using “delayed consequences” and 
“exploration.” Delayed consequences mean that the ramifications of separate actions are 
not immediately marked as right or wrong. Instead, they are assessed after a series of 
actions that together led to a successful or unsuccessful outcome. This way, a 
reinforcement learning algorithm learns to recognize not only the correct single action 
but also the correct patterns of multiple actions.  
Exploration means that, in the case of reinforcement learning, the learning process 
should resemble how a child achieves new skills. A reinforcement learning algorithm 
therefore is only fed with a large data set, through which the algorithm has to find out for 
itself which outcome is right and which one is wrong. An example of this is how a 
Chapter 1 
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reinforcement learning algorithm taught itself to play the Atari game “Pong” where one 
needs to destroy a brick wall with a ball and a bat. As the system was not taught anything 
by its developers, the learning algorithm first had to find out what the ball and the bat 
were for and initially made many mistakes. Yet, over time, the algorithm improved and 
eventually found unique ways to remove as many bricks as possible with a single hit 
(Wooldridge, 2020).  
The advantage of reinforcement learning over the other two machine learning methods 
is that it does not only learn the things that humans already demonstrated or prepared, as 
is most specifically the case in supervised learning. As such, reinforcement learning 
algorithms are promised to ultimately learn to perform certain tasks better than humans, 
which holds great promise for the future of AI. However, mainly due to the high margin 
of error at the start of its learning process, reinforcement learning algorithms are currently 
rarely used.  
1.3.4 Generalization, optimization, and datafication 
While the techniques, objectives, and tasks for which learning algorithms are developed 
can thus vary greatly, they all coincide around the overarching machine learning aims of 
generalization and optimization (e.g., Thomas et al., 2020). Because it is impossible to 
capture all cases or examples of a specific topic for an algorithm to learn from, 
generalization is the objective to solve new problems based on generic information. 
Optimization is the aim to make AI systems perform tasks to the highest standards 
possible, thereby making the best decisions or predictions with the (generic) information 
available. Together, generalization and optimization form a Perpetuum mobile when it 
comes to data collection and use; the more data is available, the better a learning algorithm 
will be at generalizing and the more optimal the decisions or predictions will be. As such, 
datafication – the constant tracking, monitoring, and registering of behavior (Newell & 
Marabelli, 2015) – has become the core practice associated with the development and use 
of AI systems (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014; Davenport & Harris, 2017; Zuboff, 2019).  
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1.4 AI as an emerging organizational phenomenon 
 
In recent years, we have seen large-scale digitization and datafication of organizational 
processes (e.g., Faraj et al., 2018; Günther et al., 2017; Hartmann & Henkel, 2020; O’neil, 
2016; Von Krogh, 2018). It therefore comes as no surprise that AI systems are now 
increasingly developed for, and implemented in organizations. For organizations, it is 
specifically interesting to deploy AI systems, as the decisions and predictions – or 
“machine learning knowledge” – that are generated through learning algorithms are 
promised to be more objective, efficient, and new (Van den Broek et al., 2021). Compared 
to human experts, the data that is used for training learning algorithms is supposed to be 
‘raw’ and to represent reality in a more holistic and objective manner (Anderson, 2008; 
Agrawal et al., 2018; Cukier & Mayer-Schönberger, 2013; Jones, 2019; Kitchin, 2014; Siegel, 
2016). AI systems can go through extremely vast amounts of data in an unprecedented 
manner, which arguably makes them more efficient (Domingos, 2015; Schildt, 2017). And 
since learning algorithms can autonomously generate connections between data points 
using advanced computational techniques, machine learning knowledge is argued to be 
new, or different from human expertise (Beck et al., 2011; Bonde Thylstrup, Flyverbom, & 
Helles, 2019; Henriksen & Bechmann, 2020; Leavitt et al., 2020). Because of the promised 
objectivity, efficiency, and novelty of machine learning knowledge, organizations 
increasingly adopt AI systems expecting a variety of opportunities not only in terms of 
productivity, and cost reduction (Newell & Marabelli, 2015), but also in terms of consistent 
decision-making and the ability to overcome many of the human limitations in knowledge 
work (Agarwal & Dhar, 2014; Agrawal et al., 2018; Barrett & Oborn, 2013; Davenport & 
Kirby, 2016; Domingos, 2015; Feigenbaum & McCorduck, 1984; Lebovitz, Levina, & 
Lifshitz-Assaf, 2021; Mitchell, Michalski, & Carbonell, 1986; Van den Broek et al., 2021; 
Zarsky, 2016). 
Several studies that adopted this perspective on the use of AI systems for acquiring new 
knowledge have indicated its potential for radically transforming work processes by 
visualizing and predicting specific patterns (e.g., Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014; Cantwell 
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Smith, 2019; Davenport, 2018; Shestakofsky, 2017). For example, some researchers argue 
that by using AI systems, underlying assumptions about work that impact the performance 
of an organization can be brought to the fore, which can benefit the objectivity of 
organizational processes (e.g., Nikolaidis & Shah, 2012; Sachon & Boquet, 2017; Shah et al., 
2011). These studies highlight the opportunities for organizations to deploy AI systems for 
knowledge acquisition and learning (Balasubramanian et al., 2020). Yet, not everyone 
agrees with this perspective, as an increasing number of organizational and information 
systems scholars voice critiques regarding the possible consequences of machine learning 
knowledge for work and organizing (e.g., Faraj et al., 2018; Kellogg, Valentine, & Christin, 
2020). 
As discussed above, using AI systems to generate new machine learning knowledge 
requires large amounts of data. Accordingly, deploying AI systems leads to the need and 
legitimacy to increasingly turn work processes and activities into numbers (e.g., Pachidi et 
al., 2020). While this can lead to better insights into who or what is of value to 
organizations, it also puts workers under increased organizational control (e.g., Ananny, 
2016; boyd & Crawford, 2012; Kellogg et al., 2020; Orlikowski & Scott, 2016). An example 
of the disrupted balance between professional freedom and organizational control can be 
found at Amazon, where employees were assessed by how much time they spent between 
finding a package in the warehouse and shipping it, which limited their freedom of 
movement to such an extent that some employees were afraid to take bathroom breaks. 
Scholars point out that not maintaining a balance between professional freedom and 
organizational control can lead to workarounds in such a way that the collected data does 
not even reflect reality anymore (Christin, 2020; Pachidi et al., 2020). Think, for example, 
of journalists tactically uploading “quick-and-dirty” articles to enhance their publication 
score (Christin, 2020) or sales employees registering what they think management expects 
from them regarding sales numbers (Cunha & Carugati, 2018).  
Other studies emphasize the decisions that need to be made for data collection and how 
they determine what ultimately ends up in data sets used for training learning algorithms 
(e.g., Barocas & Selbst, 2016; Gitelman, 2013; Pine & Liboiron, 2015). For example, if data 
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is collected using the existing work protocols, it will not become visible whether this 
protocol works or not or how often employees deviate from it. Pine and Liboiron (2015) 
studied how, in a medical setting, such a protocol does not represent reality, as medical 
personnel often perform treatment activities in a different order than how they are 
reported in the data system. Not only do data sets therefore lack a lot of the contextual 
knowledge that is embedded in work practices, but it is also even argued that the need to 
follow rigid systems when performing reporting work can affect the creativity and 
flexibility of teams (Pine & Mazmanian, 2017).  
Also, not everyone agrees with the objectivity perspective on machine learning 
knowledge (e.g., Christin & Brayne, 2020; Elish & boyd, 2018; O’Neil, 2016). Increasingly, 
researchers emphasize that learning algorithms are not objective entities, but that 
computer scientists encode them with certain views, opinions, and habits (Faraj et al., 2018; 
Introna, 2016; Waardenburg et al., 2021). As a result, a learning algorithm can, for example, 
take on a political orientation that impacts decision-making processes in organizations 
(Introna & Nissenbaum, 2000). This becomes even more problematic as AI systems are 
becoming increasingly opaque or “black-boxed” (Ajunwa, 2020; Burrell, 2016; Faraj et al., 
2018, Pasquale, 2015), meaning that people are often not aware of how learning algorithms 
arrive at insights. As AI systems are able to autonomously create connections between a 
large number of data points, it means that even if full disclosure would be given about the 
data set used to train the learning algorithm, still it would be difficult if not impossible to 
find out how machine learning knowledge was generated (Mittelstadt et al., 2016).  
As such, scholars now emphasize that by deploying AI systems to potentially generate 
more objective, efficient, and even new knowledge, organizations may run the risk of 
missing out on precisely those outliers and contextual details that are necessary to innovate 
or even survive as an organization (Pachidi & Huysman, 2016). Machine learning 
knowledge is said to provide a “narrow” perspective (Wooldridge, 2020) in which 
unexpected success, alternative perspectives, and groundbreaking insights are no longer 
possible. To go beyond such a narrow perspective, Pachidi and Huysman (2016, p. 9) argue 
that: “In order to innovate and to survive in highly volatile environments, organizations 
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also need to apply ‘technologies of foolishness’ (March, 1988), being open to new 
alternatives by employing playfulness, trial and error, and improvisation. Acting 
irrationally can sometimes lead to great outcomes for the organization. The organization 
needs to have some Don Quixote’s, the people who seem crazy by deviating from the 
expected behavior and remaining open to unexpected consequences (March & Weill, 2009) 
… Not only should organizations reduce their high expectations regarding what [AI 
systems] bring to organizational intelligence, it would be smart to include technologies of 
foolishness when engaging in learning.” In line with this, organizational and information 
systems scholars have started calling for the need to combine machine learning knowledge 
with human expertise, thereby creating new types of “hybrid intelligence” (e.g., Ebel et al., 
2021; Graef et al., 2020; Mirbabaie, Stieglitz, & Frick, 2021). 
1.5 Towards “hybrid intelligence”? 
 
Recent studies have referred to, for example, “metahuman systems” (Lyytinen, Nickerson, 
& King, 2020), “human-machine collaboration” (Graef et al., 2020), “mutual learning” (Van 
den Broek et al., 2021), “digital/human work configurations” (Baptista et al., 2020), and 
“human-in-the-loop” (Grønsund & Aanestad, 2020) to describe the coming together of 
machine learning knowledge and human expertise. The idea of hybrid intelligence resides 
in the field of simulation and modeling, where humans traditionally provided feedback on 
the performance of models with the aim to improve them (Grønsund & Aanestad, 2020; 
Sheridan, 1995). With the emergence of AI systems in organizations, the understanding of 
hybrid intelligence changed slightly to include the interaction between humans and 
learning algorithms to create knowledge that cannot be produced by technology or 
humans alone (e.g., Ebel et al., 2021; Gal, Jensen, & Stein, 2020; Glaser, Pollock, & 
D’Adderio, 2020; Graef et al., 2020; Mirbabaie et al., 2021). While this seems like an 
interesting way to find the “best of both worlds,” looking closely at the nature of human 
knowledge versus machine learning knowledge brings to the fore that combining these 
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two might lead to new organizational challenges, which as of yet have been largely left 
unaddressed.  
Organizational research commonly includes three premises about human knowledge: 
(1) human knowledge is socially and materially constructed, (2) human knowledge is 
situated, and (3) human knowledge is relational, i.e., it is shaped by the need to 
communicate knowledge across boundaries. The sociomaterial perspective on knowledge 
production implies how “the social and material are inherently inseparable” (Orlikowski 
& Scott, 2008, p. 456). Human and material agents are viewed as intertwined and brought 
about through their relations towards each other (Introna, 2011; Orlikowski, 2010). 
Knowledge is therefore socially and materially produced in practice (Orlikowski & Scott, 
2008). For example, Scott and Orlikowski (2014) studied how hotel evaluations were 
produced in practice by comparing the AA’s traditional accreditation scheme with the 
online hotel evaluation algorithm “TripAdvisor.” Their analysis showed how meaning and 
matter are intertwined in the production of knowledge about hotels, as the anonymity 
produced through the use of TripAdvisor afforded the customers a voice to share their 
experiences. Human knowledge is also situated, in that it is shaped by occupational 
structures and expertise, with their own standards of excellence, social relations, and 
identities (e.g., Anthony, 2018; Van Maanen & Barley, 1984). Finally, human knowledge is 
relational, as achieving interdependent knowledge-related tasks depends on integrating 
expertise across organizational boundaries (e.g., Barbour, Treem, & Kolar, 2017; Barley, 
2015; Brown & Duguid, 2001; Faraj & Sproull, 2000; Faraj & Xiao, 2006).  
In contrast, as discussed above, machine learning knowledge is produced by learning 
algorithms that autonomously generate connections between a large number of data 
points. To understand how machine learning knowledge differs from human reasoning, 
Burrell (2016, p. 9) provides a useful example of a spam filter: “Humans likely recognize 
and evaluate spam according to genre: the phishing scam, the Nigerian 419 email, the 
Viagra sales pitch. By contrast, the ‘bag of words’ approach [i.e., machine learning] breaks 
down texts into atomistic collections of units, words whose ordering is irrelevant.” While 
humans thus interpret emails through a sociomaterial, situated, and relational perspective 
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to assess if it is spam or not, learning algorithms use words that are disconnected from 
their context (e.g., click, dollar, price) to determine whether an email is spam based on the 
aggregate of the weights of all the words together (Burrell, 2016).  
With its focus on hybrid intelligence and combining the two types of knowledge, 
organizational and information systems scholars increasingly argue that, beyond 
automation, AI systems can actually augment existing work practices (e.g., Davenport & 
Kirby, 2016; Raisch & Krakowski, 2020). Augmentation is said to work two ways, as when 
organizational actors collaborate closely with learning algorithms, they can complement 
machine learning knowledge with unique human capabilities – such as intuition, 
emotions, and common-sense reasoning – while AI systems can also complement these 
actors’ domain knowledge by offering previously unknown insights (Daugherty & Wilson, 
2018; Raisch & Krakowski, 2020). Interestingly, those studies arguing for the potential of 
machine learning knowledge to enhance existing work through hybrid forms of 
intelligence seem to overlook the fundamental difference between the procedures used for 
developing machine learning knowledge and how human knowledge is produced. 
However, this inherent difference creates a knowledge boundary (Carlile, 2004), which 
makes it challenging to find common ground for sharing and collectively producing 
knowledge in the first place. Even though the expectations about the possibilities for 
machine learning for organizing are high, organizations thus face new yet unknown 
challenges when implementing machine learning knowledge. Therefore, the overarching 
research question of this dissertation is: How do organizations cope with the production and use 
of machine learning in practice? By taking a holistic and practice-based perspective on the 
implementation of machine learning in organizations, I address recent calls for research 
that unpacks the unique nature of AI systems and how this prompts organizational change 
(Bailey & Barley, 2019; Christin & Brayne, 2020; Faraj et al., 2018; Glaser et al., 2020; 




1.6 Using ethnography to study AI at work 
 
For the longest time, AI was a topic to be studied in computer science or operations 
research and humans were the focus of organization and management studies (Rahwan et 
al., 2019; Raisch & Krakowski, 2020; Simon, 1987). This is in line with a broader divide in 
organizational literature between either a focus on technology development and or 
understanding organizational change (Faraj & Pachidi, 2021; Leonardi & Barley, 2010). In 
this dissertation, I have intended to bridge the divide between technology and organizing 
by taking a long-term, “deep dive” into one organization to understand every facet of the 
technology, as well as the organization. Being convinced that “it takes richness to grasp 
richness” (Weick, 2007, p. 16), my ethnographic research approach could be called “slow 
research,” taking time to gain a lived experience not only of organizational life but also of 
the role of technology in it.  
1.6.1 Behind the scenes of predictive policing at the Dutch National Police  
For this dissertation, I performed three years of ethnographic work at the Dutch National 
Police to understand the influence of an AI system to predict where and when crimes were 
most likely to occur on police work and organizing. From my first interactions in 2016 
with the data scientist who was the main developer of the “Crime Anticipation System” 
(CAS), I was fascinated by the police’s intention to predict crime and its potential 
consequences for police work and organizing. However, gaining full-time, unrestricted 
access to join police officers in the street turned out to be challenging, so I decided to first 
start my observations inside the police station, at the intelligence department of a large 




Figure 1.1 At the intelligence department  
 
(Left: daily view - Right: joining a team building exercise) 
 
I selected the intelligence department because I was told that the so-called “intelligence 
officers” working there were the only ones who directly interacted with the machine 
learning knowledge generated by the AI system. I was intrigued by this role and decided 
that this could be an interesting group to study. I could not have made a better decision, 
as the intelligence officers turned out to play a key role in the use of crime predictions by 
the police. In the end, I stayed at the intelligence department for about two years, closely 
following how their work and status changed over time in relation to the AI system. I saw 
how they continued to struggle with understanding the machine learning knowledge 
generated by the AI system, which became a core theme in Study 2 in this dissertation, 
which is dedicated to the intelligence officers’ work as “algorithmic brokers.” Joining the 
intelligence department for such a long time allowed me to gain a full “lived experience” 
of intelligence work, with its associated struggles but also its unique group dynamics. Being 
part of a police department for such a long time also gave me the opportunity to gain a 
deep understanding of the daily organizing of the police, with all its associated 
abbreviations and unique features (I will never forget the first time I joined a meeting with 
police officers coming in armed). At the same time, my time at the intelligence department 
gave me the opportunity to continue my interactions with the data scientists, through 
which I learned about the details of the AI system itself.  
During the two years with the intelligence officers, I also managed to negotiate access 
to about a year of unrestricted, full-time participant observations with police officers at 
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the emergency response department of the same police station (see Figure 1.2). This gave 
me a unique experience of what it means to be a police officer, especially in a time when 
data and AI systems are becoming increasingly important. Quickly nicknaming me “the 
professor,” the police officers took me in as one of their colleagues, often giving me tasks 
such as guarding roadblocks after accidents or logging police activities. During my time at 
the emergency response department, I have seen more than one normally experiences in a 
lifetime, I have laughed and cried and everything in-between, but I have also been utterly 
bored at the extreme amount of time that police officers have to spend behind their 
computer to make the data that can be used to further develop AI systems. Experiencing 
this unexpected yet extreme difference between the often adrenaline-filled street work and 
the long and tiresome hours behind the computer triggered me to explore the role of data 
work in police officers’ daily situated work, which I describe in Study 1 of this dissertation.  
Figure 1.2 At the emergency response department 
 
1.6.2 Why ethnography as a method to study AI at work is important  
Ethnography is a particularly useful method for bridging the gap between technology 
development and organizational change that is currently still prevalent in organizational 
literature. Being present in the field for an extended period of time, in my case years, allows 
researchers to uncover the longitudinal process of development and change, both on the 
side of the technology as well as on the side of the organization. As AI systems are currently 
in the spotlight, many organizations appear to engage with this technology in one way or 
another. Yet, not much is known about the organizational processes and practices required 
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to make AI systems work in practice. Uncovering these practices is even further 
complicated by the fact that AI systems depend on large amounts of data, often from a 
variety of sources, and use complex computational methods to arrive at insights, which 
makes these learning algorithms opaque or “black-boxed.” Understanding AI systems and 
their consequences for work and organizing therefore requires long-term embedded 
research.  
Entering an organization to look “behind the scenes” of these AI systems and into the 
social and material work practices involved in making AI work allows researchers to 
uncover alternative views and unexpected consequences. Moreover, by being fully 
embedded in an organization, researchers can gain a holistic perspective on the various 
actors involved in the development, implementation, and use of AI. This also helps 
researchers to develop deep knowledge about the various angles from which AI systems 
can be approached (for example, in my case, the data scientists had a fundamentally 
different idea of crime than the police officers). Understanding these different angles can 
also help to understand the epistemic differences or “clashes” (Pachidi et al., 2021) that 
emerge when technologies such as AI systems are implemented in organizations.  
1.6.3 Why ethnography as a method to study AI at work is challenging 
While I argue that ethnography is an extremely important method for studying AI at work, 
it also comes with its challenges. Using ethnographic methods to understand technology 
and work requires one to not only be fully embedded in the work domain of technology 
users but to also unpack in detail the features of the technology studied. This means that, 
as a researcher, you need to understand multiple worlds; you need to develop knowledge 
about statistics and data science and about the user domain. As these topics are already 
challenging on their own, performing ethnography of technology at work requires an 
extreme engagement and enthusiasm of the researcher to uncover as many technology-
related and work-related details as possible. Yet, uncovering such details leads to a 
challenge on its own, as this is not always appreciated by organizations. As developing and 
using machine learning knowledge by means of AI systems is still a sensitive topic, not 
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every organization is willing to open its doors to a researcher to uncover what happens 
behind the scenes of AI at work. A deep ethnography of AI at work therefore depends on 
the stamina of the researcher, as well as the openness of the organization.  
1.7 Dissertation outline 
 
To answer my overarching research question “How do organizations cope with the 
production and use of machine learning in practice?” I performed three studies with 
specific sub-research questions. These studies are presented in Chapters 2, 3, and 4. In 
Chapter 5, I take a holistic perspective on the insights derived from the three studies and 
discuss the theoretical and practical implications and directions for future research. Table 
1.1 provides the outline of this dissertation and the outlets in which each study has been 
peer-reviewed and presented.  
1.7.1 Chapter 2: The burden of data production  
Understanding the influence of data work on existing work practices. This study is based 
on the final part of my ethnographic research at the Dutch police, as described above. Even 
though this is the last part of my empirical work, the topic I studied relates to the core 
feature of AI systems: data. As the making of data becomes increasingly important in 
organizations for developing and training AI systems, I ask what happens when workers 
are facing the need to embed such “data work” practices in their existing, situated work. 
By comparing the police officers’ experience of data work and the characteristics of their 
situated work, three data work tensions emerge. Interestingly, in this study I show that 
police officers cope with these tensions by anticipating the data work and adopting three 
strategies in their situated work: avoiding work, deviating from protocol, and capturing 
experiences. While these strategies helped the police officers to alleviate the burden of data 
production they experienced on a daily basis; they had a large influence on how police 
officers performed their situated work. As a consequence, what and how crimes were 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































1.7.2 Chapter 3: In the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king 
Understanding how machine learning knowledge is translated in practice. The second 
study presented in this dissertation builds on my two years of fieldwork at the intelligence 
department. In this study, I unpack two more features of AI systems: their opaque nature 
and the ability to produce new knowledge. With this study, I offer one of the first 
empirical accounts of algorithmic knowledge brokers and ask how such brokers can 
translate machine learning knowledge when they cannot understand how the knowledge 
is generated. In this study, I find that as these knowledge brokers try to understand 
machine learning knowledge to translate it to the user domain, they enact different 
translation practices over time and perform increasingly influential brokerage roles, i.e., 
messenger, interpreter, and curator. At the end, when the brokers come to the conclusion 
that they can never understand how machine learning knowledge is generated, they act 
like “kings in the land of the blind” and substitute the algorithmic predictions with their 
own judgments.  
1.7.3 Chapter 4: Organizing for AI at work  
Understanding the organizing efforts of implementing AI. In the third study of this 
dissertation, I build on the three unique features of AI systems that I unpacked in the first 
two studies, i.e., their dependence on large amounts of data, their ability to self-learn 
which limits their explainability, and the capability to generate alternative, pattern-based 
insights. I use unique insights from five different cases across different industries to ask 
how the “implementation line” can be crossed in the case of AI, in which technology 
development and organizational deployment are often worlds apart. I identify three 
different AI implementation practices – i.e., organizing for data, organizing for 
explainability, and organizing for new insights. I return to the notion of “hybrid 
intelligence” by showing how, through these implementation practices, developers and 
organizational actors are required to engage in continuous and reflective “collaborative 




1.8 Contributions of this dissertation 
 
This dissertation as a whole contributes to the discussion on the production and use of 
knowledge that has been core to the field of organization theory for decades. By taking a 
practice perspective, I unpack how new, machine-based knowledge is developed, 
implemented, and used in practice and with what consequences for work and organizing. 
Moreover, by including and theorizing the specific features of AI systems and their 
relation to organizing, this dissertation responds to the call to bridge the divide between 
technology development and organizational change that has traditionally informed 
organizational scholarship (Faraj & Pachidi, 2021; Leonardi & Barley, 2010). Also, this 
dissertation links to the field of information systems by going beyond the “AI hype” to 
unpack the challenges that emerge when organizing for machine learning knowledge in 
practice (e.g., Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014; Cantwell Smith, 2019; Davenport, 2018; 
Shestakofsky, 2017).  
In addition to the overall theoretical contributions of this dissertation, each study also 
contributes to specific theoretical debates. Chapter 2 contributes to current debates on 
data production (e.g., Cunha & Cargugati, 2018; Pine & Bossen, 2020; Sachs, 2020) by 
arguing that the need to perform data work can fundamentally alter other, more situated 
work. Chapter 3 contributes to perspectives on the translation of knowledge (e.g., Carlile, 
2004; Røvik, 2016) by emphasizing the importance of understanding how knowledge is 
produced to perform translation work. Also, Chapter 3 adds to our current understanding 
of knowledge brokers (e.g., Barley, 1996; Brown & Duguid, 1998) by showing that, in 
contrast to what is commonly assumed, their work can be highly influential and 
consequential. Chapter 4 contributes to the literature on the relationship between 
technology and organizing (e.g., Faraj & Pachidi, 2021; Leonardi, 2009; Zammuto et al., 
2007) by taking a holistic perspective on AI system implementation. Also, Chapter 4 
includes a plea for organizational and information systems scholars to take an embedded, 
long-term approach to study technology and organizing.  
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Finally, this dissertation also has practical implications. I urge managers to let go of the 
“AI hype” and instead consider AI implementation as effortful, skillful, and requiring 
long-term involvement. As this dissertation emphasizes, AI systems cannot be bought “off 
the shelf” but require careful, tailored development and deep organizational involvement. 
AI systems can therefore not be considered as a quick and easy solution to large amounts 
of data, nor as crystal balls that will magically lead organizations to new insights. Instead, 
long-term and direct involvement will provide managers with behind-the-scenes 
knowledge about the skills and efforts required for successfully producing and using 
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2. The burden of data production 







Organizational research on data production often aims to unpack the nature and meaning 
of data and the work practices through which it is made. Yet, not much is known about 
how the growing need to produce data influences the performance of other, more situated 
work. Our three-year ethnographic study of the Dutch police unravels this issue and shows 
that police officers adopt three strategies to cope with anticipated data work in their 
situated practices: avoiding work, deviating from protocol, and capturing experiences. 
These strategies helped police officers to alleviate the burden of data production, but also 
influenced how they performed their situated work and what and how crimes were 
reported, which contrasted the aims of data-driven police work. Our findings have 
implications for existing research on data production and for studies on anticipatory work 
by arguing that data construction starts at the situated practices and by showing how 
anticipating the work needed to produce data influences how both situated and data work 
are performed.  
 
Keywords: data work, data production, anticipation, anticipatory work, representation 
work  




“[B]efore you arrive at the scene, you are actually already dealing with the call and 
writing your report in your head.” (Interview with police officer Misha) 
 
Everyday work life is becoming more and more datafied. Given the growing importance 
and influence of data in organizations, information systems and organizational scholars 
increasingly focus their attention towards its consequences for work and organizing by, 
for example, questioning the nature and meaning of data (e.g., boyd & Crawford, 2012; 
Kitchin & Lauriault, 2014) and studying how it is produced (e.g., Pachidi, Berends, Faraj, 
& Huysman, 2020; Pine & Bossen, 2020; Sachs, 2020). Studies on data production reside in 
different fields but generally come to the same conclusion: data is socially and politically 
constructed (e.g., Pine & Liboiron, 2015). For example, Latour and Woolgar (2013 (1979)) 
unraveled how scientists transformed the ‘messy’ process of doing science into an orderly 
representation of seemingly objective and indisputable scientific facts.  
One of the most recent subfields in the literature on data construction is focused on 
“data work,” i.e., the specific practices workers engage in to produce data (e.g., Bossen et 
al., 2016; Cunha & Cargugati, 2018; Gray & Suri, 2019; Kellogg, Valentine, & Christin, 2020; 
Kittur et al., 2013; Pine & Bossen, 2020; Sachs, 2020; Truelove, 2019). For example, Pine 
(2019) examined the decisions and efforts that “medical records coders” and “birth 
certificate clerks” put into creating administrative medical data. These studies have 
provided very important first steps to understand the work practices that are involved in 
making data. However, because they have mostly been motivated to unpack the 
construction of data and how this leads to misrepresentation and misalignments with 
‘reality,’ how the growing need to produce data influences the performance of more 
situated work is not yet fully understood. This becomes especially interesting when 
workers produce data about their own activities, such as sales employees reporting their 
sales performance, doctors and nurses keeping electronic health records, or police officers 
reporting their responses to crime events. In the case of such self-reporting, workers are 
not only producers, but also subjects of data, which leads to a direct connection between 
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data work and the performance of situated practices. To better understand this 
relationship, we ask: How do workers cope with data work in their situated practices?  
To answer this question, we build on three years of fieldwork at the Dutch police, 
specifically using insights from eight months of full-time research at the police emergency 
department of a large Dutch city (between September 2018 and April 2019). The first 
author spent over 100 shifts (day, evening, and night) following how police officers went 
about their work. By studying the performance of situated work and data work, we found 
that, instead of ‘misrepresenting’ their situated activities in their reports, police officers 
adjusted their situated work to fit the practice of data work. We explain this outcome by 
unpacking how the police officers coped with the tensions they experienced between data 
work and their situated performances. On a daily basis, they experienced the practice of 
data work as bodily constrained, materially rigid, and ethereal, while they experienced 
their situated work as deeply embodied, contextual, and lived. To cope with these tensions, 
the police officers enacted three coping strategies in their situated work: avoiding work, 
deviating from protocol, and capturing experiences. By using these coping strategies, they 
adjusted the situated activities that they subsequently had to record and thereby aligned 
their situated work to reflect the practice of data work. As such, they ex-ante enacted data 
work in their situated practices  
Our findings offer contributions to existing research on data production, and 
specifically data work (Bossen et al., 2016; Cunha & Carugati, 2018; Pachidi et al., 2020; 
Pine & Bossen, 2020; Pine & Liboiron, 2015; Truelove, 2019), and for studies on anticipation 
and anticipatory work (Barley, 2015; Bucher, Schou, & Waldkirch, 2020; Flyverbom & 
Garsten, 2021). We emphasize that, in contrast to how data work has previously been 
understood, constructing data is not a separate activity but is inherently entwined with 
situated work. In addition, we argue that, while current research considers anticipation as 
building upon data, our findings show the importance of anticipation for the construction 
of data. We argue that data work practices go beyond ‘impression management’ and call 
for the importance of including situated work to understand the practice of data work.  
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2.2 Research on data work 
 
Data is generally considered as “information that can be used for reference, analysis, 
calculation, and computer operations” (Christin, 2020, p. 1116). Given the widespread 
development of digital information systems, collecting, storing, and analyzing data has 
become possible for many organizations. As a consequence, data is now central to 
producing knowledge, conducting business, and enacting governance (Kitchin & 
Lauriault, 2014). With this growing pervasiveness of datafication, scholars increasingly 
focus their attention on data and its consequences for work and organizing (e.g., Bietz & 
Lee, 2009; Borgman, 2015; Brayne, 2017; Newell & Marabelli, 2015; Stein et al., 2018). Studies 
taking on this topic show that using data can fundamentally alter situated work practices 
and that people adjust their behavior when they are the ‘subjects’ of datafication (Brayne, 
2017; Christin, 2020). For example, Christin (2020) described how, when using data about 
the popularity of articles, journalists adjust their work and become more similar to each 
other because they focus on pursuing the same topics and headlines and use a similar 
writing style that attracts the highest number of readers.  
The rapid rise of data use in organizations also led scholars to critically reflect on the 
nature and meaning of data. These studies build on the foundations of critical accounting 
studies, which focus on understanding and questioning the nature of accounts or 
representations as a means for recording and managing activities (e.g., Bevan & Hood, 
2006; Hull, 2012; Power, 2021; Quatrone, 2015; Roberts, 1991; Van Maanen & Pentland, 
1994). For example, Roberts (2009) criticized the ideal of transparency in financial 
institutions and explained how the nature of accounts is influenced by individual choices 
(e.g., trying to appear perfect), as well as social norms and environmental characteristics 
(e.g., expectations to be met). Adopting this perspective, critical data scholars argue that 
data is not raw, unbiased, and objective, but instilled with decisions, judgments, and values 
dictating what should be taken into account and what not (e.g., boyd & Crawford, 2012; 
Christin, 2020; Gitelman, 2013; Pine & Liboiron, 2015; Slota, Hoffman, Ribes, & Bowker, 
2020). For example, Kitchin and Lauriault (2014) argued that data is socially constructed 
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by an assemblage of social and material actors directly or indirectly involved in the data 
production process.  
Digging deeper into the social construction of data, recent studies started to unpack 
the work practices involved in constructing and producing data (Bossen et al., 2016; Cunha 
& Carugati, 2018; Pachidi et al., 2020; Pine & Bossen, 2020; Pine & Liboiron, 2015; Truelove, 
2019). Commonly referred to as “data work,” these studies highlight its “effortful, skillful, 
and resource-intensive” nature (Pine & Bossen, 2020, p. 4). For example, Slota et al. (2020) 
studied how data scientists generated datasets and emphasized that data is never ‘out there’ 
for data scientists to use, but has to be actively ‘sought out’ or ‘prospected’ by them. Cunha 
and Carugati (2018) asked what happens when sales employees are responsible for data 
production by reporting their own work. They found that, instead of having the data 
reflect their sales work, these employees engaged in ‘transfiguration work’ to adjust sales 
data to meet managerial demands. Besides, some studies have found new occupations to 
emerge and adopt the specific skills for doing data work (Gray & Suri, 2019; Kellogg et al., 
2020; Kittur et al., 2013; Pine, 2019; Pine & Bossen, 2020; Sachs, 2020). For example, Gray 
and Suri (2019) described how “ghost workers” emerged as a new occupation because of 
the need to review and categorize data to be used in the learning algorithms of companies 
such as Uber.  
Studies on data work have been highly insightful for understanding how new work 
practices emerge when workers are confronted with data-making requirements. Yet, to 
show the consequential nature of such practices, these scholars have mostly been motivated 
to unpack how data work can lead to misalignment between data and ‘reality’ (Cunha & 
Carugati, 2018; Pachidi et al., 2020; Pine & Liboiron, 2015). For example, to return to Cunha 
and Carugati (2018), their study points to the discrepancy that emerges when workers 
adjust the data to fit managerial needs while continuing to perform their established, 
situated work. While these studies have helped us understand that data work is a 
sociomaterial practice yielding flawed representations of work, we have so far left out what 
happens to the situated work practices that are being represented. Adopting a practice 
theory perspective, we argue that when workers are required to produce data about their 
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own activities (e.g., sales employees reporting their sales numbers, doctors keeping 
electronic health records about treatments, or police officers reporting crime events), 
maintaining such a strict divide between data work and situated practices is problematic. 
In fact, in our setting, we saw that data work requires physical, emotional, and cognitive 
efforts that may be in conflict with the situated work that is represented by data work. 
Coping with these misalignments or tensions may have significant consequences, not only 
for what is represented but also for how situated work is performed. However, this has not 
yet been a topic of research. We therefore ask: How do workers cope with data work in their 
situated practices?  
2.3 Anticipating data work 
 
The concept of anticipation is helpful to better understand the potentially problematic 
relationship between data work and situated practices. Anticipation is commonly 
understood as “foreseeing, foreshadowing, or forecasting future events” (Flyverbom & 
Garsten, 2021, p. 2). Recently, Flyverbom and Garsten (2021) have conceptualized 
anticipation as a way of producing knowledge about the future, which has effects on 
organizing. Other scholars have also emphasized this “performative” nature of anticipation 
(Barley, 2015; Loxley, 2007) and focused on how the future could have an active influence 
on the present (Slaughter, 1993). For example, Barley (2015) studied how weather scientists 
adjusted their work practices in anticipation of the kind of knowledge that weather 
forecasters would need from them. As such, the weather scientists changed their work and 
the knowledge they produced. Recent developments in digital technologies, and 
specifically datafication, have triggered renewed scholarly interest in anticipation (Bucher 
et al., 2020; Flyverbom & Garsten, 2021). Some scholars argue that data sources promise to 
generate more objective and new perspectives on the future (Engle Merry 2011; Muller, 
2019), while others take a more critical perspective and claim that data creates the future 
(boyd & Crawford, 2012; O’Neil, 2016). Interestingly, scholars interested in the relationship 
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between data and anticipation take data as a source for producing knowledge about the 
future, but leave out the potential role of anticipation for performing data work itself. 
To fully grasp the performative nature of anticipation in data work, we adopt a practice 
theory perspective. Practice theory originates from scholars in the field of philosophy and 
sociology – such as Bourdieu, Giddens, Foucault, Garfinkel, Latour, Taylor, and Schatzki 
– and is mainly concerned with understanding how practices emerge and change, and their 
intended and unintended consequences (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011). Core to practice 
theory is a focus that goes beyond the individual towards work practices, which are 
considered routinized types of behaviors that are interdependent and mutually 
constitutive (Bradbury & Lichtenstein, 2000; Giddens, 1984; Østerlund & Carlile, 2005; 
Reckwitz, 2002). In other words, “social orders (structures, institutions, routines, etc.) 
cannot be conceived without understanding the role of agency in producing them, and 
similarly, agency cannot be understood “simply” as human action, but rather must be 
understood as always already reconfigured by structural conditions” (Feldman & 
Orlikowski, 2011, p. 1242). Practice theory therefore implies that social orders are never 
static or established, but evolve and change over time (Gherardi, 2006; Reckwitz, 2002).  
Practice theory has been increasingly adopted by information systems scholars to 
understand how technology and work are mutually constitutive and with what 
consequences for organizations (Oborn, Barrett, & Davidson, 2011). Especially the 
technology-in-practice perspective as defined by Orlikowski (2000) – which emphasizes 
that social structures, such as rules, are not embedded in technology but instantiated by 
the activities of people engaging with it – has been largely influential in the information 
systems field (e.g., Azad & King, 2008; Hevner, March, Park, & Ram, 2004; Jasperson, 
Carter, & Zmud, 2005; Sein et al., 2011; Sergeeva, Huysman, Soekijad, & Van den Hooff, 
2017). For example, Sergeeva et al. (2017) used the technology-in-practice perspective to 
study the use of mobile technology in operating rooms and showed how so-called 
‘onlookers’ play an important role in how collective patterns of technology use are 
structured.  
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Recently, scholars have argued that most IS research using a practice lens to study 
technology adopted only a partial definition of practice theory, which is mainly focused 
on the role of human and material agency (e.g., Hindmarsh, Hyland, & Banerjee, 2014; 
Oborn et al., 2011; Sergeeva, Faraj, & Huysman, 2020; Vertesi, 2012). These studies 
emphasize the need for a more holistic perspective on technology in practice, in which 
technology is embedded and interrelated with core elements of a practice that are often 
overlooked, such as bodily strains and emotions (Oborn et al., 2011), and which can have a 
formative effect on how a technology is perceived and used. In other words, recent calls 
for a more holistic perspective on technology in practice leave room to explore the so-
called ‘lived experience’ of technology use, in which we not only look at the direct 
relationship between human action and technology, but include more of how technology 
is experienced in everyday organizational life. Below, we analyze how police officers 
experienced the use of an information system to perform data work as in conflict with 
their everyday situated work and how they coped with this tension by adjusting their 
situated practices to the anticipated data work.  
2.4 Methods 
2.4.1 Data-driven police work 
Being accountable for their actions and decisions in the field is one of the key elements of 
police work. This is specifically prevalent in the administrative work of officers after an 
encounter or incident took place. This ‘administrative burden’ has been part of police 
work for decades (Van Maanen, 1980; Van Maanen & Pentland, 1994). Yet, crime reporting 
has become a specifically labor-intensive and pervasive part of police work in the last two 
decades, given the increasing incorporation of data-driven decision-making into law 
enforcement practices (Brayne, 2017). One of the main reasons for law enforcement to 
embrace data-driven technologies is said to be the implicit assumption that the “rapid and 
efficient flow of information (by technological means) would in itself empower policing” 
(Manning, 2001, p. 84). For example, it could allow the police to gather intelligence through 
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data and visualize patterns of criminality that might otherwise remain hidden from view 
(Ferguson, 2019).  
In the Netherlands, so-called “data-driven policing” was nationally introduced in 2008 
and implemented across all levels of the organization. The implementation of this strategic 
change was the key moment for the increasing importance and formalization of crime 
reporting. Organizational changes included a focus on improving reporting skills of police 
officers by adding this in the initial police training, a formal differentiation between 
strategic and operational information, making operational information available in real-
time to police officers, and establishing formal procedures for analyzing data points which 
otherwise remained unutilized. In the years after 2008, the police paid increasing attention 
to developing and implementing technologies that would facilitate and support data-
driven activities. For example, they merged all local police data into one nationally 
organized database and digitalized the format of police reports, which allowed for the 
quick and easy sharing and retrieval of police data (e.g., police reports, information about 
known suspects across the country). They also hired data scientists for developing systems 
to analyze data (e.g., a learning algorithm for predicting crime). On a departmental level, 
all police officers were equipped with secured smartphones that allowed them to retrieve 
and share information while working ‘on the beat.’ 
A focal consequence of data-driven policing for officers working at the emergency 
response department was that crime reporting (i.e., data work) became more embedded in 
the responsibilities of police officers. When asked about how activities of crime reporting 
had changed, officer Johan reflected: “We’ve always had to report certain crimes, but back 
then [before 2008] we often didn’t report some of them and it was never checked.” As more 
advanced methods for digital reporting became available, police officers’ personal call 
signs became automatically attached to every crime event they were dispatched to. This 
gave police chiefs full insight into whether officers fulfilled their reporting duties and 
reporting became an obligatory and integral part of police daily operations.  
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2.4.2 Data collection 
Our study builds on three years of ethnographic fieldwork with the Dutch police, 
specifically using insights of eight months of full-time research – between September 2018 
and April 2019 – at the police emergency response department of a large Dutch city. Before 
joining the emergency response department, the first author spent nearly two years at the 
intelligence department studying the use of a learning algorithm for crime prediction, 
during which she negotiated eight months of unrestricted and unsupervised access to the 
emergency response department. She spent over 100 shifts (day, evening, and night) 
following how police officers went about their work. Initially, she was surprised to see how 
much time officers spent at their desks, writing crime reports at their computers (i.e., 
performing data work). Our interest in how the act of writing reports influences situated 
work was triggered when we realized that performing data work was not a ‘side job’ for 
police officers, but was deeply embedded in their day-to-day work. The first author 
tracked the exact amount of time spent on data work by keeping track of the officers’ 
activities every 15 minutes. Eventually, she calculated that, across 99 shifts, data work 
counted for approximately 3 out of 9 hours.  
The shifts at the emergency department were divided into morning (07:00 till 16:00), 
afternoon (14:00-23:00), and night (22:00-07:00) shifts. While police officers were heavily 
armed (e.g., they had a gun, pepper spray, and a baton) and wore a recognizable police 
uniform, the first author was not armed and wore her own clothes (except for a transceiver 
with a matching earpiece). Shifts typically comprised around 4–10 police officers and 1 
senior officer acting as the team chief. Police officers mostly worked in teams of 2, moving 
around the city in a recognizable police vehicle. At the start of each shift, the first author 
typically joined two police officers working as a couple whom she shadowed all through 
the 9-hour shift. During patrols, she sat in the back of the car, closely following police 
officers’ activities and their interactions with each other and their environment. When 
called to assist in an event, the first author joined the police officers in every activity. While 
this sometimes resulted in questions from citizens, she was quickly nicknamed “the 
professor” and introduced as such. While always taking into account her safety, all officers 
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allowed her to fully join in every event, due to which she was able to gain a holistic 
experience of police work at the emergency response department.  
The first author took detailed notes of all police officers’ actions, responses, and 
reflections, describing in detail the activities as well as writing down quotes when officers, 
for example, reflected on experiences. This happened outside in the street, ‘inside’ in the 
car, during breaks at the office, and when performing desk work. During desk work, she 
would typically join one of the police officers and closely observe the steps they took to 
report a specific event. She wrote down, for example, how they went about creating and 
submitting a report in the information system, how they described an event, as well as 
what officers said and reflected on while performing desk work. For cross-referencing, the 
first author also gained access to the reports submitted to the database by the officers. This 
resulted in approximately 500 pages of crime reports.  
While the detailed field notes comprise the bulk of the empirical data used for this 
study, the first author also organized 12 in-depth, audio-recorded conversations (lasting 
between 1 and 2 hours) with police officers in which she asked them to reflect on data work 
and their experience of this work in practice. With these conversations, she aimed to get 
a deeper understanding of how performing data work was related to police officers’ 
situated practices and to further unpack the general ‘rules’ associated with working at the 
desk. For example, in 7 of these conversations, police officers were asked to read and reflect 
on a specific crime report (written by another, anonymous officer) to better understand 
how and why crime was reported in that way. Besides, throughout the fieldwork, countless 
informal conversations took place where the first author could ask questions to solicit 
interpretations of specific events or decisions. We summarize each of the data sources in 
Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1 Data sources 






Total: 109 (± 1020 hrs.) 
-!32 (± 300 hrs.) 
-!64 (± 600 hrs.) 
-! 13 (± 120 hrs.) 
Provided rich insight into the daily practices at the emergency 
response department at different times of the day. 
Police street work ± 650 hrs. Provided deep insight into the lived experience of police 
street work. 
Police desk work ± 350 hrs. Provided deep insight into the activities involved in 





12 (± 14 hrs.) Enriched and deepened our understanding of how data work 
was performed and experienced and the ‘rules’ behind this 
work.  
Documents 
Crime reports 237 (± 500 pages)  Allowed for cross-referencing our observations of how police 
situated work was translated into reports.  
2.4.3 Data analysis 
During the full process of data collection, the full author team regularly came together to 
reflect on the observations, ask critical questions, and to suggest connections with related 
literature. During the coding process, the first author took the lead, with the second and 
third author frequently checking in and adding suggestions. The coding process started 
with reading all field notes, leaving potential codes and interesting themes in the margins. 
For this paper, we set out to understand how police officers performed data work and with 
what consequences and, due to the sheer size of the dataset, we decided to focus our coding 
on identifying the different responses and activities related to data work.  
During the first rounds of coding, we found a variety of activities enacted by police 
officers in their street work in relation to data work. For example, coded activities such as 
“being untraceable,” “staying silent,” “not arresting a suspect,” and “trying to find 
alternative solutions.” We saw similarities between these activities and grouped them into 
three main categories: (1) avoiding street-level work, (2) deviating from street-level 
protocol, and (3) capturing street-level experiences. We engaged in further rounds of axial 
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coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1990) and noticed that the practices we identified were related 
to a specific experience of the data work performed. We grouped these three types of 
experiences as: (1) bodily exertion, (2) data categorization, and (3) unknown audiences.  
Using the literature on data work and anticipation then helped us to better understand 
the relationship between the experiences and activities we identified. We realized that the 
three experiences were actually anticipatory triggers for police officers to enact the 
activities we identified, which helped us to term the three activities “coping strategies.” 
Understanding that the three types of experiences were anticipatory triggers also helped 
us identify that these triggers did not exist on their own, but were actually tensions 
between the nature of data work and the nature of the situated work of police officers. We 
grouped these tensions as “bodily constrained vs. embodied,” “materially rigid vs. 
contextual,” and “ethereal vs. lived.” Below, we use the anticipatory triggers and the 
tensions between data work and situated work to explain how police officers cope with 
data work in their situated practices.  
2.5 Findings 
 
Whatever the time of day, police officers typing away at their computers was a common 
observation at the police department. It was so embedded in their work that the officers 
spoke of “outside time” (i.e., responding to crime events) and “inside time” (i.e., reporting 
crime events). During the fieldwork, a 9-hour shift consisted of, on average, 2.5 hours 
responding to events and 3 hours reporting those events (the other hours were typically 
filled with activities such as patrolling). Writing a report was obligatory for officers 
whenever they were dispatched to a crime event by the control center. The control center 
received all initial crime calls. When the control center decided to dispatch a call, they 
created a new crime event in the information system where events had to be reported. The 
callsign of the officers dispatched to the event were automatically added in the 
information system, which they became responsible for the data work. In the information 
system, police chiefs could see which events lacked the necessary reports and could thus 
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keep control over the data work. As such, data work was an obligatory and integral part 
of daily police operations.  
Officers had two options for reporting crimes: they could use their smartphone while 
still 'on the beat' or they could return to the office and use a computer. The smartphone 
offered officers more flexibility, but most of them considered the screen too small to write 
reports and preferred to go back to the office to use a computer. Back at the office, they 
would sit down at one of the computers and log into the secured police environment using 
their callsign and password. The opening screen of the system showed the list of all crime 
events an officer was sent to and for which a report had to be submitted. To start writing 
a report, officers clicked on a call. A new screen opened where they could add general 
characteristics of the event by selecting tags (e.g., type of crime, crime code, location, 
people involved, children involved). After submitting this, another screen opened with an 
overview of all report options (e.g., general description, official description of findings, 
witness statement, declaration). Not all events required the same types of reports. For 
example, a witness statement was not always possible or necessary. Officers had to decide 
themselves what to fill in and what to leave empty.  
Selecting a specific type of report opened yet another screen with a fixed format for 
that type of report. These formats included predetermined categories that could be 
selected from a drop-down menu. For example, when reporting details of victims, drown-
down menus were available for categories such as a person's gender, whether the person 
belonged to a vulnerable or minority group, and types of vulnerable or minority groups. 
Some formats also included “free writing space” where officers could provide more details. 
Yet, officers were taught to use a fixed format for this too, which included seven points: 
“(1) What was the cause? (2) Which actions did you take on the spot? (3) What agreements 
have you made? (4) What still needs to be done? (5) Who approved the description? (6) 
Who is the description transferred to? (7) Did you speak to the person who reported the 
incident?” Though there was some interpretative flexibility in terms of writing styles, most 
reports were structured to answer these points.  
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The structured, rational nature of data work was distinct from the often adrenaline-
filled nature of police street practices. Officers themselves were aware of this distinction 
and frequently expressed this after being involved in crime events. For example, during 
one of the observations, officer Arnold returned to the police station after an adrenaline-
filled emergency that involved a teenager being threatened at knifepoint at a high school. 
Back at the office, Arnold sighed: “Well, that was ten minutes of fun and now a lot of time 
inside [writing reports].” In addition to reflecting on data work after the fact, they also 
actively anticipated data work requirements before and during crime events. As officer 
Misha explained:  
“We start [anticipating reporting work] the moment we receive a call from the 
control center and drive to the given location. During that time, we are actually 
already busy anticipating the message ... So, before you arrive at the scene, you are 
actually already dealing with the call and writing your report in your head. And 
then in that moment, I try to focus on and remember the most important aspects 
of the crime event. Things like the details of the criminal offense.” 
 
Anticipating data work had an important influence on how officers performed their 
street-level work. In what follows, we unpack how police officers experienced data work 
as bodily constrained, materially rigid, and ethereal, and how the police officers enacted 
coping strategies that were consequential for their street-level practices (see Table 2.2). 
2.5.1 Bodily exhaustion and avoiding street-level work  
To officers, data work was an embodied performance, inherently distinct from their 
street-level work. The office could be filled with banter and laughter from officers taking 
a break, but to do data work they had to sit down behind their computers, preferably in 
silence, for prolonged periods and had to put considerable effort into concentrating and 
staying focused on a computer screen that contained small fields (see Figure 2.1). To ban 
surrounding noise some officers put in earphones. Moreover, police officers were 
extensively trained to shoot, but typing was not part of their skillset and typing was 
therefore a bodily exertion for the officers. For example, when officer Arnold was writing 
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“I’m so tired, I only make typos,” he complained. An additionally exerting condition was 
that officers had to perform this already bothersome data work at all times during the day 
and night.  
Figure 2.1 Police officers sitting down to write reports 
 
 
Writing reports was especially experienced as heavy and demanding after incidents that 
included high levels of action and adrenaline. For example, officer Anna explained how 
she, after being involved in a crime where multiple people were murdered, sat down 
behind a computer to do the desk work but ended up spending the first fifteen minutes 
staring blankly at the screen, her hands trembling and unable to focus or to start typing. 
Officer Misha further elaborated on how the bodily exertion of reporting was distinct 
from street-level work:  
“At the moment [of a crime event] you have to do your job. You have to act. You 
have to react. And then, immediately afterward, you have to [sit down and] do the 
typing work to get it into the system. That’s difficult.”  
 
In addition, it was exceptionally difficult that, during most 9-hour shifts, officers had to 
switch between writing reports and doing street-level work multiple times. Because of this, 
officers felt that they were going “from pillar to post,” constantly switching between two 
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modes of work. For example, it was not uncommon for shifts to start with a heavy two-
sided car accident with heavily injured victims. Then, while the officers were working on 
the reports of this case, for a robbery call to come in which required them to immediately 
jump up and rush to the crime location. Then, when back doing data work of now two 
events, for the third call to come in about a dangerous situation including violence. Not 
only was this constant switching physically straining for officers, at the end of the third 
call the stress of still having so much data work would make them nearly run back to their 
desks.  
Unsurprisingly, officers were happiest when they were able to do “a lot of street-level 
work without having to do any reporting” (officer William). However, given that they were 
automatically attached in the database to each crime event they were involved in, doing 
street-level work without having to report was almost impossible. To cope with the bodily 
exertion of data work and the need to constantly switch, officers therefore tried to avoid 
street-level work by signaling ‘unavailable’ with their transceivers. They commonly used the 
numbered buttons on the transceiver to show to the control center whether they were 
available or not. For example, when they were available for crime calls, they pressed the ‘1’ 
button and they had to press ‘4’ when they were unavailable. The status ‘unavailable’ should 
be used, for example, when they had to transport a suspect to the police station, since 
having a suspect in the back of the car meant they could not leave their car to join another 
crime call. It was commonly assumed that, whenever they finished duties that urgently 
hindered their availability, officers should switch back to ‘available’ to be dispatched to 
new crime events. However, anticipating the bodily exertion of data work, officers used 
the ‘unavailable’ status to avoid street-level work. For example, officer Danny explained 
how reporting bicycle theft was an especially exhaustive activity, for that required sitting 
down for many hours at the computer. When, at the end of a night shift, the control center 
would call out for officers available to assist in a case of bicycle theft it would “stay very 
quiet,” meaning that no one would signal available.  
By trying to avoid street-level work to reduce the exertion of reporting, officers created 
stressful and sometimes troublesome situations in the field. For example, during a patrol 
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with officers Joyce and Mary, all officers had their transceivers signaling ‘unavailable’ while 
they were actually driving around and fully available. An emergency call came in and the 
control center asked for available officers but nobody responded. Joyce and Mary were 
also reluctant, as they had already spent a large amount of time they spent at their desk 
during that shift. The control center decided to give a quick description of the emergency 
– a girl was screaming and being pushed into a car by several men – and a broad indication 
of the location, in the hopes to provoke some officers to go there. Joyce and Mary were 
immediately triggered because they were driving in the middle of that area. However, 
suddenly, at least five other police couples reported being available and Joyce and Mary 
were unable to share with the control center that they were very close by. The only thing 
they could do was change their status. Finally, when the control center answered all 
requests, they noticed that Joyce and Mary literally drove past the location of the 
emergency and the control center asked them whether they observed something. They did 
not see anything, since it was dark and they did not know where to look. “Damn it, we 
could have prevented it,” Joyce said disappointed.  
In sum, for police officers, the bodily constraints of data work conflicted with their 
adrenaline-driven situated work. Anticipating the bodily exhaustion of reporting, the 
officers coped with the tension by avoiding crime events (see Table 2.2). 
2.5.2 Data categorization and deviating from street-level protocol 
In performing data work, officers also encountered the material and discursive nature of 
the information system that was used for writing and submitting reports. One of their 
most challenging tasks was to categorize street-level experiences using fixed labels. This 
was especially difficult given the complex and ever-changing nature of their street-level 
work. As officer Misha explained:  
“Every case is different, you know. That’s the tricky part of police work. You can 
never compare cases one to one. Someone who exhibits one type of behavior one 
day might respond very differently tomorrow. Unfortunately, it’s not at all possible 




Officers frequently spent a large amount of time finding ways to fit their unique cases to 
predetermined labels. For example, during one of the observations, officer Jan encountered 
a man sleeping at a train platform, who appeared to have a location ban for that area. The 
man was what they called in police terms “trespassing.” Back at the desk, Jan had trouble 
adding the right label. After fifteen minutes of trying different settings, he still could not 
select the trespassing label and asked a more senior officer (Matt) to help him out. Matt 
looked at his settings and suggested that Jan changed the location of the case to the waiting 
area of the train station (instead of the platform). Finally, Jan was able to label the case 
‘trespassing’.  
Moreover, officers were concerned about the persistence of labels they attached to a 
person or a case. For example, officer Neil explained:  
“The moment someone opposes an arrest and gets labeled ‘resistance perpetrator,’ 
it’s very difficult for that person to get rid of it [the label]. It could be attached to 
that person for a long time, while it could have been a one-time incident because 
that person had a really bad day at the time and literally got out of bed on the 
wrong foot. And then that person could still be confronted with that two years 
later, while he’s actually a good guy.”  
 
Especially when children were involved, attaching a label put a lot of pressure on 
officers. To track child-related incidents they were obliged to add a so-called “safe-at-
home” label to every report involving children. Adding this label automatically alerted 
child safety agencies when submitting the report. However, the officers were convinced 
that not all child-related cases needed such a label and that, once it was used, parents could 
experience unreasonably difficult times. For example, officers Rory and Luke were sent to 
check up on a baby that had been crying for over an hour. Upon arrival, it turned out to 
be a colicky baby and the parents were trying everything they could to comfort the child. 
Yet, because a baby was involved in this case, police protocol was to add the safe-at-home 
label. Still involved in the case at hand, the officers started to visualize what would happen 
if they would label this case accordingly and said that, if one of the neighbors would call 
more often, the parents would have “a mountain of nonsensical reports with safe-at-home 
labels and child protection knocking at their door” (officer Luke).  
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The categorical and persistent nature of reports went against officers’ feeling of justice, 
which was generally based on intuition and empathy for the situation at hand. For 
example, officer Randy empathized with the conditions of a suspect he had just addressed 
for unlawful begging:  
“Someone like that will never be able to integrate again. He was just released from 
prison and had no money, of course, so he was forced to beg. But then he gets yet 
another label. It didn’t seem like he was going to end his life anytime soon, but I 
wouldn’t be surprised if he eventually did out of desperation.”  
 
To cope with the clash between the categorical and homogeneous perspective on crime as 
embedded in the information system and their own feelings of justice based on their lived 
experiences, officers found ways to turn a blind eye on crime events. By doing this, they 
intentionally deviated from street-level protocol, which prescribed that in case of crime a 
suspect should be arrested. This practice was commonly observed in the case of shoplifting. 
If, for example, the suspect was a so-called “first offender” (i.e., had not been registered for 
committing a crime before) and if the costs of the stolen goods were low (e.g., when the 
suspect tried to steal an energy drink and a chocolate bar), officers tried to compromise 
with shop owners to not arrest the suspect but to give them a fine and ban them from the 
shop. This way, officers did not have to label someone a ‘shoplifter’ in a report and they 
would therefore stay out of the database. 
Deviating from protocol to synchronize with their empathy-based feeling of justice was 
not possible in every case, which led officers to experience extreme pressure from having 
to choose between the influence of labels and the situation that demands them to take 
‘official’ police action. For example, officers Robert and Oliver were called to assist at the 
train station where the local security guards were holding a girl who was trying to commit 
suicide by jumping in front of one of the arriving trains. Once there, they found the girl 
to be in such distress that they could not leave her in the hands of the inexperienced local 
guards, for then she might end up indeed taking her life. Robert and Oliver saw no other 
way than to take the girl back to the office and lock her into one of the cells while trying 
to contact a crisis center for people with a mental breakdown. While they acted exactly 
according to one of the fundamental police principles – offer help to those in need – once 
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back at the office, Robert and Oliver experienced heavy social reprimanding by their 
colleagues. They were chastised for bringing the girl into the physical police environment 
and putting her in a cell, which could have serious negative consequences on her already 
volatile mental state. Next to that, they were also scoffed for simultaneously bringing her 
into the ‘virtual’ police environment, since locking her up meant that they would have to 
report it, which meant that the girl would from now on carry a label of having been 
associated with the police while, no matter how worrisome, what she tried to do was not 
criminal.  
In sum, the materially rigid information system conflicted with the police officers’ 
contextual understanding of justice. Anticipating the categorical and persistent nature of 
doing data work, the officers coped with the tension by deviating from street-level 
protocol (see Table 2.2). 
2.5.3 Unknown audiences and capturing street-level experiences 
As reports were submitted to the database, they could travel across a wide variety of 
potentially unknown audiences, which officers experienced to exacerbate the 
accountability of their already highly visible street-level work. For example, officer Bram 
reflected on this as follows:  
“Nowadays, everything has to be visible and explainable, otherwise you’ll get 
investigated. As a result, we as police are now much more focused on the ‘outside 
world’, on how the outside world can perceive us.”  
 
For officers, the main consequence of widespread and potentially unknown audiences of 
reports was that they could unexpectedly be held accountable for their street-level 
behavior. Officer Andrew explained how he almost lost his job when he wrongly 
anticipated the potential audience of a burglary report. He thought he added an 
illustration for exclusive internal use to the report and wrote: “This lady [the victim] comes 
across as unstable.” As he submitted the report, it was automatically forwarded to the 
victim, including the note intended for mere internal use, who filed an official complaint 
against Andrew. 
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Being well aware of their accountability, officers took efforts to capture their lived 
experiences to control whether and how their street-level work would be perceived by 
unknown others. To do this, they augmented their vision and memory with camera 
recording capabilities that could replicate and capture at least part of their experiences in 
more detailed ways than by just writing reports. Specifically, officers adopted bodycams – 
which were provided to them by their department but were not mandatory to use – to 
record their street-level work. Bodycams were small, rectangular devices attached to the 
front of the police uniform, around the chest area (see Figure 2.2). It consisted of one lens 
that captured all that happened in front of the officer. When used, the bodycam was 
continuously recording but did not save the recorded footage unless officers pressed the 
‘save’ button at the front of the device. When pressed, audio and visual data were saved 
from 30 seconds before the starting time until the button was pressed again. Officers were 
convinced that using a bodycam provided an additional account to their lived experience, 
which they could not offer when being fully occupied with acting in the moment. For 
example, bodycams could capture the time it took to act or respond and it could bring 
into view what they saw and heard at the time. This made officers feel like bodycam 
footage gave them “100% believability” (Misha). “Don’t underestimate the value of a 
bodycam,” officer Misha said, “it makes portraying details and getting the message across 
so much easier.”  
Figure 2.2 Example of a bodycam worn by officers8 
 
One of the most pressing examples of how officers used a bodycam to capture their 
embodied experience happened in the second week of our fieldwork, which allowed us to 
 
8 By Sanderflight - Own work, CC BY-SA 4.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=76206520 
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trace how the reports traveled across (unexpected) audiences over time. On a Monday 
afternoon, officer Jack, together with about six other colleagues, was sent to a man who 
appeared to be in a psychosis. Once there, the first thing Jack did was switch on his 
bodycam. He later explained that pushing the ‘save’ button was common practice:  
“Using the bodycam was a matter of conditioning. I pushed that button every time 
I got out of the car. It was routine for me to press it. I didn’t know at all that I was 
getting into this situation. I just always pressed it.”  
 
Indeed, little did Jack know that about 15 minutes later he would shoot the man in an act 
of self-defense, for the man threatened to stab him with a kitchen knife. 
In the year after this incident, the reports reached a variety of audience groups and the 
bodycam footage played a key role in how the case was perceived. First, before being 
allowed to continue doing street-level work, Jack was obliged to hand in his gun and 
undergo an internal investigation of whether his behavior was rational during the incident. 
Having the bodycam footage ready-at-hand, which portrayed Jack’s decisions in the heat 
of the incident, helped the criminal investigation department to quickly reach a decision 
and to return the gun to Jack. Second, Jack’s immediate colleagues, who were not involved 
in the incident, were interested to learn from the incident. In addition to having access to 
the reports, Jack showed them the bodycam footage. Third, Jack was subjected to a judicial 
investigation, which involved judges and lawyers, to determine whether he had lawfully 
shot the person. The case turned out to be complicated, because the person was not moving 
towards Jack when he was shot. In previous cases, this was not considered self-defense. In 
this case, the bodycam footage was decisive for the final verdict that Jack was acting out 
of self-defense, for the detailed images showed that Jack had no other choice than to shoot. 
Fourth, the person who was shot also accessed the reports and bodycam footage. This 
resulted in the person requesting a meeting with Jack to apologize for his actions. Finally, 
since shootings were extreme events and this case had an unprecedented verdict, the case 
with its reports and bodycam footage became part of the curriculum for new police 
recruits, in which specific attention was paid to the importance of capturing street-level 
experiences by using bodycams. 
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Using a bodycam to capture lived experiences for a variety of audiences created a 
previously unknown level of transparency in police work, which had both positive and 
negative consequences for police accountability. For example, in the case of the shooting, 
having bodycam footage had a positive outcome for officer Jack, but there was a downside 
to it too, as the details of the recording were the sole reason why the case was brought to 
court in the first place. In the heat of the moment, the officers had been so absorbed with 
the threatening situation that no one had noticed that the person was actually not moving 
towards them with the knife. It was only when watching the recording that they realized 
this. Jack explained: “In hindsight, if I wouldn’t have had the bodycam footage, nobody 
would have ever said that the person I shot was not moving forwards.” Moreover, while it 
helped them to bring into view and compensate for what their body could not capture in 
the heat of the moment, officers struggled with the fact that even this ‘bodily’ tool could 
not fully convey their lived experience. As Jack reflected: “Bodycam footage is great, it can 
have a lot of advantages, but it doesn’t show what happens inside the body of the one 
wearing the bodycam.” Using a bodycam to augment their vision and memory, officers 
thus ran the risk of capturing more details without actually conveying their lived 
experience, thereby creating only limited transparency and not solving issues of 
accountability.  
In sum, the ethereal nature of crime reports conflicted with the officers’ lived 
understanding of their work. Anticipating the widespread and potentially unknown 
audience of their data work, the officers coped with the tension by capturing their 






In this paper, we set out to examine how workers cope with data work in their situated 
practices in order to understand how data work influences situated work performance. 
We took as our subject a team of police officers at the emergency response department 
who experienced strong organizational and institutional pressures to record their everyday 
activities and move towards ‘data-driven policing’. Our analysis showed that, instead of 
‘misrepresenting’ activities in reports, police officers adjusted their situated work to fit 
the practice of data work. On a daily basis, they experienced data work as a bodily 
constrained, materially rigid, and ethereal practice, which produced tensions with the 
deeply embodied, contextual, and lived experience of their situated work (see Figure 2.3). 
To cope with these tensions, they enacted three coping strategies in their situated work 
(i.e., avoiding work, deviating from protocol, and capturing experiences). Through these 
coping strategies, they ex-ante enacted data work in their situated practices; they adjusted 
the situated activities that had to be recorded and aligned their situated work to reflect 
the practice of data work.  
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2.6.1 Anticipating data work as a practice  
One of the core findings of the study presented in this paper is that when workers 
experience tensions between their data work and their situated work, they ex-ante adopt 
coping strategies in their situated practices. This insight has implications for our current 
understanding of data work and anticipation.  
Previous studies on data work have looked at the practices involved in the construction 
of data (Cunha & Carugati, 2018; Pachidi et al., 2020; Pine & Bossen, 2020; Pine & Liboiron, 
2015; Truelove, 2019) and have emphasized the new skills that are required for doing data 
work (Gray & Suri, 2019; Kellogg et al., 2020; Kittur et al., 2013; Pine, 2019; Pine & Bossen, 
2020; Sachs, 2020). Our case contributes to these studies by unpacking how doing data 
work also changes situated work practices. We emphasize that, in contrast to how data 
work has previously been understood, it is not a separate activity but is inherently 
entwined with situated work. Moreover, this study shows that workers, in their efforts to 
cope with the tensions between data work and situated work, can create a pattern of action 
in which they reproduce the burden of data work by engaging in coping strategies that 
temporarily alleviate but not fundamentally remove these tensions.  
The insights from this study also contribute to research on the social construction of 
data. Studies in this field have argued that data is not objective but includes the decisions 
and actions of those who make the data (e.g., boyd & Crawford, 2012; Christin, 2020; 
Gitelman, 2013; Kitchin & Lauriault, 2014; Pine & Liboiron, 2015; Slota, Hoffman, Ribes, 
& Bowker, 2020). This case builds on and adds to this perspective and emphasizes that 
social construction not only happens when making data, but that this is already performed 
in the field, before the data is made. This means that, to understand how data is socially 
constructed requires one to look beyond the data work practices, towards a holistic 
perspective on the situated work performance that forms the basis of the data that is made. 
In line with this, this case also contributes to research on anticipation and anticipatory 
work (Barley, 2015; Bucher et al., 2020; Flyverbom & Garsten, 2021) which considers data 
as input for anticipation about the future. Specifically, we emphasize that by ex-ante 
coping with tensions between data work and situated work, workers are creating the data 
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in their situated performances. While we agree that “data may be combined in creative 
ways in anticipatory practices” (Flyverbom & Garsten, 2021, p. 7), our study shows that 
data can also be created in creative ways through anticipatory practices.  
2.6.2 From impression management to anticipating data work 
A second core finding of this study is that workers can anticipate data work in different 
ways, depending on the tensions they experience with their situated work. This insight 
contributes to research on representation practices in data work.  
Previous research on representation in data work has largely focused on what and how 
data represents reality and how this representation does not align with ‘reality’ (Cunha & 
Carugati, 2018; Pachidi et al., 2020; Pine & Liboiron, 2015; Van Maanen, 1980). While not 
directly addressing the anticipatory aspect of data work, these studies address this type of 
work as a kind of ‘impression management’ in which those who perform data work take 
into consideration what the data they report reflects to those who read it. This study builds 
upon and extends this perspective by showing the important role not only of the audience, 
but also of the nature of data work itself for how data is reported. Our case emphasizes 
that performing data work is a constrained activity with consequences beyond creating a 
good but misrepresented impression of oneself, towards changing the situated work.  
In addition, our study contributes to research that uses the foundations of critical 
accounting studies for understanding and questioning the nature of representations (e.g., 
Bevan & Hood, 2006; Hull, 2012; Power, 2021; Quatrone, 2015; Roberts, 1991, 2009; Van 
Maanen & Pentland, 1994). These studies question the current focus on data and numbers 
as a means for representing work and informing management activities. While we share 
the concern presented in these studies that data can fundamentally misrepresent reality, 
our study highlights the performative nature of data work in that, to cope with the 
tensions between data work and situated work, workers can also adjust ‘reality’ in such a 
way that it fits with the data that is being reported. In such instances, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to discern what is ‘real’ and what is not. 
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2.6.3 Practical implications and future research 
Our study has practical implications for managers and workers involved in the making 
and use of data. First, our study shows that implementing data-driven approaches to work 
requires careful consideration and understanding of the situated practices and mapping 
out where and how tensions may appear between the two. This requires managers, or those 
who are responsible for the implementation process, to understand the nature of the work 
that is being datafied. Implementing data-driven approaches thus requires new 
responsibilities on the side of managers to monitor the relationship between data work 
and situated work. This is also important, because increasing attention is paid to the 
problems of data work for domain experts such as doctors. Studies increasingly point at 
the potential of burnouts due to overwhelming data-related activities. To prevent data 
work from becoming a societal problem requires a better alignment between the activities 
of data production and other, more situated work.  
At the same time, implementing data-driven approaches also requires new data-related 
skills on the side of those who make the data to understand the consequences of decisions 
and actions for the data that is being made (and how it is being used afterwards). As our 
study showed, because of the tension between the practice of data work and their situated 
practices, workers are urged to be reflective about the situated work they perform and 
how these activities are ‘translated’ into data. However, this reflection goes one-way and 
does not take into account the consequences for the nature of data. To become a “reflective 
data practitioner,” requires workers to reflect on how their work is translated into data 
and what this means for their situated practices, but also what this means for the data that 
is being made and used (for example, for training learning algorithms to create artificial 
intelligence systems).  
It is also worth noting some boundary conditions to our study. First, we offer a study 
in which the data work to be performed is largely ‘manual.’ While there are different 
contexts in which data work is not yet automated (think, for example, of doctors filling in 
the electronic health records of patients), there are also cases in which dataficiation is 
indeed a largely automated process (e.g., Amazon's shelf workers). As such workers might 
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experience different tensions between their situated work and the data that is being 
produced, it would be interesting for future research to go beyond the ‘self-reporting’ 
nature of data and also include the automated data production in understanding how 
situated work changes. In addition, our more holistic approach to the experience of data 
work in practice offers first insights into the role of the body in data work (e.g., in the 
tension between the exhausting data work and the adrenaline-driven situated work). We 
encourage future research to further explore not only the role of the body but also, for 
example, the role of emotions in data production. Finally, with our case we offer an 
extreme example of the tensions between situated work and data work. There are other 
examples in which the difference between the two are less severe, such as where the data 
work and situated work are performed in the same environment (e.g., customer service 
employees). As the changes in situated work might be more nuanced and may be even 
more difficult to observe, we encourage future studies to also include such contexts in 
understanding the relationship between data production and situated practices.  
2.7 Conclusion 
 
With the growing prevalence of data in everyday work and organizing, data work is 
becoming an increasingly central activity. While previous research on data and data work 
has already emphasized the misrepresentation of work in data and the potential 
misalignment with reality, this study emphasized data work as performative in such a way 
that workers can adjust their ‘reality’ in such a way that it aligns with the practice of data 
work. As such, to deeply grasp the nature of data, our study emphasizes the importance of 
understanding the burden of data production in workers’ every day, situated work 
practices. It is only then that we will see that, sometimes, it is not the data that is adjusted, 
but the reality of everyday work that surrounds it. 
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3. In the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king 










This paper presents research on how knowledge brokers attempt to translate opaque 
machine learning knowledge. The research is based on a 31-month ethnographic study of 
the implementation of a learning algorithm at the Dutch police to predict the occurrence 
of crime incidents and offers one of the first empirical accounts of algorithmic knowledge 
brokers. We studied a group of intelligence officers, who were tasked with brokering 
between machine learning knowledge and domain knowledge by translating the outcomes 
of the learning algorithm to police management. We found that, as knowledge brokers, 
they enacted different translation practices over time and performed increasingly 
influential brokerage roles i.e., messenger, interpreter, curator. We explain this outcome 
by the opaque nature of learning algorithms which hindered the translation from the 
knowledge source to the domain. Triggered by an impassable knowledge boundary 
between the brokers and the machine learning domain, the brokers acted like ‘kings in the 
land of the blind’ and substituted the algorithmic predictions with their own judgments. 
By emphasizing the dynamic and influential nature of algorithmic brokerage work, we 
contribute to the literature on knowledge brokerage and translation in the age of learning 
algorithms.  
 
Keywords: learning algorithms, machine learning knowledge, artificial intelligence, 
knowledge brokerage work, algorithmic brokers, knowledge translation,  
  




From healthcare to recruitment, litigation, and law enforcement, learning algorithms are 
increasingly prevalent in everyday work (e.g., Brayne, 2020; Rezazade Mehrizi et al., 2020; 
Van den Broek et al., 2021; Zhang et al., 2020). By autonomously combining large datasets 
with advanced computational and statistical methods to make connections between data 
points – a process which is called “machine learning” (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2017; 
Burrell, 2016; Davenport, 2018) – learning algorithms generate “machine learning 
knowledge” (Van den Broek et al., 2021). Learning algorithms deserve specific scholarly 
attention, as we cannot rely on the existing understanding of knowledge technologies in 
organizations (Huysman, 2020; Newell, 2015; Pachidi et al., 2020; Von Krogh, 2018). Earlier 
‘rule-based’ technologies, such as expert systems, required developers to manually extract 
expert rules and transform these into code. These systems thus reflected the expert 
knowledge that was coded into them (Forsythe, 1993). In contrast, through machine 
learning, learning algorithms promise to generate more objective, efficient, and new 
knowledge that might even surpass human-generated insights (Leavitt et al., 2020; 
Tshitoyan et al., 2019; Van den Broek et al., 2021). The downside of machine learning is 
that it is difficult for humans to discern how and which connections between data points 
are made, which is often referred to as the “opaque nature” (Burrell, 2016; Christin, 2020) 
or “black box problem” (Ajunwa, 2020; Introna, 2016; Pasquale, 2015) of learning 
algorithms. It is therefore challenging to understand how machine learning knowledge is 
generated.  
The opaque nature of learning algorithms makes trusting and using algorithmic 
predictions in practice problematic (Bader & Kaiser, 2019; Glikson & Woolley, 2020; 
Lebovitz et al., 2019). Recent studies posit that "algorithmic brokers" (Kellogg et al., 2020) 
or "algorithmists" (Gal et al., 2020) could emerge to facilitate the use of these systems by 
translating algorithmic predictions towards users (Henke et al., 2018; Sachs, 2019). Such a 
role resembles what is referred to in organizational theory as “knowledge brokers” (e.g., 
Brown & Duguid, 1998; Meyer, 2010; Pawlowski & Robey, 2004); actors who solve 
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knowledge boundaries between groups by translating knowledge between them (Carlile, 
2004). What we call ‘algorithmic knowledge brokers’ would thus need to translate machine 
learning knowledge towards the user domain. Interestingly, a prerequisite for being able 
to translate knowledge is to have a thorough understanding of the knowledge of both the 
knowledge source and the target domain (Carlile, 2004; Røvik, 2016; Sturdy & Wright, 
2011). For algorithmic knowledge brokers, this means understanding both the machine 
learning domain and the user domain. The opaque nature of learning algorithms then leads 
to a puzzle that goes beyond the current understanding of knowledge brokers, for how do 
knowledge brokers translate machine learning knowledge when they cannot understand 
how this knowledge is generated? 
To answer this question, we offer a 31-month ethnographic study of a Dutch police 
department that implemented predictive policing; the use of a learning algorithm to 
predict where and when a crime is likely to occur. By analyzing the implementation 
process over an extended period, we found that a group of ‘intelligence officers’ enacted 
different translation practices that afforded them to perform increasingly influential 
knowledge brokerage roles (i.e., messenger, interpreter, curator). We explain the change 
in roles by unpacking the knowledge differences that emerged when the intelligence 
officers attempted to translate machine learning knowledge in practice. At first, the 
intelligence officers were unfamiliar with both the learning algorithm as well as the police, 
and their attempts to simply list and transfer algorithmic predictions towards the police 
were unsuccessful. They realized that to perform brokerage work, they needed to better 
understand the technical as well as the domain details. As they tried to understand the 
inner workings of the learning algorithm, they figured that the boundary between machine 
learning knowledge and their human interpretations was impassable. On the other hand, 
due to their efforts to better understand the police domain, the knowledge differences 
between the intelligence officers and the police dissolved. Their brokerage work 
increasingly fitted police requirements, yet they remained unable to open the black-boxed 
learning algorithm, which eventually triggered them to substitute machine learning 
knowledge with their own judgments.  
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Our study offers an integrative perspective on organizational theory and emerging 
technologies and reveals the emergence of a new phenomenon, meaning that of the 
algorithmic knowledge broker with its dynamic and influential nature. Through our 
process perspective on knowledge brokerage work, we offer new insights into the 
literature on knowledge brokers (e.g., Brown & Duguid, 1998; Burgess & Currie, 2013; 
Meyer, 2010; Pawlowski & Robey, 2004). The study shows that the translation practices 
that knowledge brokers enact over time afford them a unique position in which they can 
grow to become increasingly influential. Moreover, this case highlights that knowledge 
brokerage work is more complex than resolving a knowledge boundary between groups 
(e.g., Boari & Riboldazzi, 2014; Carlile, 2004; Dougherty, 1992) as, in their efforts to resolve 
such boundaries, brokers can generate new boundaries between themselves and those 
groups they are intended to connect. In addition, our findings contribute to translation 
theory (e.g., Czarniawska & Sevón, 2005; Mueller & Whittle, 2011; Nielsen et al., 2014; 
Røvik, 2016). While these studies mainly focus on how knowledge is translated to specific 
fields and organizations, we show the importance of unpacking how knowledge is 
translated from its original source and provide insights into what happens to translation 
in the case of opaque machine learning knowledge.  
3.2 Research on knowledge brokers 
 
Knowledge brokers gather and disseminate knowledge and thereby create connections 
between groups with different kinds of tasks, expertise, meanings, status levels, or 
occupational or institutional worlds (Allen, 1977; Barley & Bechky, 1994; Brown & Duguid, 
1998; Burgess & Currie, 2013; Chiambaretto et al., 2019; Evers & Menkhoff, 2004; Haas, 
2015; Howells, 2006; Lomas, 2007; Meyer, 2010; Pawlowski & Robey, 2004; Van Zoonen & 
Sivunen, 2020). Due to their interesting intermediary position between disconnected 
groups, organizational scholars increasingly pay attention to the role of knowledge brokers 
in areas such as engineering (Johri, 2008), science (Barley, 1996; Kissling-Naf, 2009), IT 
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(Pawlowski & Robey, 2004), and recently also regarding emerging technologies such as 
learning algorithms (Kellogg et al., 2020).  
Research on knowledge brokers is a sub-field of the larger brokerage studies (e.g., 
(Appelbaum & Batt, 2014; Burt, 1992; Gould & Fernandez, 1989; Heaphy, 2013; Obstfeld, 
2005; Obstfeld et al., 2014; Stovel & Shaw, 2012) and traditionally resides in the structural 
network approach (e.g., DiMaggio, 1993; Fernandez & Gould, 1994; Gould & Fernandez, 
1989; Leonardi & Bailey, 2017; Obstfeld, 2005; Reagans & McEvily, 2003; Stovel & Shaw, 
2012). Taking this perspective, knowledge brokers are considered to occupy a “structural 
hole” (Burt, 1992) between disconnected actors and benefit from unique access to various 
groups and knowledge sources (DiMaggio, 1993; Fernandez & Gould, 1994). Knowledge 
brokers perform a kind of “boundary work” (e.g., Langley et al., 2019; Soundarajan et al., 
2018) between different groups. They differ, however, from what is commonly known in 
organizational and information systems literature as “boundary spanners” (e.g., Ancona & 
Caldwell, 1992; Levina & Vaast, 2005) in that knowledge brokers do not belong to or come 
from the groups they intend to connect (Gould & Fernandez, 1989; Fleming & 
Waguespack, 2007; Haas, 2015; Meyer, 2010). In performing brokerage work, knowledge 
brokers thus cannot tap on their own knowledge bases but rely on their interactions with 
the groups to establish an understanding of the groups’ knowledge (Brown & Duguid, 1998; 
Haas, 2015).  
Without specifically focusing on knowledge, studies on brokerage work move away from 
the structural network perspective to take a more micro perspective and examine the 
practices of brokering that are aimed to “fill critical gaps in complex networks of relations 
by connecting, buffering, and mediating across multiple organizational and occupational 
boundaries” (Anteby et al., 2016, p. 218). These studies scrutinize the practices through 
which brokers can help two or more groups of actors collaborate, coordinate, or maintain 
institutionalized roles (e.g., Canales, 2011; Edacott & Leonardi, 2020; Fernandez-Mateo, 
2007; Fleming & Waguespack, 2007; Hoffer Gittel, 2002; Obstfeld et al., 2014; Pawlowski 
& Robey, 2004; Sele & Grand, 2016; Wenger, 1999). For example, Lingo and O’Mahony 
(2010) studied brokerage work carried out by country music producers to coordinate the 
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work of various groups of actors (e.g., songwriters, performers, sound engineers) to 
produce a hit song. Studies on brokerage work attribute the emergence of specific 
brokering practices to triggers such as institutional reform or organizational change 
(Barley, 1996; O’Mahony & Bechky, 2008; Hargadon & Sutton, 1997; Heimer & Stevens, 
1997; Huising & Silbey, 2011; Reay et al., 2006; Silbey et al., 2009). These studies emphasize 
how brokerage work emerges when reforms create new tasks that existing groups are 
unwilling or unable to take on. In such cases, brokers can absorb the newly created tasks 
and maintain the stability of the occupational system while simultaneously facilitating 
reform (Obstfeld, 2005). For example, Kellogg (2014) examined how, in the face of 
organizational reform at a hospital, low-status brokers took on tasks that medical 
professionals and lawyers did not consider to be part of their occupational field. In an 
effort to deal with the groups’ unwillingness to collaborate, the brokers enacted buffering 
practices that kept the groups from interacting with each other and thereby maintained 
the occupational system.  
Brokerage work can take many forms – e.g., in a business context a broker can perform 
the tasks of an agent, promoter, or dealer, in politics it can be tasks such as those of a 
mediator or diplomat (Meyer, 2010). In the case of knowledge brokerage, the tasks are 
specifically associated with gathering and disseminating knowledge. Knowledge brokerage 
work can involve many different knowledge-related activities, such as “the identification 
and localization of knowledge, the redistribution and dissemination of knowledge, and 
the rescaling and transformation of knowledge” (Meyer, 2010, p. 120). Yet, what binds these 
activities is that there exists a semantic (or interpretative) boundary regarding, for 
example, words, outcomes, or measurements, which hinders the flow of knowledge 
between the groups that a knowledge broker is intended to connect (Carlile, 2004; 
Dougherty, 1992). Knowledge brokerage work is not needed when knowledge boundaries 
exist on the syntactic or pragmatic level. If the knowledge boundary is syntactic (or 
grammatical), knowledge can be transferred without too much effort and no brokering is 
necessary. If the knowledge boundary is pragmatic (or political), the efforts required to 
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transform knowledge from one group to the next is beyond the limits of brokerage work 
(Carlile, 2004).  
A semantic boundary makes gathering and disseminating knowledge a complex 
endeavor that requires alignment between perspectives through translation practices 
(Barley, 1996; Boari & Riboldazzi, 2014; Grady & Pratt, 2000; Paul & Whittam, 2010; 
Tushman & Katz, 1980; Wenger, 1999). Translation means altering knowledge in such a 
way that it gains a common meaning that can be understood by the receiving party 
(Callon, 1986; Carlile, 2004; Dougherty, 1992; Latour, 1986, 2005; Law, 2002). Translation 
generally consists of two phases (Røvik, 2016). In the first phase, a practice or idea is 
translated from the source domain into more abstract representations, such as words or 
texts, which is also called de-contextualization. In the second phase, the more abstract 
representations are translated to the concrete practices of the target domain, which is also 
referred to as contextualization (Røvik, 2016). When a semantic boundary limits the source 
and target domains to engage in these two phases, translating tasks can be taken up by 
knowledge brokers to continue the knowledge flow (Allen, 1977; Brown & Duguid, 2001; 
Carlile, 2004; Hargadon & Sutton, 1997; Law, 2002; Wenger, 1998).  
To perform translation tasks as a knowledge broker, “contextual bilingualism” (Røvik, 
2016, p. 299) – in other words, comprehensive knowledge of the source and target domains 
(Brown & Duguid, 1998; Carlile, 2004; Shulman, 1987; Sturdy & Wright, 2011) – is 
important. For example, in case of translating knowledge from the source domain, “the 
main challenge is to ensure that the representation contains all the relevant information 
required to explain and understand how the practice functions in the source context” 
(Røvik, 2016, p. 294).9 If you take knowledge out of its original context without having 
enough background knowledge, this can result in incorrect translations. Consider the first 
sentence of Albert Camus’ “L’Étranger”: “Aujourd’hui, maman est morte.” Even though most 
know the English translation to be “Mother died today,” translators who are 
knowledgeable of Camus’ background and the nature of the French language are pointing 
 
9 It is important to note that Røvik (2016) refers to the translation of practices and ideas and does not include machine 
learning knowledge. 
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at the wrong translation of “maman” into “mother” (it should be something like “mom”). 
Moreover, to correctly translate this sentence also requires translators to understand that 
Camus is an existentialist, meaning that time plays a very important role in his worldview. 
Camus thus put “aujourd’hui” purposefully at the start of the sentence. Putting “today” at 
the end of the sentence in the English translation leads to a main emphasis on “mother” 
instead of “time”, which is not what Camus intended to do.10 This example shows the 
importance of translators to be “sufficiently knowledgeable” (Brown & Duguid, 1998) 
about the knowledge source to ensure that one does not get lost in translation.  
For knowledge brokers, who are not members of the source or target domain (Gould & 
Fernandez, 1989; Fleming & Waguespack, 2007; Haas, 2015; Meyer, 2010), understanding 
both can be a challenging task (Brown & Duguid, 1998). Interestingly, despite the growing 
attention of organizational scholars in the role of knowledge brokers for transmitting 
knowledge (e.g., Chiambaretto et al., 2019; Pawlowksi & Robey, 2004), the actual practices 
through which knowledge brokers become knowledgeable of the domains remains largely 
invisible in current research (Barley, 1996; Meyer, 2010; Vogel & Kaghan, 2001). In doing 
so, knowledge brokerage research leaves unexplored how brokers cope with the challenge 
of dealing with different knowledge domains and what this means for performing 
brokerage work. This implies that the prerequisite of understanding both domains for 
performing knowledge brokerage work has largely remained implicit and apparently 
unproblematic. Yet, the recent emergence of learning algorithms – technologies that can 
autonomously generate knowledge (Faraj et al., 2018) – requires us to reconsider and 
further elaborate how knowledge brokers enact translation practices. Learning algorithms 
are known for making knowledge ‘invisible’ and trigger concerns about the inability for 
users to understand how these tools arrive at insights (e.g., Ajunwa, 2020; Burrell, 2016; 
Zhang et al., 2021). To solve these concerns, organizational practitioners and scholars 
suggest introducing a new role that we term ‘algorithmic knowledge brokers,’ who can 
translate the knowledge generated by learning algorithms to the intended users (Gal et al., 





more than any other previous phenomenon, offer insights into what it means for 
knowledge brokerage work when knowledge cannot be understood.  
3.3 Brokering learning algorithms 
 
Learning algorithms are technologies that autonomously generate decisions, 
classifications, or predictions (Faraj et al., 2018). Generally, algorithms contain a series of 
logical steps for performing computational tasks on data (Christin, 2020). In previous, 
‘rule-based’ technologies, such as expert systems, developers had to manually extract steps 
(or rules) from human experts and code them into an algorithm. Thereby, rule-based 
systems always replicated expert rules (Forsythe, 1993). In contrast to rule-based 
technologies, learning algorithms do not depend on expert rules stated up-front but can 
generate their own rules by automatically and autonomously creating connections 
between a large number of data points (Balasubramanian et al., 2020; Dourish, 2016; 
Kellogg et al., 2020; Zhang et al., 2021). This is what is commonly referred to as “machine 
learning” (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2017; Burrell, 2016; Davenport, 2018).  
Through machine learning, learning algorithms produce machine learning knowledge that 
is different from human knowledge and might even exceed it (Leavitt et al., 2020; Lebovitz 
et al., 2021; Tshitoyan et al., 2019; Van den Broek et al., 2021). For example, consider a spam 
filter as discussed by (Burrell, 2016, p. 9): “Humans likely recognize and evaluate spam 
according to genre: the phishing scam, the Nigerian 419 email, the Viagra sales pitch. By 
contrast, the ‘bag of words’ approach [i.e., machine reasoning] breaks down texts into 
atomistic collections of units, words whose ordering is irrelevant.” In other words, while 
humans use their ability to interpret a message in order to assess if an email is spam, a 
learning algorithm uses words commonly associated with spam (e.g., click, dollar, price) 
and is trained to rank these words by weight and to flag an email based on the aggregate 
of the weights of all the words. In general, machine learning knowledge is promised to be 
more objective, efficient, and new (Van den Broek et al. 2021).  
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Yet, there is also a problem with the use of learning algorithms, as the procedures used 
for machine learning differ fundamentally from “demands of human-scale reasoning and 
styles of semantic interpretation” (Burrell, 2016, p. 2). Understanding machine learning 
knowledge requires one to discern how the internal decision logic of learning algorithms 
changes when they learn from data. However, because machine learning is based on 
combining large datasets and advanced computational methods, it becomes increasingly 
challenging for humans to understand how learning algorithms arrive at insights 
(Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2017; Burrell, 2016; Carrizosa & Morales, 2013; Campolo & 
Crawford, 2020; Christin, 2020; Davenport, 2018; Faraj et al., 2018; Gal et al., 2020). This is 
commonly referred to as the “opaque nature” (Anthony, 2021; Burrell, 2016; Christin, 2020) 
or the “black box problem” (e.g., Ajunwa, 2020; Introna, 2016; Pasquale, 2015) of learning 
algorithms. The inherent difference between machine learning and human knowledge 
makes this opaque nature (or opacity) a fundamental issue in the case of learning 
algorithms and keeps even developers in the dark about how the internal decision logic of 
these systems evolves (Faraj et al., 2018; Michalski et al., 2013; O’Neil, 2016). For example, 
when in 2016 the learning algorithm AlphaGo defeated Go grandmaster Lee Sedol, the 
developers were unable to explain how the system exactly generated the strategies that led 
to its victory.  
As a consequence, the opacity of machine learning is a specific area of concern in the 
field of computer science and has triggered a community of scholars to study 
‘explainability issues’ and how to alleviate them (e.g., Barredo et al., 2020; Doran et al., 2017; 
Kirsch, 2017; Lipton, 2018; Miller, 2019; Mittelstadt et al., 2019; Preece et al., 2018; Robbins, 
2019). Scholars engaged in this community argue that the nature of learning algorithms is 
a double-edged sword: their key strength (i.e., processing and learning from large data sets 
to arrive at new knowledge) is simultaneously their main problem. To solve this problem, 
these scholars focus on finding technical solutions for opacity and rarely look at questions 
such as how explainability issues are dealt with in practice, who needs explanations, or 
why, what kind of, and when explanations are needed in the first place (Hafermalz & 
Huysman, 2019). Yet, these are important organizational questions, for organizational 
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scholars increasingly argue that when users are confronted with machine learning 
knowledge that cannot be explained or understood, they experience difficulties trusting, 
using, and maintaining control over the role of learning algorithms in their decision-
making process (Bader & Kaiser, 2019; Christin, 2017; Gal et al., 2020; Glikson & Woolley, 
2020; Lebovitz et al., 2019; Zarsky, 2019). For example, examining machine learning 
knowledge in a medical context, Durán and Jongsma (2021) asked: “If we are unable to 
entrench reliable knowledge from medical [learning algorithms], what reasons do 
physicians have to follow their diagnosis and suggestions of treatment?” (p. 330). 
To overcome the explainability issues of machine learning knowledge in organizations, 
organizational scholars argue for the need to translate this knowledge to make it 
comprehensible for humans (Bolin & Andersson Schwarz, 2015). This requires new tasks 
related to translating the knowledge generated by learning algorithms in practice (Gal et 
al., 2020; Henke et al., 2018; Kellogg et al., 2020; Sachs, 2020; Shestakofsky & Kellar, 2020), 
which are usually outside the domain of expertise of technology developers and users – i.e., 
developers generally do not have sufficient knowledge of the user domain, and users often 
do not possess enough technical knowledge. The need for translation creates an 
opportunity for knowledge brokers to step in and take up these translation tasks. Such 
‘algorithmic knowledge brokers’, at first sight, could be an organizational solution to the 
explainability problem established in computer science. Yet, in the case of algorithmic 
knowledge brokers, an interesting puzzle arises regarding the ability to translate machine 
learning knowledge if learning algorithms are indeed opaque. 
As we discussed above, theories on translation taught us that to translate knowledge 
from one domain to the next requires one to understand the source and target domains 
(e.g., Brown & Duguid, 1998; Røvik, 2016). Translation scholars argue that to adequately 
translate from the source to the target domain depends on the complexity, embeddedness, 
and implicitness of knowledge (Røvik, 2016). Complexity refers to the ability to 
understand the relationships between observed results and underlying practices. 
Embeddedness means how much of the knowledge is ingrained in the specific context (and 
is therefore difficult for a knowledge broker to access). Implicitness refers to how much of 
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the knowledge can be articulated. The higher the complexity, embeddedness, and 
implicitness of knowledge, the more challenging translation becomes (Røvik, 2016). In the 
case of machine learning knowledge, the complex, embedded and implicit nature of the 
knowledge that needs to be translated can be considered as extreme, yielding an 
insurmountable knowledge boundary between the source domain and the target domain. 
To translate machine learning knowledge towards the target domain, algorithmic 
knowledge brokers are thus confronted with a new situation in which they, by definition, 
cannot understand how knowledge is generated by the source domain (see Figure 3.1). 
Accordingly, in this paper, we aim to understand which practices algorithmic knowledge 
brokers build on and use when they cannot scrutinize the knowledge generated by learning 
algorithms – in other words, when they operate ‘in the land of the blind’ – and ask: How 
do knowledge brokers translate machine learning knowledge when they cannot 
understand how this knowledge is generated? 
Figure 3.1 The challenge of brokering machine learning knowledge 
 
3.4 Methods 
3.4.1 The learning algorithm 
Our study focuses on the implementation of the so-called ‘Crime Anticipation System’ 
(CAS), which was internally developed by a team of data scientists at the Dutch police. 
The development was initiated by the national police management to allocate police 
resources (e.g., patrol officers, specialized teams, material resources) more effectively and 
efficiently by predicting where and when a crime was most likely to occur. To create CAS, 














bought-in the external PredPol-algorithm, national management decided that the in-
house data scientists could better develop a new version so that it would not require the 
police to share vulnerable data with external sources. Moreover, through in-house 
development the police planned to hold a grip on which data and variables were included 
in the learning algorithm (e.g., to prevent profiling they decided to not include individual-
level data). 
The data scientists used logistic regression analysis as the technique for the CAS 
learning algorithm. Logistic regression analysis is a very popular method in machine 
learning, specifically for binary classification tasks (i.e., a problem with two class values, 
such as ‘crime’ and ‘no crime’). It is used to predict, for example, whether an email should 
be classified as spam or not, whether a tumor is benign or malignant, or whether a loan 
will or will not be repaid. Because learning algorithms are typically trained using large 
amounts of data, CAS was developed with data of the crimes with the highest reporting 
numbers, which are called ‘high-impact crimes’ (e.g., burglary, car theft, robbery). Such 
crimes are relatively easy to carry out, and thus happen frequently, and have a high impact 
on citizens, which means that they are also often reported. The reporting of these crimes 
results in a large number of data points, which makes them specifically suited for 
developing and training learning algorithms.  
For the CAS algorithm to learn, the data science team constructed a dataset with 
historic high-impact crime data. They divided the country into squares of 125m2 and used 
three years of historical data for every square. Across these three years, they used bi-weekly 
reference moments, which resulted in 76 lines of data per square. Each line of data 
consisted of 8 technical variables and 47 predictive variables (limited by strict data 
regulations). The technical values included, for example, time indicators, the name of the 
police station, and the name of the police district. The 47 predictive variables consisted of 
19 population-related variables, e.g., number of one-parent households, total number of 
addresses, average house price, number of male inhabitants, number of female inhabitants, 
average age of inhabitants, and 28 crime-specific variables, e.g., for burglary, variables such 
as time since the last burglary, number of burglaries in the last two weeks. In addition, 
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each line included whether the specific crime happened in the two weeks between the 
reference moments (see Appendix 1, Table A1). To predict the probabilities of future 
crimes, the logistic regression model of CAS was trained to learn a mapping between the 
47 predictive variables and whether a crime happened or not (see Appendix 1, Table A2). 
To transform the numerical probabilities into a visualization of the crime predictions on 
a map, threshold values were added to determine whether and in what color predicted 
squares appeared on the map; the darker the color, the higher the predicted probability 
(see Figure 3.2). Data extraction, data preparation, model building, and generating maps 
were automated and happened on a weekly basis. The model was thus able to 
autonomously learn and generate predictions. This, in combination with the size of the 
data set and the high number of predictions, made the internal decision logic of 
predictions opaque in practice, even for the data scientists. 
Figure 3.2 Visualization of predictions as perceived in the user interface 
 
3.4.2 Research setting 
In contrast to, for example, the fragmented organizational structure of the U.S. police 
force (see e.g., Brayne, 2020; Van Maanen, 1973), the Dutch police is nationally organized 
and coordinated, which facilitated the nationwide implementation of CAS. The Dutch 
police started the predictive policing project in 2012 by hiring three data scientists and, 
between 2012 and 2017, gradually expanded the data science team to about 20 members. 
Maintaining CAS remained one of the responsibilities of these data scientists, also after 
the implementation at local police departments, but most of the members of the data 
science team were also actively involved in other projects, such as developing counter-
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terrorism learning algorithms and image recognition for investigating and preventing 
child sexual abuse. One data scientist (Dennis11) took the lead in the development of CAS 
and was therefore the main ‘brain’ behind the learning algorithm. All other data scientists 
were responsible for the maintenance of the system and performing updates.  
In 2013, the data scientists finished the first version of CAS, which predicted a week in 
advance where and when a crime was most likely to occur. During the test phase, an 
important role for a group of ‘intelligence officers’ emerged, who could help local police 
managers to use the crime predictions. In the Findings section, we will go into detail about 
the emergence of these intelligence officers as algorithmic knowledge brokers. Here, it is 
important to emphasize that the implementation of CAS therefore included three separate 
groups: data scientists as developers, intelligence officers as algorithmic knowledge 
brokers, and local police managers (hereafter ‘police managers’) as users. The interaction 
between intelligence officers, data scientists, and police managers in the implementation 
and use of CAS was influenced by the ‘siloed’ organizational structure of the Dutch police. 
The police managers engaged in tasks related to police operational decision-making. They 
transferred data-related tasks to intelligence officers and, because the nature of police 
work was action-oriented and police managers considered CAS to be extremely complex 
and ‘foreign’, they did not feel the need to engage with CAS directly and trusted 
intelligence officers to do so. As one police manager responded to an intelligence officer: 
“You lost me at http.” The data scientists were located in a different building, far removed 
from daily police operations and the intelligence officers. They were hired for their 
expertise in computer science and were expected to create systems that would generate 
new insights for police operations across the country. The data scientists were not 
bothered by their distance from daily police operations. They considered machine learning 
knowledge fundamentally different from police occupational knowledge and were 
convinced that such knowledge could and should be generated away from the police 
domain. As a result, the data scientists only occasionally interacted with intelligence 
officers (via email or organized meetings held on average twice a year) and they rarely 
 
11 All original names have been removed, the names mentioned are pseudonyms.  
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spoke with police managers. In the Findings, we describe how the intelligence officers 
attempted to broker these two disconnected groups by translating the machine learning 
knowledge to the police domain. 
3.4.3 Data collection 
We performed ethnographic research with the aim of theory elaboration to make 
theoretical advancements (Fisher & Aguinis, 2017). We conducted our fieldwork at the 
Dutch police over 31 months, from October 2016 to April 2019. During these three years, 
the first author observed and took part in the daily work at the intelligence department 
and the emergency response department. In this study, we report on our data of the 
intelligence department only. We followed the intelligence officers over these three years, 
with an intensive observation period in the second year of the study, in which the first 
author joined the intelligence department approximately 3 days a week, observing and 
taking part in the intelligence officers' work. All observations were conducted when CAS 
was already in use, details about the development of CAS and the techniques used were 
obtained through (retrospective) interviews with data scientists and archival documents. 
Our interest in the role of the intelligence officers was triggered when, at the start of our 
fieldwork, we were surprised to see that the police managers did not directly interact with 
CAS but that the intelligence officers performed this work. We saw parallels with Barley’s 
(1996) broker technicians and observed the intelligence officers’ struggles with 
understanding the meaning of the crime predictions in practice.   
The first author had unrestricted access to the intelligence department – which 
consisted of about 15 full-time employees – of a police station in a large Dutch city. She 
shadowed the intelligence officers in all their work, including their interactions with CAS, 
data scientists, police managers, and police officers. Her main focus was on the intelligence 
officers but joining the various interactions also gave her thorough insights into the other 
groups involved. She would usually sit at the desk next to one of the intelligence officers 
and write down in detail which features they used when working with CAS, how they 
tried to make sense of the learning algorithm and the crime predictions, and how they 
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reasoned and went about representing the predictions to police managers. Through her 
prolonged presence at the intelligence department, she gained the trust of the intelligence 
officers to perform some of the intelligence activities herself, which gave her deep insights 
in the efforts involved in performing intelligence officers’ work. For example, they asked 
her to help out with extensive database searches, she was given access to the CAS user 
interface to go through crime predictions, and eventually even helped new intelligence 
officers settle in by explaining how to use CAS. The first author also followed other 
activities of the intelligence officers, which gave her a rich contextual understanding of 
the empirical site. For example, participating in briefings at the start of police shifts, 
joining management meetings and meetings with data scientists, and accompanying the 
intelligence officers for lunch and occasional festivities, such as their yearly team outing 
and Christmas party. Finally, the first author joined one of the intelligence officers 
appointed as 'spokesperson' to regional (once a month) and national (once every six 
months) gatherings of intelligence officers at police stations across the country. Because 
the intelligence officers all worked at different police stations, these meetings were used 
to reflect and learn from each other. Initially during these meetings, the intelligence 
officers shared best practices and their struggles with translating machine learning 
knowledge. This further established her observations of the challenges faced by the 
intelligence officers. Near the end of the fieldwork, the first author observed that the 
intelligence officers collectively emphasized the need to substitute predictions, which 
validated her observations of how the role of intelligence officers changed over time. By 
actively participating in all facets of the intelligence officers’ work, the first author became 
fully socialized into the intelligence department, by which she developed a holistic 
perspective of intelligence officers’ work and their relationship to other stakeholders, a 
deep understanding of the work practices performed, as well as the underlying feelings 
and experiences, such as confusion, stress due to time pressure, tiredness, but also pride 
and joy of being able to come up with a fitting recommendation.  
The first author also conducted 33 formal semi-structured interviews. Voice recording 
was possible for 25 interviews, which were transcribed verbatim. For the other eight, 
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detailed notes were taken during the interview and expanded afterward into an elaborate 
summary. We explicitly searched for and contacted people who could provide rich details 
and reasoning into how CAS development, implementation, and deployment proceeded 
and why. The first author interviewed actors from all groups involved to maintain a multi-
actor perspective. This included data scientists who were closely involved with CAS for 
the longest time, intelligence officers who were at the intelligence department already 
before the implementation of CAS, and police managers who were closely involved in the 
implementation of the learning algorithm. Moreover, for a deeper understanding of the 
police occupational world, the first author interviewed five patrol officers, who needed to 
have at least 10 years of experience to make sure they could deeply reflect on their work. 
The main questions asked to data scientists were about the techniques used in CAS to get 
in-depth, retrospective insight into the development and reasoning behind CAS. After 
one of these interviews, the first author sat with the data scientist to have a close look at 
the learning algorithm of CAS, which gave her a better understanding of the methods 
used. Intelligence officers and police managers were asked to describe their occupational 
trajectory, their daily activities, and what role CAS played in these activities to get an in-
depth understanding of the influence of the learning algorithm on their everyday work. In 
addition, police managers were asked about their views on the usefulness of CAS for 
allocating police resources and crime prevention to understand their motivation behind 
working with the system. At the very end of the fieldwork (April 2019), the first author 
conducted retrospective interviews with two intelligence officers, where she asked them 
to reconstruct how their work practices and responsibilities changed from the 
introduction of CAS in 2015 to their current role. These two intelligence officers were 
selected because they had been with the department for the longest time.  
Finally, during the fieldwork, countless informal conversations took place with all 
groups involved. These informal conversations allowed the first author to ask questions to 
solicit interpretations of specific events or decisions. For retrospective details, we also 
collected documentation data that was either internally or externally available. These 
materials were very valuable as they gave us additional information about the technical 
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specifications of CAS (e.g., the complete list of variables used) and insight into, for 
example, the evaluations of the CAS implementation, strategic plans, reasoning and 
expectations about role transformations, and meeting details. We summarized each of the 
data sources in Table 3.1.  
Table 3.1 Description of data sources and their use 
Data types Amount/duration Use in analysis 
Primary data   
Observations of intelligence 
officers’ work  
 







(regional and national) 
Between Oct. 2016 and Apr. 
2019, 565 hours 
 
2 (avg. duration: 2 hrs.) 
 
47 (avg. duration: 2 hrs.) 
 
123 (avg. duration: 15 
min.) 
14 (avg. duration: 2 hrs.) 
Provided rich insight into the daily practices and lived experience of 
intelligence work and their interactions with data scientists and police 
managers. 
Provided insight into the intelligence officers’ attempt at giving 
feedback to the data scientists and the data scientists’ responses. 
Provided insight into the changing dominance of intelligence work 
and how the managers responded to this. 
Provided insight into the translation of intelligence work to daily 
police practice. 
Provided broader insight into how intelligence officers’ work 











Total: 33 (avg. duration: 1 
hour) 








Enriched and deepened our understanding of the worlds of the actor 
groups involved. 
Enriched our understanding of the background and development 
of intelligence work.  
Enriched our understanding of the “machine reasoning” world of 
the data scientists. 
Enriched our understanding of the police occupational world, the 
needs for police operational decision-making, and the managers’ 
trust in data and algorithms. 
Enriched our understanding of the police occupational world.  
















Validated observation and interview findings and added context and 
historical insights. 
Provided insight into managerial decisions and helped to establish 
the chronology. 
Provided insight into the developments in the role of the 
intelligence officers and helped to establish the chronology. 
Provided insight into the backgrounds to CAS and enriched our 
understanding of the police occupational world.  
3.4.4 Data analysis 
Throughout the data collection, we engaged in regular conversations to reflect on 
observations, ask ourselves what these meant, and link to related literature. The coding 
was performed by the first and second authors, with the first author taking the lead and 
the second author frequently checking in and adding input. We began coding by reading 
field notes and interview transcripts, adding potential codes in the margins. This helped 
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us to identify important themes. For example, we were struck by how the intelligence 
officers frequently referred to unexpected changes in their role and remarks about their 
growing influence on police managers. To trace how this growing influence came about, 
we performed a temporal analysis of our data, broadly mapping the role changes. We also 
noted the struggles of intelligence officers with understanding and interpreting 
algorithmic predictions. This triggered us to further scrutinize the nature of algorithmic 
predictions and how this related to the intelligence officers’ brokerage work.  
We used open coding (parsing out the data to understand the underlying dynamics) to 
conduct a more formalized analysis of the field notes and transcripts (Strauss & Corbin, 
1990). We initially focused on specifying in detail the activities and interactions of the 
three groups involved. We categorized the codes by the occupational group to maintain 
oversight (i.e., ‘data scientists’, ‘intelligence officers’, ‘police managers’) and used these 
groups to construct a visual map that portrayed how certain activities triggered specific 
events (Langley, 1999; see Appendix 2 for the visual map). We then engaged in further 
rounds of axial coding, i.e., unraveling more thematic relationships and contrasts through 
coding across concepts (Strauss & Corbin, 1990), and noticed that the intelligence officers’ 
efforts to understand both machine learning knowledge and the police domain played a 
central role in how their work changed over time. We compared and contrasted the 
intelligence officers’ actions with the learning algorithm and the associated machine 
learning knowledge, as well as with the police domain, through which five key translation 
practices emerged: (1) extracting, (2) examining, (3) transferring, (4) domesticating, and (5) 
substituting (see Figure 3.3).  
Using the literature on knowledge brokerage work and translation theory then helped 
us to better understand what these five brokerage practices were examples of. Based on 
theories on translation (Røvik, 2016), we grouped the practices “extracting” and 
“examining” under the theoretical category “translating from (machine learning 
knowledge)” and the practices “transferring,” “domesticating,” and “substituting” under 
the theoretical category “translating to (domain knowledge).” Together, these two 
theoretical categories formed the basis for our understanding of algorithmic brokerage 
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work. This structure with its associated practices also helped us to see how the algorithmic 
brokerage work evolved through a cumulative process, in which new types of practices 
were built on earlier ones. In this cumulative process, we identified three algorithmic 
knowledge brokerage roles: (1) messenger, (2) interpreter, and (3) curator. In what follows, 
we use these roles to explain the cumulative efforts to translate machine learning 
knowledge in practice. 




After a two-year development period of CAS, in 2015, the data science team performed a 
test to see whether the learning algorithm could be nationally implemented. They 
deployed it for several months in five large Dutch cities, which was closely monitored by 
evaluators from the Dutch police academy. After the test, which was considered a success, 
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‘intelligence officers,’ who emerged as important actors who “supported police managers” 
at local police stations by “being able to generate CAS predictions” (internal document). 
The important role of intelligence officers was surprising to the evaluators, since before 
the introduction of CAS, the work of intelligence officers mainly involved supporting 
police officers by searching the numerous police databases when the police themselves did 
not have direct access to it (e.g., finding crime numbers, suspect data, or information about 
criminal networks). Intelligence officers were ‘hidden’ at a back-office, the work was 
generally regarded as low-status, the education level required for the position was low – it 
did not require one to be knowledgeable of technology or police work – and it was 
considered to offer an opportunity for those who “wanted to join the police without 
wanting to work on the street” (intelligence officer Louisa).  
The evaluators, however, saw the potential benefits of tasking intelligence officers, who 
were used to working with police data, with translating machine learning knowledge to 
make it meaningful for police work and ended their report with suggestions for a new 
work process for contextualizing algorithmic predictions. According to the evaluation 
report, the work process should include three steps: actualizing, interpreting, and 
explaining. Actualizing meant adjusting predictions to local changes (e.g., when a burglar 
was captured). Interpreting meant adding more information to the crime predictions, such 
as the most-used crime methods. Explaining meant deeply analyzing why a crime is 
predicted (i.e., finding causal explanations for the algorithmic predictions). The data 
science team agreed with the suggestion of the evaluators and gathered that intelligence 
officers could, for example, contextualize a burglary prediction by adding information 
about the kind of houses in the targeted area. As data scientist Dennis reflected:  
“You need to have somebody [i.e., intelligence officers] who looks at the maps and 
thinks about the causes of high risk and how to prevent them. How to take the 
cause away so that you are not fighting the symptoms but taking away the cause of 
the problem.” 
 
While the intelligence officers were thus expected to find underlying causes for 
predictions, the data scientists assumed that the intelligence officers did not need to 
understand how the learning algorithm generated knowledge to perform their translation 
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tasks and that access to police databases would be enough. As one of the data scientists 
explained: “Intelligence officers don't have to interpret model parameters or any kind of 
technical stuff, they just get the maps.” The intelligence officers thus were asked to fulfill 
brokerage work without understanding how machine learning knowledge was generated. 
Below, we analyze the efforts of a group of intelligence officers at one police station to 
translate crime predictions for police managers and how they thereby performed three 
consecutive roles – i.e., messengers, translators, and curators. We discuss how these efforts 
were hindered by the inability to understand machine learning knowledge and how this 
eventually led the intelligence officers to believe that the predictions should be substituted 
by their own alternatives.  
3.5.1 Algorithmic knowledge broker as messenger 
The main aim of intelligence officers’ work was to make abstract crime predictions based 
on machine learning meaningful for local police managers. The predictions were presented 
to the intelligence officers by means of an interactive map where they could select the 
location, the crime type, and the timeframe. Because police managers never really looked 
at the map, they asked the intelligence officers to generate a weekly overview of the CAS 
predictions, so that the overviews could be used as input for scheduling police tasks and 
resources. Generating such an overview was a laborious task for the intelligence officers. 
For example, they had to click on every timeframe in a drop-down menu12 and since the 
system generated predictions for four different crime types per police station, the 
intelligence officers went through this cycle four times, selecting a timeframe in the drop-
down menu a total of 168 times. When a prediction appeared on the map in the form of a 
colored block, they translated the predictions into words and added it to a Word 
document – e.g., “burglary, Monday, between 12:00 and 16:00, [name of the 
neighborhood].” Per crime type, the final list made in Word included on average one 
predicted timeframe and one or two predicted areas a day.  
 
!"!"#$%&'!()*+,'-*+./!0!1-2.!-!3++4/!*+-5(!67)64)58!9:";"<=0!>!":!()*+.!(%!8+(!-!3++472!%?+'?)+3@!
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Through this process of extracting predictions, a comprehensive list of likely future 
crimes was generated. However, because the map that the intelligence officers used as 
input did not offer any insight into the causes of crime predictions, they had little clue 
about the meaning of these predictions in the context of the police. Moreover, since their 
new tasks caused them to be “in search of their identity as intelligence officers and 
sometimes didn't know where their work ended” (intelligence officer Wendy), their 
insecurity grew towards the information needs of the police managers. Afraid to leave out 
a prediction that might turn out to be right, or add irrelevant information, the intelligence 
officers decided to stick to comprehensive reporting of all the crime predictions. Better 
safe than sorry, the intelligence officers gathered that transferring a full overview of 
potential crimes would be best to support police managers' decision-making and assumed 
that “all police managers probably know what's behind the predictions” (intelligence 
officer Eva).  
Even though it took the intelligence officers quite some time and effort to construct an 
exhaustive list of predictions, the police managers did not receive the lists with much 
enthusiasm; the document was too long and the potential crime causes were unknown. For 
example, police manager Rudy reflected that the long lists were difficult to use because 
they lacked a specific focus: “If you keep the [algorithmic predictions] too broad, then we 
are quick to ignore them. I think the more concrete you are, the more feeling we have for 
it.” The data scientists also acknowledged that simply listing crime predictions was not 
enough because the “quantitative” predictions needed “qualitative insights” (data scientist 
Dennis). They emphasized the need for intelligence officers to “add color to” and “enrich” 
the crime predictions. As Dennis explained:  
“Intelligence officers have to take the predictions and enrich them with qualitative 
information. For example, [for burglary predictions] adding who could do it or why 
burglaries might occur in that area or at that time. Intelligence officers could say: 
we have some narcotics-related issues here, so maybe it could be junkies? Most of 
the time, junkies aren't well-prepared criminals, so maybe it's just very easy for 
them to burglarize that area. So maybe those houses have very bad hinges and locks 
and you can just enter them with a very easy trick. That's the kind of context the 




In sum, confronted with a map that did not provide any background, such as the causes 
of crime predictions, together with largely unknown requirements from the target domain, 
intelligence officers initially tried whether the algorithmic predictions would make sense 
to police managers by extracting them from the system and transferring them as a list (see 
Table 3.2). As such, their knowledge brokerage role can be described as a “messenger”. It 
soon became clear however, that the differences between machine learning knowledge and 
the domain knowledge of police managers were larger than the intelligence officers 
initially expected. Both the police managers and the data scientists criticized the efforts of 
the intelligence officers and pushed them to deepen their knowledge brokerage work by 
not just listing but further translating the predictions. The intelligence officers had to 
better de-contextualize the algorithmic predictions from the machine learning domain in 
order to contextualize them in the domain of the police.  
 
3.5.2 Algorithmic knowledge broker as interpreter 
To be able to translate algorithmic predictions to the police domain, the intelligence 
officers realized they lacked a deep understanding of both the machine learning knowledge 
and the domain-specific knowledge of police managers and invested in learning more 
about the technical details of the learning algorithm and the domain details of the police.  
Learning about the source domain. To be able to translate the crime predictions from the 
machine learning domain, the intelligence officers recognized they had to better 
understand the computational and statistical techniques used in CAS. As intelligence 
officer Richard reflected:  
“There are so many indicators that CAS uses to make these calculations. And then 
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Consequently, the first step was to find out if the causes of predictions could be made 
transparent and they asked the data scientists to create a tool that would make the decision 
logic of crime predictions visible. The assumption was that such a tool would make it 
possible for the intelligence officers to trace how a crime prediction was calculated. 
However, the data scientists insisted that “the algorithm did not easily display why 
something was predicted” (manager of the data science team Jules) and that generating the 
best possible predictions required complex techniques for pattern recognition in vast 
amounts of data, which made the learning algorithm opaque. As a consequence of these 
beliefs, the team of data scientists claimed that pattern recognition through machine 
learning, which combines many different variables and theories, required “such complex 
mathematical reasoning that it probably extends beyond human reasoning.”13 Data 
scientist Dennis further explained this belief as follows:  
“If you want to have the perfect set of selection rules, it means that you have to 
study a lot of variances for a long time. And this is the reason why [data scientists] 
don't do it in a commonsense way [using human reasoning] because there are too 
many possible variations. You have to do it by computer [using machine learning].” 
 
To help the intelligence officers, the data scientists did explain the basic techniques 
they used for developing CAS. For example, they showed the variables that were included 
in the learning algorithm. Such a list of variables still, however, did not give insight into 
which variable was considered most important for a given prediction and for what reason. 
These explanations therefore did not satisfy the intelligence officers’ need to understand 
how the crime predictions were generated and gradually they gave up on their quest to 
gain deep insights into the learning algorithm. Dedicated to fulfilling their tasks as 
brokers, they decided to leave the data scientist aside and started to examine the 
predictions by inspecting the source they had direct access to: the police data. As 
intelligence officer Eva reflected:  
“How predictions come about technically might be a guess but you can have a look 






For example, to understand why burglaries were often predicted in the morning, insight 
into how the timeframe of crime predictions was calculated was needed, which triggered 
the intelligence officers to dig into the police database and look for timestamps in burglary 
reports. It appeared that, if a burglary occurred in a period when people were away from 
home, the report included a timeframe (e.g., 08:00 to 18:00) instead of one timestamp (e.g., 
08:30 a.m.). So, they reasoned that the time the data scientists decided to use was the so-
called 'starting time' of an incident (in this case 08:00 a.m.) instead of including the full 
timeframe for calculating predictions.  
Taking their assignment to create connections between the world of algorithms and the 
police occupational world seriously, the intelligence officers unsuccessfully tried to share 
their findings from the police data with the data scientists. For example, when they 
suggested a different method for calculating timeframes, the data scientists maintained 
their belief in the machine learning techniques they had applied and said that this was the 
“only scientifically proven method” for calculating time predictions (data scientists Dennis 
and Mary). In another instance, when one of the intelligence officers emailed the data 
scientists to share that CAS generated predictions for car burglaries in areas where cars 
were not permitted, data scientist Dennis continued to believe in the CAS predictions and 
answered that “it really was a parking area.” 
These interactions with the data scientists made the intelligence officers realize there 
was a serious boundary between the machine learning knowledge and their 
interpretations, which blocked a mutual understanding between them and the data 
scientists. According to the intelligence officers, the data scientists were “trying to develop 
better tools” (intelligence officer Fred) but “did not understand what they [intelligence 
officers] wanted” (intelligence officer Bart). They grew more and more skeptical of how 
machine learning knowledge was developed. As intelligence officer Wendy remarked: 
“Data scientists don't have a clue about police work. CAS is just a tool with some kind of 
science behind it. Well, if you reason like that, you don't get our reasoning.” Moreover, no 
matter how much effort they put into examining the data to better understand where 
machine learning knowledge came from, “sometimes [they] just could not deduce from the 
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data why a prediction appeared” (intelligence officer Joey), which was considered to be a 
serious bottleneck in performing their work as knowledge brokers. As intelligence officer 
Fred explained:  
“Understanding CAS is especially important for getting to the final step, for 
putting the predictions in the context of the police. If I know that the reason behind 
a prediction is just that a lot of crimes happened there in the past, then I can suggest 
that the police officers drive around in that area so that they can prevent the 
predicted crimes from coming true. If the prediction appears because of 
demographic data, indicating that there's a lot of money over there or something 
like that, then police officers have to take another approach. Then they have to 
warn the residents and make them prevent these crimes from happening [e.g., by 
improving their locks].”  
 
The inability to fully comprehend the decision logic of CAS had fundamental 
consequences for translating predictions from the learning algorithm to the police domain. 
To better understand how this was so influential, we first turn to how the intelligence 
officers also put efforts into better understanding the police domain. 
Learning about the target domain. Initially, the intelligence officers also struggled with 
translating the crime predictions to the police domain. To solve this issue, they started to 
interact more directly with the police to gain a better understanding of the occupational 
world. By printing a crime prediction, sitting down with police officers, and asking them 
to make sense of that prediction from their occupational perspective (see Figure 3.4), they 
learned that “more concrete” (police manager Rudy) or contextualized predictions 
included specific details of the area or of potential suspects. For example, the police 
managers told the intelligence officers that algorithmic predictions would start to make 
sense to them if the intelligence officers “dared to add suspects” (Rudy). To create these 
more contextualized predictions, the intelligence officers relied on police data; navigating 
the police databases and reading police reports (e.g., DNA matches, burglary reports that 
included descriptions of burglars, pictures of crimes or criminals sent to the police via 




Figure 3.4 Intelligence officer and police officer together making sense of a 
prediction  
 
They also learned from interacting with police managers that short and action-oriented 
descriptions best fit the police occupational world. “We gave the police managers a couple 
of options and asked for their opinion,” intelligence officer Wendy reflected, “and 
eventually they said ‘give us as little as possible.’” Using their improved understanding of 
police work, the intelligence officers changed the way they handled crime predictions and 
started deleting, editing, and interpreting them. The request for a concise document 
triggered the intelligence officers to limit the number of predictions they presented to five 
timeframes (from on average 28) and two locations (from on average 56) and to delete all 
predictions they thought did not make sense. For example, they removed burglary 
predictions when no burglaries happened the week before. Moreover, even though they 
could not comprehend the decision logic of the crime predictions, the intelligence officers 
tried to increase the meaning by including details that they could link to the predictions 
without knowing the exact causes, such as area characteristics (e.g., “rehabilitation center 
for ex-convicts in the vicinity”), housing conditions (e.g., “mainly student houses” or 
“outdated locks”), or even adding potential suspects who had been criminally active in the 
area before. Intelligence officer Ben summarized their knowledge brokerage work as 
follows:  
“We add an interpretation to the algorithmic predictions so police managers can 
do something with them. In other words: ‘It is like this for these reasons.’ You can 
also give police managers advice, like: ‘I would focus on this or that person,’ or ‘I 
wouldn't do anything about that type of crime because it's way too unpredictable.’” 
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The police managers appreciated the new way of domesticating algorithmic predictions 
and perceived the brokerage work as more relevant and valuable. They expressed, for 
example, that thanks to the intelligence officers’ interpretations the algorithmic 
predictions gave more “direction to their decision-making work” (police manager Harry) 
and also recognized the increased value of intelligence officers’ work for “coordinating 
police work” (police manager Rudy). Moreover, during the time that the intelligence 
officers became more knowledgeable of police work and the police managers started using 
the crime predictions to inform their operational decisions, the police managers observed 
an overall decline in the number of high-impact crimes (e.g., burglary and car theft). The 
decrease in the number of burglaries was even so spectacular that the police station won a 
national award called “Harm Alarm” for the largest reduction in burglaries (minus 47 
percent compared to the year before). In their internal communication, the police 
managers attributed this achievement largely to the learning algorithm that offered them 
“new ways of gathering and analyzing data.” Even though the declining crime numbers 
could have reasons unrelated to the use of algorithmic predictions (e.g., criminals being 
less interested in doing ‘laborious’ burglaries and moving towards cybercrime instead), the 
police managers felt they had reasons to believe that the use of algorithmic predictions 
was paying off. Happy with the work of the intelligence officers, the police managers 
decided to give more weight to the brokering activities of the intelligence officers. They 
appointed them as key figures for informing their operational and strategic decisions by 
inviting them into regular management meetings. To “make crime predictions more 
central” (police manager Harry), management scheduled about 20 minutes at the 
beginning of these meetings for intelligence officers to present their advice.  
In sum, to translate machine learning knowledge to the police domain, the intelligence 
officers realized they themselves first had to better understand how machine learning 
knowledge was generated and how police work was performed. In their efforts to find out 
more about the decision logic of crime predictions, they encountered the opaque nature 
of learning algorithms in the complex, embedded, and implicit nature of machine learning 
knowledge, which solidified a knowledge boundary between the machine learning domain 
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and the intelligence officers. On the other hand, due to the consistent interactions with 
the police, the access to the police data, and the police managers’ increased belief in the 
value of crime predictions, the knowledge differences between the intelligence officers and 
the police managers was slowly fading. This allowed the intelligence officers to 
contextualize the algorithmic predictions in such a way that they made sense to the police 
managers (see Table 3.2). As such their knowledge brokerage role can best be described as 
an “interpreter”. However, even though their contextualizing efforts seemed to work for 
the police managers, the intelligence officers continued to struggle with passing the 
machine learning knowledge boundary.  
3.5.3 Algorithmic knowledge broker as curator 
Now that the intelligence officers became more used to their ascribed expertise as 
algorithmic knowledge brokers, they searched for ways to deal with the opaque machine 
learning knowledge and discussed this with the head of their department. He suggested 
that, maybe, the difference between how machine learning knowledge was generated and 
their human interpretation was so large that it could not be overcome at all and that they 
should therefore use their own expertise:  
“Intelligence work is not only about CAS. You can include your input there as well. 
Human intelligence is by definition smarter than algorithmic systems.” (Head of 
intelligence department Rick) 
 
By now, the intelligence officers were so knowledgeable of the police domain that they felt 
confident enough to leave CAS aside and focus only on helping police managers to not be 
disturbed by “useless” issues and emphasize the “really important” ones (intelligence officer 
Richard). Moreover, a side-effect from their efforts to deduce details about machine 
learning techniques from police data was that they realized that they used many more data 
sources in their knowledge brokerage work than those included in CAS. “To be honest, I 
trust CAS less than I trust the information I can gather from the police databases,” 
intelligence officer Joey expressed the shared sentiment. They also became increasingly 
vocal amongst each other about the centrality of their work for guiding police managers. 
For example, in one of their department meetings, they agreed that intelligence work 
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should not be about “figuring out how systems work, but making meaningful data 
combinations for police managers.” 
The data scientists believed that the intelligence officers made the crime predictions 
meaningful to the police and helped police managers to make their operational processes 
“smarter and better” (head of data science Jules). In the meantime, the intelligence officers 
substituted CAS with more explainable solutions that supported their human judgments. 
For example, the intelligence officers requested their local IT desk to develop an archival 
and analysis tool. This tool operated on Excel and used all data sources the intelligence 
officers worked with previously to make sense of algorithmic predictions. It did not 
include a learning algorithm but was merely there to help the intelligence officers to store 
and add codes to police reports, which facilitated quick and easy information retrieval and 
analysis. Since the tool did not use a learning algorithm, it was possible to scrutinize the 
calculated patterns, which facilitated their knowledge brokerage work. For example, they 
requested that the tool included a new method for calculating crime timeframes, i.e., by 
using and visualizing a weighted average of the time windows of past crimes. When the 
intelligence officers compared the times calculated with the times predicted by CAS, they 
considered their “own” times “more explainable” (intelligence officer Louisa). Their new 
tool only gave the intelligence officers insights into past crime patterns and had no 
predictive capacity (see Appendix 3 for an example of CAS predictions compared to 
outcomes of their new tool). However, the transparent and explainable nature of their new 
tool helped them in making predictions that they thought would best fit the police 
domain. As intelligence officer Wendy reflected:  
“We already see the problem and then we go and double-check it with CAS and 
say: oh, well, it supports our judgment, we can point police managers' attention 
there. The problem is already clear, it's already evident, so we don't need CAS that 
much anymore.”  
 
Interestingly, while they pushed the learning algorithm to the background and 
constructed explainable alternatives that aligned with their human judgments, only the 
intelligence officers themselves were aware of this shift. Driven by police management's 
pushback to being disturbed by the complex technology and pushed by their 
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encouragement s to come up with “concise” predictions, e.g., to “give them as little as 
possible” (police manager Rudy), the intelligence officers shielded the police managers 
from the process through which they generated the substitutes. “We should keep these 
choices away from police management,” said the head of intelligence Rick during one of 
their department meetings, “they just need a clear recommendation, we shouldn't bother 
them with what kind of tools we used for it.” This was also reinforced by the intelligence 
officers’ experiences during their presentations at management meetings. During these 
presentations, police managers did not pay attention to slide handouts or explanations 
and were instead checking their phones. Yet, they plainly followed the intelligence officers’ 
recommendations. “We give our advice,” intelligence officer Wendy reflected, “and most 
of the time the police managers allocate police resources accordingly.” These occurrences 
during meetings made them believe that the police managers took their advice seriously 
without the need for any references. They thus decided to just offer the substitutes without 
the need to “back up their suggestions to police managers with numbers” (intelligence 
officer Aileen). Wendy explained:  
“In the beginning, we had this whole document with a long interpretation [of the 
algorithmic predictions]. Now, I only present the problem and our advice. Police 
managers just don't care at all what the numbers look like.”  
 
In the end, the intelligence officers presented their recommendations using just one 
slide, which only included a direct and short piece of advice without its source, such as: 
“Due to incidents with disorderly conduct because of alcohol/narcotics use, the 
intelligence department advises police management to conduct alcohol/narcotics tests on 
traffic participants during the nightly hours over the weekend. Mainly at locations 
[anonymized].” Being able to substitute the crime predictions with their own alternatives 
that were willingly accepted by the police managers, the intelligence officers felt they had 
grown more equal to them:  
“We are now considered more as a partner of police managers. Before, we would 
usually wait for police managers to give us a task. Now, it’s just: we are a department 
and we have something to say too. And we have good suggestions. That’s the 
difference. We changed into an intelligence department having a seat at the table.” 
(Intelligence officer Wendy) 
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In sum, the intelligence officers eventually realized that the boundary between machine 
learning knowledge and their human interpretation of crime predictions was impassable. 
As a consequence, they pushed back the learning algorithm and substituted it with 
explainable alternatives that aligned with their human judgments and that they considered 
most suitable for the police managers (see Table 3.2). As such, their knowledge brokerage 
role can be described as a “curator”, in which they grew to become more influential and 
were eventually even considered more as a partner. As curators, the intelligence officers 
stopped translating the knowledge from the machine learning domain and substituted the 
knowledge to the police domain instead, without police managers ever noticing it.  
3.6 Discussion 
 
Building on the findings of our case, we offer a general explanation of how algorithmic 
knowledge brokers translate machine learning knowledge from the source domain to the 
target domain (see Figure 3.5). In particular, we observed how brokers enact translation 
practices that afford them to perform increasingly influential algorithmic brokerage roles. 
These brokerage roles change over time, because when they attempt to translate machine 
learning knowledge, knowledge differences emerge between the brokers and the source 
and target domains. At the start of the brokerage work, brokers lack sufficient 
understanding of machine learning and of the target domain and cannot do more than act 
as messengers. They do so by extracting and transferring knowledge which leads to failed 
attempts to de-contextualize the machine learning knowledge from the source domain and 
to contextualize it to the target domain. To solve this, realization sets in that translation 
requires deeper insights into both domains. This means a move away from merely acting 
as a messenger to an interpreter role, aiming to examine the machine learning knowledge 
and domesticating it in the target domain. While it is possible for the brokers to reach a 
deeper understanding of the target domain, the opaque nature of learning algorithms 
prevents them from understanding how algorithmic predictions are generated. Because of 
this, the brokers experience an impassable knowledge boundary between them and the 
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source domain, which triggers them to act as curators and substitute the machine learning 
knowledge with their own human judgments 
 
Figure 3.5 Theoretical model of brokering machine learning knowledge 
 
 
Bringing together the fields of emerging technologies and organizational theory allows 
for the emergence of a new phenomenon, that of the algorithmic knowledge broker with 
its dynamic and influential nature. More specifically, the current divide between the two 
fields has resulted in an academic understanding of knowledge brokerage in which the 
need to understand the knowledge source to be able to translate has been taken more or 
less for granted. The recent rise of learning algorithms as technologies that generate 
opaque knowledge brings to the fore the need for uniting the two fields. Particularly, our 
case of knowledge brokers in the age of learning algorithms highlights the complex and 
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Studying the translation practices of opaque machine learning knowledge reveals that 
knowledge brokers can become increasingly influential, even to the extent that brokers 
can eventually substitute the original knowledge sources, and gives us a better 
understanding of how and why this growth in influence happens. Below, we offer the key 
contributions of our study. 
3.6.1 Algorithmic brokerage work as translating from and translating to 
One of the core findings of the research presented in this paper is that algorithmic 
knowledge brokers enact different translation practices over time in their efforts to 
translate machine learning knowledge to practice. This dynamic perspective on brokerage 
work offers new insights into the literature on knowledge brokers and to translation 
theory.  
Previous studies argued that knowledge brokerage tasks emerge when a semantic 
boundary hinders two groups from sharing knowledge (Boari & Riboldazzi, 2014; Carlile, 
2004; Dougherty, 1992) and reasoned that knowledge brokers could resolve boundaries and 
align perspectives by enacting translation practices (Barley, 1996; Grady & Pratt, 2000; 
Kellogg et al., 2020; Paul & Whittam, 2010; Tushman & Katz, 1980; Wenger, 1999). We 
contribute to the knowledge brokerage literature by providing a more fine-grained and 
dynamic perspective on how knowledge brokers enact translation practices over time and 
in relation to opaque machine learning knowledge. Building on Røvik (2016) and based on 
our empirical findings, we consider ‘extracting’ and ‘examining’ as practices to translate 
from machine learning knowledge, and ‘transferring’, ‘domesticating’, and ‘substituting’ as 
practices to translate to domain knowledge, which offers a more refined insight into the 
complexity of brokerage work.  
For brokers to resolve a semantic boundary and to translate knowledge, prior research 
has emphasized the need to understand the source domain and the target domain (Brown 
& Duguid, 1998; Carlile, 2004; Gal et al., 2020; Shulman, 1987; Sturdy & Wright, 2011). Our 
research reveals that, in the case of learning algorithms, such “contextual bilingualism” 
(Røvik, 2016, p. 299) cannot be obtained because gaining a deep understanding of the 
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source domain is impossible. Through the brokers’ failed translation practices, which are 
caused by a lack of understanding of how machine knowledge is generated, a knowledge 
boundary solidified between the machine learning domain and the brokers. As we 
mentioned above, most research on knowledge brokers mainly focuses on the semantic 
boundary that brokers should be able to resolve (Boari & Riboldazzi, 2014; Carlile, 2004; 
Dougherty, 1992). Our case shows that, in the efforts to resolve a semantic boundary 
between the source domain and the target domain through translation practices, 
knowledge boundaries can solidify between knowledge brokers and the groups they intend 
to connect. This added complexity regarding knowledge boundaries uncovers an 
additional understanding of knowledge brokers; by translating knowledge, they can create 
their own boundaries.  
By unpacking the practices through which brokers translate knowledge from the source 
and to the target domain, this study also contributes to translation theory (Callon, 1986; 
Czarniawska & Sevón, 2005; Latour 1986, 2005; Law, 2002; Røvik, 2016) by emphasizing 
the dynamic and changing nature of translation practices. Moreover, while translation 
theory scholars have paid extensive attention to how ideas are translated to specific fields 
and organizations (e.g., Bergström, 2007; Ciuk & James, 2014; Mueller & Whittle, 2011; 
Nielsen et al., 2014; Saka, 2004; Waldorff, 2013), only a few studies have focused on how 
knowledge is translated from its original source (Furusten, 1999; Heusinkveld & Benders, 
2005; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2001). These studies, so far, did not address what translation 
entails if knowledge boundaries are impassable, such as in the case of learning algorithms. 
Our case offers an extreme example in which the knowledge that needs to be translated is 
highly complex, embedded, and implicit (Røvik, 2016) and brings to the fore the 
importance of the first ‘translating from’ phase for the process of translation.  
3.6.2 Algorithmic knowledge brokers as influential curators 
Another core finding of this study are the knowledge brokerage roles that change to 
become more influential over time. Especially the emergence of algorithmic knowledge 
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brokers as curators, acting as ‘kings in the land of the blind’ adds to our understanding of 
the role of knowledge brokers as influential and consequential.  
Research on knowledge brokers has largely regarded these actors to be neutral 
intermediaries who deal with the knowledge of others but have no recognizable knowledge 
of their own (Barley, 1996; Barley & Bechky, 1994). To better understand the influential 
nature of algorithmic brokerage work, the analogy of art curators provides a useful lens. 
Around the 16th Century, with the materialization of ‘cabinets of curiosity’, art curators 
emerged and became responsible for taking care of works of art and valuable objects. In 
that time, they were leveraging the direct connection between artists and collectors. The 
cabinets were closed to the public and housed the private art collections of wealthy 
citizens. Stemming from the Latin word cura, the art curators’ work at that time was to 
take care of art objects behind closed doors and was not considered to have a recognizable 
status. Interestingly, with the rise of public museums, the caretaking efforts triggered the 
public to consider art curators as experts of art objects (Balzer, 2014; Teather, 1990). Over 
time, art progressed into “too many artists, too many movements, too many artworks in 
too many shows, too much discussion” (Balzer, 2014, p. 65). The direct connection between 
an artist and a collector thus was vanishing and knowledge about art became increasingly 
abstract and difficult to understand. Given their knowledge of art sources, art curators 
stepped in as key figures in the translation of art towards the wider public and were usually 
blindly trusted by collectors.14 The story of art curators is particularly helpful because it 
reveals the change from hidden caretakers to a highly influential and independent 
occupation. The historical journey of curators helps us to understand that, in contrast to 
our previous understanding of knowledge brokers as neutral intermediaries, the 
algorithmic brokers in our study become so influential that they may move away from the 
knowledge source and substitute it with their human judgments. 
It is interesting to note that the development of the art curator role departs from the 






data cleaners, or data editors (e.g., Carah, 2014; Karasti et al., 2006; Kellogg et al., 2020; 
Muller et al., 2009; Parmiggiani & Miria, 2020). Some studies describe how such curator 
activities happen ‘behind the scenes’ of technology development and are therefore usually 
invisible (Sachs, 2020). For example, Gray and Suri (2019) described how “ghost workers” 
emerged because of the need to review the content and quality of the data that is used for 
training learning algorithms. As the current focus of curation is mainly on the input of 
technology, our case of algorithmic knowledge brokers as curators shifts this perspective 
towards the output of learning algorithms, just like the output of art. This study therefore 
emphasizes the need to acknowledge that algorithmic knowledge brokers acting as 
curators can occupy a much more influential role than what was previously assumed in the 
invisible ‘ghost work’ of data curators and to unpack the consequences of curation for how 
machine learning knowledge is (re)presented to users.  
3.6.3 Practical implications and future research  
This study offers practical implications for domain experts, managers, and technology 
developers engaged in the development and implementation of emerging technologies in 
organizations. In various fields and parts of organizations, dealing with issues around 
explainability of technology is becoming an important topic. As we have seen so far, on 
the side of technology developers and regulatory bodies these issues are mainly assumed to 
reside in the ‘translating from’ side and technical solutions are offered (e.g., Barredo et al., 
2020; Doran et al., 2017; Kirsch, 2017; Lipton, 2018; Miller, 2019; Mittelstadt et al., 2019; 
Preece et al., 2018; Robbins, 2019). On the other hand, organizations are generally 
interested in the ‘translating to’ side when confronted with issues of algorithmic 
(in)transparency and push for more contextualization towards the target domain without 
recognizing the need for explaining how machine learning knowledge is generated (Henke 
et al., 2018; Kellogg et al., 2020). Our study emphasizes, however, that one cannot exist 
without the other, which requires involving both the technology developers and domain 
experts, for example, through mutual reflection and adaptation already during the 
development and implementation process (Van den Broek et al., 2021; Zhang et al., 2020). 
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Involvement in terms of understanding each other’s thought worlds requires more long-
term investments and new skills (Waardenburg et al., 2021). For example, developers need 
social skills to understand the domain needs, domain experts need technical skills to 
understand the reasoning behind and limits of these technologies. Developing such skills 
will provide a first step to overcome the knowledge boundary between machine learning 
knowledge and the user domain.  
This study also shows that algorithmic knowledge brokers are not neutral 
intermediaries that can objectively represent algorithmic predictions, but are likely to 
include their own interpretations. While brokerage work can be crucial for using learning 
algorithms in practice, it needs clear demarcations through, for example, regulation and 
close monitoring to prevent the work from going beyond translating into substituting. As 
Røvik (2016) emphasized: “the more the transfer process is regulated by authorities, the 
less transformable the transferred construct is for the translator.” (p. 300). Also, to be able 
to perform brokerage work, our case highlights data access as an important resource for 
brokers to be able to translate algorithmic predictions to the expert domain. Yet, while 
data access can offer transparency, this study shows that unguided data access can also 
trigger brokers to trust their own interpretations more than algorithmic predictions and 
set aside the learning algorithm.  
It is worth noting several boundary conditions of our study, which also open up 
opportunities for further research. Our case shows that occupational values matter for how 
desirable access to explanations may be from the perspective of the user. In our study, the 
users (i.e., police managers) did not feel the need for an explanation of machine learning 
knowledge and blindly left the responsibilities of translating the knowledge with the 
intelligence officers. While brevity and action orientation are virtues in the police 
occupational culture, this might be different in other occupational groups, such as 
radiology, where the decision-making practices of the users might require as much 
evidence as possible (e.g., Rezazade Mehrizi et al., 2020). We encourage future studies to 
look at other occupational domains to further understand the differences in explanations 
required and to provide further insights into who or what is accountable in the age of 
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learning algorithms. Also, we presented a case of the use of a learning algorithm within a 
highly hierarchical and siloed organizational structure which hindered the interaction 
between the different groups. It would be interesting for advancing our knowledge on 
algorithmic knowledge brokering, to also include more innovative or flat research settings, 
in which different relationships exist between developers and users (such as co-creation or 
agile technology development). Finally, our study focused on a relatively basic and simple 
version of a learning algorithm, which nevertheless had a fundamental consequence for 
work and organizing. With the emergence of more advanced and even more opaque 
learning algorithms and computational techniques such as artificial intelligence tools 
based on deep learning, these consequences can be further enlarged. We thus encourage 
future research to continue to unpack algorithmic brokerage work to provide deep insights 




Learning algorithms, because of their highly complex, embedded, and implicit nature, 
offer an extreme case for understanding how knowledge brokers translate knowledge in 
practice. In this study, we provided a case of knowledge brokers who aimed to translate 
machine learning knowledge to a target domain. Translation has always been the core of 
knowledge brokerage work, yet so far has been mainly taken for granted. It is now, in the 
age of learning algorithms, of significant importance to question how knowledge brokers 
are able to translate from a source domain, since these domains have become increasingly 
difficult to understand. As this study shows, when the source domain is opaque to all actors 
involved, brokers can become ‘kings in the land of the blind’ and decide to substitute 
machine learning knowledge with their own judgments. The case of learning algorithms 
therefore highlights that knowledge brokers should not be considered as merely 
instrumental in solving knowledge boundaries but even more so as highly influential 
curators of knowledge.  
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Simplified examples of the dataset used in CAS 
 
Table A1. Simplified visualization of the dataset used for developing CAS 
Line Square 
ID 



















in last 2 
weeks 
1 1 10 150,000 25 5 11 1 (Yes) 
2 1 10 150,000 25 12 7 1 (Yes) 
77 2 4 450,000 40 2 25 1 (Yes) 
153 3 11 250,000 65 30 0 0 (No) 
 
Table A2. Simulated and simplified example of predicted crime probabilities 
Square 
ID 



















last 2 weeks 
Predicted 
burglary 
4 12 170,000 28 6 13 1 (Yes) 0.81 
5 3 480,000 38 2 21 1 (Yes) 0.95 
6 9 220,000 68 41 0 0 (No) 0.13 
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Appendix 2 
Visual map of main events 
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Appendix 3  
Example of CAS time predictions compared to intelligence officers’ own outputs 
 
Type of crime CAS  
(algorithmic predictions) 
Intelligence officers’ explainable 
tool (historic patterns) 
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Source: Observation notes 












4. Organizing for AI at work 









Artificial intelligence (AI) systems are intended to accomplish tasks that are normally 
performed by humans. Their unique features – the dependence on large amounts of data, 
the ability to self-learn which limits explainability, and the capability to generate 
alternative, pattern-based insights – make them fundamentally different from the 
technologies that organizations have previously implemented. However, because of the 
strong divide in management scholarship between either a focus on technology 
development or on organizational change, the features of AI are generally left out when 
studying its influence in organizations. Using examples from five large organizations that 
implemented AI in their organizational processes, we unpack how organizations need to 
“cross the implementation line” between technology development and organizational 
change to organize for data, organize for explainability, and organize for alternative 
insights. These AI implementation practices require developers and organizational actors 
to engage in continuous and reflective “collaborative learning”, which has socio-technical 
consequences for both technology development and organizing. Taking a holistic 
perspective on AI system implementation offers new insights to the current understanding 
of the relationship between AI and organizing, including a plea for slow system 
development.  
 









Artificial intelligence (AI) refers to a field in computer science that is concerned with 
creating systems that can accomplish tasks that normally require human intelligence 
(Nilsson, 1971; Pesapane, Codari, & Sardanelli, 2018). By using learning algorithms, AI 
systems can generate decisions, classifications, or predictions that “resemble those of a 
knowledge worker” (Faraj, Pachidi, & Sayegh, 2018, p. 62). Recent technological 
developments – i.e., increasing datafication and computing power – have made 
mainstream AI implementation possible in organizations. Workers are therefore 
increasingly confronted with systems that are able to perform tasks previously left to 
humans. Accordingly, a number of scholars have turned their attention towards the 
potential organizational impacts of AI systems (e.g., Faraj et al., 2018; Gal, Jensen, & Stein, 
2020; Glaser, Valadao, & Hannigan, 2021; Kellogg, Valentine, & Christin, 2020; Raisch & 
Krakowski, 2021; Von Krogh, 2018). However, as AI systems have the potential to learn and 
adjust unlimitedly, merely looking at the ‘organizational side’ is not enough to fully 
understand its consequences. Instead, studying AI systems requires a holistic perspective 
that “crosses the implementation line” (Leonardi, 2009) to include both organizational and 
technological change (Bailey & Barley, 2020).  
In line with earlier calls for including the specific characteristics of technology for 
gaining a deeper understanding of organizational change (Faraj & Pachidi, 2021; Zammuto 
et al., 2007) and to consider “technological and organizational change as mutually 
constitutive in nature” (Leonardi, 2009, p. 295), we examine AI-specific features, how 
organizations cope with these features upon implementing AI systems, and how this 
triggers further technological change. We use empirical examples from data collected in 
organizations in a variety of fields (i.e., healthcare, law enforcement, finance, insurance, 
and recruitment) that have introduced AI systems in their existing work processes. In the 
balance of this paper, we combine existing research with the illustrations from our cases 
to understand how the implementation line can be crossed in the case of AI. By doing this, 
we emphasize a blind spot in current research on AI systems and organizational change: 
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organizing for AI systems calls for a continued intertwinement of organizational actors 
and technology developers, from the technology’s initiation all the way to its deployment 
in practice.  
4.2 Defining the specific features of ai systems 
 
AI is certainly not a new phenomenon, as computer scientists have been occupied with 
whether machines can think since Alan Turing first asked this question in 1950 
(Wooldridge, 2020). Yet, it has only been in recent years that AI systems have been 
increasingly developed for, and implemented in organizations. For example, AI systems 
can now help radiologists detect tumors that are sometimes invisible to the human eye 
(Aerts, 2018; Kim et al., 2021), or they can provide legal support by, within seconds, digging 
through lengthy documents and pinpointing where specific information can be found 
(Zhang et al., 2020). AI systems can reach these new application areas because they are said 
to have three unique features that make them fundamentally different from previous 
‘intelligent technologies’ (e.g., knowledge management systems): (1) they depend on large 
amounts of data, (2) they are self-learning which limits their explainability, and (3) they 
offer alternative, pattern-based insights.  
4.2.1 The data-driven nature of AI systems  
For algorithms to recognize patterns and ‘learn’ from them requires comprehensive data 
sets, which makes data the central building block of AI systems. Data has been the topic 
of much scholarly attention over the past years and many scholars have written about the 
extensive digitization and datafication of organizational processes (e.g., Agostinho, 2019; 
Chen, Chiang, & Storey, 2012; Davenport et al., 2012; Flyverbom & Murray, 2018; Jones, 
2019; McAfee et al., 2012; Newell & Marabelli, 2015; Von Krogh, 2018; Zuboff, 2019). The 
emergence of these studies reflects the rise of a ‘data-driven logic’ in organizations and 
management, which implies an increasing belief in the potential of data to provide better 
insights into, for example, internal organizational practices, market opportunities, or 
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trends (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014; Davenport & Harris, 2017; Lycett, 2017). Moreover, 
since “information technology has become increasingly efficient at capturing and storing 
task-related data across the organization” (Von Krogh, 2018, p. 404), the datafication and 
digitization practices of organizations have become more comprehensive (Brayne, 2017; 
Newell & Marabelli, 2015). Collecting data is now considered necessary for organizations 
to, for example, gain or maintain a competitive advantage (Gregory et al., 2020; Günther 
et al., 2017) or as a “strategic resource” (Hartmann & Henkel, 2020).  
As data sets have become ‘bigger’ over time, they have grown to become so 
comprehensive that organizational actors cannot derive meaningful insights from just 
inspecting their content any longer. The need or wish to generate data-driven insights for 
organizing purposes therefore triggered the development and use of machine learning 
algorithms; a series of coded instructions aimed at solving an arithmetic problem, which 
can improve through experience and thus have a capacity to learn (Tegmark, 2017). In 
order to learn, these algorithms are programmed to automatically identify patterns in the 
data provided. It is generally assumed that the larger the amount of data, the bigger the 
opportunities for uncovering new patterns or relations between existing phenomena, and 
the faster the machine learning algorithm is able to develop. As such, data is the 
foundation for AI systems’ unique capacity to learn (Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2014; 
Davenport & Harris, 2017).  
4.2.2 The self-learning and unexplainable nature of AI systems 
What differentiates learning algorithms from other ‘intelligent technologies,’ such as 
knowledge management systems, is that machine learning does not follow pre-
programmed, rule-based patterns (e.g., by following a decision tree), but can autonomously 
find these patterns by combining large data sets with advanced computational methods 
(Brynjolfsson & McAfee, 2017; Burrell, 2016; Davenport, 2018). This is also referred to as 
‘machine reasoning’ (Burrell, 2016). There are several techniques through which machine 
learning algorithms can be programmed to learn (i.e., supervised learning, unsupervised 
learning, reinforcement learning). For example, in the case of so-called ‘supervised 
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learning’, a machine learning algorithm autonomously derives patterns from labeled data 
(data sets in which each data point has its own tag) through which it learns to recognize 
new data points. If such a system uses a data set with images of forks (data points) all 
labeled as ‘fork’ (tags), then the algorithm will learn to connect these data points with their 
tags and thereafter be able to distinguish ‘forks’ from ‘not forks’.   
Because of this self-learning nature, an AI system can autonomously create connections 
or find patterns between data points (Balasubramanian et al., 2020; Dourish, 2016). 
However, this autonomy of AI systems also creates new problems, for it becomes 
increasingly difficult for humans to understand how these systems arrive at insights 
(Anthony, 2021; Burrell, 2016; Christin, 2020a; Zhang et al., 2021). Machine learning 
algorithms are therefore often described as “black boxes” which are closed-off or “opaque” 
to their users (e.g., Ajunwa, 2020; Burrell, 2016; Introna, 2016; Pasquale, 2015). Various 
organizational scholars have argued that this black-boxed nature of AI systems is 
problematic in practice, for it creates difficulties for users to trust and use these algorithms 
in their decision-making processes (Bader & Kaiser, 2019; Christin, 2017; Gal et al., 2020; 
Glikson & Wooley, 2020). Moreover, the more advanced machine learning algorithms 
(such as neural networks) not only leave users but even AI developers in the dark about 
how learning algorithms arrive at insights (Faraj et al., 2018; Lindebaum & Ashraf, 2021; 
O’Neil, 2016; Zhang et al., 2021). This poses new organizational challenges regarding how 
to implement a system that cannot be explained.  
4.2.3 Offering alternative, pattern-based insights 
The ability of learning algorithms to autonomously create connections and find patterns 
between data points results in another unique characteristic to AI systems, which is that 
this makes them able to arrive at alternative, pattern-based insights with the potential to 
transcend human knowledge (Agarwal & Dhar, 2014; Agrawal, Gans, & Goldfarb, 2018; 
Davenport & Kirby, 2016; Domingos, 2015; Ford, 2018; Leavitt et al., 2020; Tshitoyan et al., 
2019). Especially the more advanced techniques, such as reinforcement learning, add to this 
potential. With reinforcement learning, computer scientists aim to approach and resemble 
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how children learn, by ‘handing over’ a data set to a learning algorithm and having it figure 
out by itself which combinations lead to a good outcome (Gollapudi, 2016). For example, 
when trying to teach an algorithm to play various Atari games, computer scientists used 
reinforcement learning. Without receiving any specific instructions, the algorithm learned 
by itself to play a number of different games but was especially exceptional in playing 
‘Pong’ (a game where you have to remove a brick wall by using a ball and a bat). Looking 
back at the playing history, the learning algorithm started off badly, missing the ball nearly 
every time. Yet, slowly the system became better and eventually developed new strategies 
for optimally playing the game, obtaining the highest number of points with the least hits 
(Wooldridge, 2020).  
In general, according to computer scientists, the alternative, pattern-based insights 
promise to be more objective, efficient, and new (Cukier & Mayer-Schönberger, 2013). 
They are argued to be more objective because the data that is used for training learning 
algorithms is supposed to be ‘raw’ which, compared to human experts, represents reality 
more holistically and objectively (Agrawal et al., 2018; Cukier & Mayer-Schönberger, 2013; 
Jones, 2019; Kitchin, 2014; Siegel, 2016; Van den Broek et al., 2021). For example, for tasks 
such as employee selection or crime judgement, scholars have argued that human biases or 
irrational decisions can be avoided by using AI systems that can automatically derive 
patterns from large amounts of data (Kleinberg et al., 2017; Kuncel et al., 2013). Because of 
the speed with which AI systems can analyze data and uncover underlying patterns, AI-
based insights are expected to be more efficient (Domingos, 2015; Schildt, 2017). For 
example, Zhang et al. (2020) described how lawyers engaged in the development of an AI 
system that could analyze court files containing hundreds of pages and could suggest where 
to find a specific data source in only seconds, something that would normally take lawyers 
weeks to achieve. Finally, because learning algorithms can not only find patterns or 
connections that have been prepared by humans, but generate their own ‘ground up’ rules, 
AI-based insights are promised to be new or different from what was known before (Bonde 
Thylstrup, Flyverbom, & Helles, 2019; Henriksen & Bechmann, 2020; Kitchin, 2014; Leavitt 
et al., 2020). For example, Beck et al. (2011) have described how, in the field of radiology, a 
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machine learning algorithm for analyzing breast tissue to predict breast cancer discovered 
new markers that could indicate breast cancer which were previously unknown to 
radiologists.  
4.3 The role of technology for understanding organizing 
 
The unique features of AI systems bring to the fore questions about how these features are 
implicated when machine learning algorithms are implemented and deployed in an 
organizational context. The question of whether and how technology influences 
organizing is not new to organizational literature. In their recent work, Faraj and Pachidi 
(2021) date such questions as far back as Marx’s work in 1847 and Schumpeter’s in 1942. 
Interestingly, organizational scholars have only recently pointed out that, while questions 
around technology and organizing might have been around for nearly two centuries, many 
organizational scholars have refrained from taking into account how specific features of 
technology and forms of organizing are intertwined (Bailey & Barley, 2020; Faraj & 
Pachidi, 2021; Faraj et al., 2018; Kellogg et al., 2020; Leonardi & Barley, 2010; Orlikowski, 
1992). In the past, some organizational scholars have specifically called for the inclusion of 
technological features to understand organizational form and change (Zammuto et al., 
2007). To understand why this still did not happen, Leonardi (2009) provided a useful 
model in which he emphasized the tendency for organizational scholars to maintain a fixed 
(yet artificial) line between technology development and technology use (see Figure 4.1). 
Leonardi (2009) argued for the need to “cross the implementation line” to understand how 
technological and organizational change are inherently intertwined. In addition, some 
recent scholars have started to unpack specific technological features (e.g., Brayne, 2017; 
Faraj et al., 2018; Gal et al., 2020; Van den Broek et al., 2021). For example, in her quest to 
understand “what data can do,” Christin (2020b) attempted to break down the umbrella 
concept “data” into smaller types (e.g., metadata, biometrics, indicators) and used this to 
unpack how mechanisms such as “tracking” or “nudging” can emerge. Yet, the perspective 
in which the specific features and thus the agency of technology is taken into account for 
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understanding organizational phenomena, is still largely neglected or put aside in the field 
of organizational research (Faraj & Pachidi, 2021; Leonardi & Barley, 2010). 
Figure 4.1 The “implementation line” Leonardi (2009, p. 294) 
!
As we discussed above, the unique features of AI systems make them fundamentally 
different from, and potentially much more consequential than any other technology that 
organizations have previously implemented. This makes having a deep understanding of 
the relationship between technology development and organizational deployment even 
more pressing. As AI systems depend on large amounts of data, this requires bringing 
together organizational processes (to gather data) and technology development (to learn 
from that data). Because AI systems are self-learning, organizational involvement is 
required to validate the system and decide whether it is ‘good enough’. And because AI 
systems can generate alternative, pattern-based insights, technology developers have to 
remain involved when the system is deployed in the organization to make sure the insights 
continue to ‘make sense’ (Waardenburg, Huysman, & Agterberg, 2021). Accordingly, the 
plea for a more holistic perspective on studying technology implementation (Bailey & 
Barley, 2020; Leonardi, 2009; Leonardi & Barley, 2010) is more urgent than ever. Yet, 
despite attempts at unpacking specific features of technology (e.g., Brayne, 2017; Christin, 
2020b; Faraj et al., 2018; Gal et al., 2020; Van den Broek et al., 2021) and studies regarding 
the potential organizational consequences of emerging technologies, such as AI systems 













Krakowski, 2021; Von Krogh. 2018), what is still left to be studied is how the 
“implementation line” can be crossed in the case of AI, in which technology development 
and organizational deployment are often worlds apart.  
4.4 Implementing ai systems in practice 
 
In this section, we present five illustrative cases that offer deep insights into the 
relationship between the AI-specific features and organizational implementation. The 
examples are derived from a collective research effort and for every illustration at least one 
of the authors was involved in the data collection. By bringing together the various cases 
of AI implementation, we saw strong overlaps between them and decided to further 
explore this. We constructed case narratives, between 10 and 14 pages each, in which we 
provided detailed information about the AI system and the implementation process. We 
then zoomed in on the practices enacted by the organizations in the implementation of 
the AI systems and found three overlapping “AI implementation practices” that linked to 
the technology’s key features: (1) organizing for data, (2) organizing for explainability, and 
(3) organizing for alternative insights. We went back to the literature related to AI 
implementation and found that our cases further substantiated or offered alternative 
perspectives to the current understanding of AI implementation in organizations. Below, 
we first give a brief summary of the five cases, after which we take a closer look at the three 
AI implementation practices that we identified, which we embed in the literature on data-
driven work and organizing, black-boxed or opaque technologies, and the changing nature 
of work.  
4.4.1 Introduction of illustrations 
Predictive policing. Since 2008, police departments across the world have turned their 
attention to developing and using AI systems to predict where and when a crime is most 
likely to occur. The main aim of implementing these systems is not to “catch thieves” but 
to more efficiently and effectively schedule and deploy police officers. One of the most 
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well-known examples is PredPol, developed by the Los Angeles Police Department, but 
there are many more examples across the world. In 2012, the Dutch police set up a project 
group to develop their own “predictive policing” AI system. These systems are not 
undisputed. For example, mainstream media regularly claim that learning algorithms can 
create ‘self-fulfilling prophecies’ of crime. By carrying out targeted actions at predicted 
locations, police officers automatically register more crimes at those locations. Since these 
crimes count as data points, to be used for training learning algorithms, a location can 
become labeled as a ‘high crime area’ through a vicious cycle of algorithmic predictions. 
Another common argument is that such systems reinforce profiling (e.g., targeting people 
with a specific ethnic background), as these systems contain prejudices that have been 
ingrained in police work for decades. Partially due to these warnings, the Dutch police 
hired a group of data scientists in 2012 to create an AI system that would be less sensitive 
to these criticisms. The team eventually built a supervised learning algorithm using a 
relatively simple logistic regression analysis and called it the “Crime Anticipation System” 
(CAS). To predict a week in advance where and when a crime will happen, the variable 
“incident versus no incident” is related to approximately 55 predictors, such as previous 
crimes, average household income, and household size. To reduce chances of profiling, no 
individual-related variables are included. Based on the existing data, the algorithm is 
trained to learn a mapping between the predictive variables and whether an incident did 
or did not occur. To this day, CAS predicts a week in advance where (per 125m2 block) and 
when (per 4-hour timeframe) the chances of pattern-based crimes (e.g., burglary, car theft, 
robbery) are highest. CAS is used across almost all 168 Dutch police stations 
(Waardenburg et al., 2021).  
Predictive tumor modeling. In recent years, the healthcare industry has faced a shift 
towards “value-based healthcare” (VHBC) aimed at both maximizing the quality of patient 
care as well as reducing the costs of providing care. This has major consequences for many 
areas of medical expertise but especially for radiologists. After all, radiologists are often 
frontrunners when it comes to technological innovation (e.g., the x-ray innovation was the 
trigger for the profession to emerge in the first place). In the past ten years, the images 
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developed and used by radiologists have become digitized; in other words, they are 
digitally produced, reported, and archived. The increased amount of digital imaging 
available has led to a corresponding demand for quantitative analysis of these images. 
Accordingly, many hospitals are now implementing AI systems to automate tasks that 
previously belonged to the work of radiologists, such as image review and image processing 
support. This is also the case at a large Dutch hospital, where members of the radiology 
department are involved in the development and deployment of a learning algorithm 
focused on recognizing and predicting the growth pattern of a vestibular schwannoma 
(VS). A VS is a benign tumor that grows slowly within the ear and skull. Despite being 
benign, the slow but continued growth of a VS can put pressure on the nerves and 
brainstem, causing symptoms such as hearing loss, dizziness, balance problems, and facial 
paralysis. The supervised learning algorithm for modeling VS tumors serves two purposes. 
First, it can automatically process MRI scans, segment the VS tumors, and calculate the 
volume of tumors. Second, based on scans and clinical information from the Ear, Nose, 
and Throat (ENT) department, a predictive model estimated the development of the VS 
tumors. This way, scans can be scheduled and performed more efficiently, taking time-
consuming tasks off the hands of radiologists, and making follow-up treatments for 
patients faster and more personalized (Kim et al., 2021). 
Predictive people analytics. Many organizations around the world face a growing 
number of applicants. MultiCo15, one of the world’s largest Fast-Moving Consumer Goods 
organizations, faces more than 10,000 applicants every year for their European talent 
programs. To cope with the large number of applicants and to improve the efficiency and 
objectivity of the hiring process, MultiCo asked and external technology developer 
(NeuroYou16) to create an AI system for recruitment purposes. NeuroYou developed an AI 
system to be used in the first round of the talent program selection process. In this round, 
applicants are asked to play fifteen online neuroscientific games, which assess traits such 
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algorithm used in the AI system is trained on the profiles of successful MultiCo employees. 
Having learned a mapping between character traits and employee ‘success,’ the system 
predicts whether applicants are likely to be successful employees within MultiCo (and 
should therefore continue to the next round of interviews). The learning algorithm was 
first implemented at the Sales department of MultiCo Europe but, since it has been 
evaluated as a success by the organization, is now also in use at the IT department and at 
MultiCo’s global headquarters in the United States. Recently, new discussions have started 
with NeuroYou about extending the use of AI beyond the first selection round and also 
using automatic video analysis software. The use of AI systems at MultiCo is thus still also 
in constant development (Van den Broek et al., 2021). 
Fraud prediction. Over the last years, the financial sector has increasingly been 
confronted with the need for societal engagement. For example, banks play an important 
role in the fight against financial crime. Across the world, around 2,400 billion euros a year 
account for criminal transactions, including money laundering and financial terrorism. 
Detecting suspicious transactions is much like looking for a needle in a haystack; it takes 
a lot of time and requires very precise work. Banks around the world are therefore trying 
to find technological solutions to increase the effectiveness of detecting suspicious 
transactions to fulfill their responsibilities. Specifically focusing on money laundering, 
BankCo17, a large bank operating in the European market, developed the so-called ‘Anti-
Money Laundering’ (AML) system; an AI system for generating targeted, potential 
laundering alerts. The system uses both supervised and unsupervised models. The 
supervised model is trained on existing alerts, finding a mapping between an alert and the 
predictive variables. This way, the supervised model can improve the quality and efficiency 
of the alerts already known to BankCo. In addition, the unsupervised model is a type of 
“anomaly detection model;” a model aimed at detecting outliers or rare actions. The 
unsupervised model can discover new, unknown money laundering patterns and has the 





unsupervised model are implemented in the daily work of the human money laundering 
analysts.  
Helpdesk chatbot. The insurance industry faces customer expectations around 24/7 
service and immediate support. In response to these expectations, insurance companies are 
implementing chatbots that have the benefits of 24/7 availability. While chatbots are in 
use for a number of years already, most have not proven to be very useful because they had 
to be pre-programmed and could only answer a very limited number of questions. For 
example, the earlier chatbots required pre-composed scripts that resembled question-
answer conversations typically performed by helpdesk employees (e.g., questions about the 
coverage of certain policies or how to make adjustments to insurance contracts). Because 
these scripts provide a fixed sequence of steps that a chatbot could follow, these tools are 
called “linear” chatbots. InsureCo18, a large international insurance company, also started 
with a pre-programmed linear chatbot but has continued to work on the tool and has 
developed it into a supervised learning algorithm using natural language processing. This 
so-called “nonlinear” chatbot can solve a much wider variety of queries because the 
machine learning algorithm is trained to recognize the meaning a particular phrase can 
have in a particular situation. For example, the AI system is trained to recognize all 
possible words that represent the subject or the direct object; in the sentence ‘there is 
damage to my car’, the learning algorithm is trained to recognize the subject (‘damage’) 
and the direct object (‘car’). In this way, the learning algorithm can find the connections 
between the different words and learn to unpack the intention behind a large number of 
questions, which helps to provide the right information to the customer.  
Table 4.1 provides an overview of the details related to the above-mentioned five 
illustrative cases. Below, we use these examples and discuss them in further detail to 
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Table 4.1 Overview of illustrations 
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4.4.2 Organizing for data 
As we have discussed above, data is the fundamental building block of AI systems. Big data 
is a ‘big’ topic, which obtained a lot of scholarly attention (e.g., (e.g., Agostinho, 2019; 
Chen, Chiang, & Storey, 2012; Flyverbom & Murray, 2018; Gregory et al., 2020; Jones, 2019; 
Lycett, 2017; Newell & Marabelli, 2015). Yet, what data should be about (‘the content’) 
when developing AI systems for organizing purposes, and how data is constructed in a way 
that fits AI system development is often overlooked or put aside in organizational 
literature (Parmiggiani, Østerlie, & Almklov, 2021). This is specifically problematic 
because data is used to train learning algorithms, which means that how data is gathered, 
produced, and constructed can have fundamental consequences for the functioning of AI 
systems (Pachidi et al., 2020). Our case examples show that to develop AI systems that fit 
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within organizational processes, data gathering is not just a ‘technical’ activity on the side 
of AI developers. Instead, to cope with the data-driven nature of AI systems requires active 
organizational involvement around organizing for data; a collaborative process between AI 
developers and organizational actors to generate the right data set, which often requires 
new data-related tasks, roles, and expertise within an organization.  
Making AI systems fit well with organizational processes preferably requires data that 
is derived from within the organization, which means that to ensure that sufficient data is 
available to train a learning algorithm, organizational activities around data gathering and 
data construction have to be performed. For example, for the development of the 
recruitment AI system at MultiCo, the developers asked MultiCo’s HR-professionals to 
provide data about the organization’s own employees. The developers were convinced that, 
if they trained the learning algorithm using data that included characteristics, such as 
personal traits and skills, of MultiCo’s own employees, the AI system would be better able 
to make accurate and organization-specific predictions. However, this data was not yet 
available and required MultiCo’s HR-professionals to approach 300 employees and ask 
them to play online neuroscientific games made available by the AI developers. These 
games measured, for example, employees’ ability to concentrate, their emotional 
intelligence, and their leadership qualities. In addition, the developers also asked the HR-
professionals to provide performance data (i.e., data about how well each employee 
performed in the organization) for each of the 300 employees. This way, the scores of the 
online games could be linked to the overall performance of employees, which helped to 
train the learning algorithm to detect which game scores belonged to ‘successful’ 
employees. These were used to predict the suitability of new applicants (Van den Broek et 
al., 2021).  
Organizing for data is thus a key practice already during the development phase of a 
learning algorithm and can include organizational activities like adding new tasks to 
existing roles, which can have implications for existing work practices, such as in the 
example of the HR-professionals at MultiCo described above. In more extreme cases, it 
can also lead to completely new roles for data production and construction. In various 
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organizations we now see so-called “data engineers” who are responsible for gathering, 
cleaning, and preparing datasets for developing and training AI systems (DalleMule & 
Davenport, 2017; Ross, 2019). Such a new role was observable at the radiology department 
of a large hospital, where its members were developing an AI system to predict the growth 
rate of an ear tumor. To train the learning algorithm, the department already had a large 
data set available with existing ear tumor scans. However, just having these images 
available was not enough. Each tumor had to be outlined in the scans, so that the algorithm 
could learn to recognize and distinguish images of tumors from ‘not-tumors’. Since the 
members of the radiology department were planning to develop more AI systems than just 
the one for predicting ear tumor growth, and because analyzing and manually drawing 
contours around the tumors in the scans required a considerable time investment, the 
hospital decided to create a new department dedicated to this data work. They hired non-
radiologists for a so-called “Imaging Services Group” who became solely responsible for 
data preparation (Kim et al., 2021).  
Of course, there are ethical considerations organizations have to be aware of when 
organizing for data. Datafication is widely scrutinized in recent literature (e.g., Crawford 
& Schultz, 2014; Lyon, 2014; Mai, 2016; Tene & Polonetsky, 2013; Van Dijck, 2014) and 
organizations are increasingly criticized regarding their motives for data collection (e.g., 
boyd & Crawford, 2012; Zuboff, 2019). Studies question the objectivity of data by 
emphasizing that categorization is dependent on human judgment (e.g., Barocas & Selbst, 
2016; Elish & boyd, 2018; Gitelman, 2013; O’Neil, 2016) and some empirical studies also 
maintain that collected data will never represent reality (e.g., Pine & Liboiron, 2015; Vad 
Karsten, 2020). For example, journalists tactically upload “quick-and-dirty” articles to 
increase their publication score (Christin, 2017) and employees often consider 
management expectations when reporting their work activities (Cunha & Carugati, 2018; 
Pachidi et al., 2020). Also, AI developers speak a “computer language” that is required for 
coding learning algorithms that is often unfamiliar to organizational actors (Pachidi et al., 
2020; Slota et al., 2020; Van den Broek et al., 2021). This can lead to confusion, 
miscommunication, or failures when organizing for data. Returning to the example of the 
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recruitment AI system at MultiCo, the organization faced the need of the HR-
professionals to acquire data-related knowledge to collect data in a responsible manner 
that would not be detrimental to the existing employees. MultiCo therefore facilitated 
training courses to help the HR-professionals obtain data-related knowledge about, for 
example, sample selection, data quantity and quality, and understanding data legislation, 
such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). At the same time, MultiCo also 
facilitated the interaction between the developers and the HR-professionals, so that the 
developers could find out how to best communicate their needs and wishes for data 
collection to the HR-professionals but also for them to understand the potential pitfalls 
and shortcomings of the data (Van den Broek et al., 2021). To cope with the potential issues 
related to organizing for data, organizational actors thus need to acquire statistical and 
data-related knowledge and technology developers need to obtain the more ‘social skills’ 
related to organizing. 
In sum, the data-driven nature of AI systems requires organizing for data, which has 
socio-technical consequences for organizational actors and for technology developers. On 
the organizational side, it requires new data-related tasks, roles, and expertise. On the side 
of the technology developers, it needs a deeper understanding of datafied work processes 
as well as new, organization-related social skills.  
4.4.3 Organizing for explainability 
How AI systems learn and whether they work are questions generally dealt with by 
computer scientists or AI developers (e.g., Hand & Khan, 2020; Menzies & Pecheur, 2005; 
Xie et al., 2011). These are often technical questions regarding the measurability of 
outcomes (e.g., predictions must be accurate in at least 90% of the cases), which methods 
lead to the best results, and whether outcomes make sense mathematically (e.g., how are 
data patterns modeled). This is also why technical “explainability” is now often considered 
an important condition for AI systems (e.g., Arrieta et al., 2020; Doran, Schultz, & Besolt, 
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2017; Miller, 2019; Robbins, 2019).19 Less attention is paid to whether and how AI systems 
work in an organizational context, which is a challenging question given learning 
algorithms’ black-boxed nature (Ajunwa, 2020; Burrell, 2016; Christin, 2020a; Introna, 
2016; Pasquale, 2015). However, our cases show that implementing AI systems in an 
organizational context requires activities that go beyond looking at technical questions 
and conditions and include whether predictions make sense in practice. In other words, it 
requires organizing for explainability. For example, when the Dutch police implemented 
their predictive policing AI system, the organizational requirement was not only whether 
crime predictions were technically correct but also if the predictions made sense in 
relation to the existing police operations they had to be included in.   
Organizing for explainability is a cumbersome and challenging task, especially because 
there is a large difference between the mathematical reasoning used in AI systems and 
human reasoning based on often years of domain knowledge (Burrell, 2016; Christin, 
2020a). For example, by means of calculations, an AI system might be able to predict 
whether a convicted criminal will reoffend. However, a judge generally builds on years of 
expertise (instead of complex calculations) to make a decision. This difference in reasoning 
makes it difficult for judges to fully trust and accept AI-based predictions (Christin, 2017). 
In line with these struggles, some studies refer to the need to interpret or translate insights 
produced by learning algorithms to make them resonate with human reasoning (Gal et al., 
2020; Henke, Levine, & McInerney, 2018; Waardenburg, Sergeeva, & Huysman, 2018). 
According to these organizational scholars, this requires new roles such as “algorithmic 
brokers” who dedicate their time and work to translating, interpreting, or explaining 
algorithmic outcomes and to “sell” these to their users (Gal et al., 2020; Kellogg et al., 2020). 
At BankCo, where they implemented the AI system to detect money laundering, 
management appointed a number of experienced analysts to act as algorithmic brokers to 
guide other analysts and help them work with the AI-based insights. To support the new 
tasks of the brokers, the AI developers created a “translation machine;” a technical solution 
 
19 E.g., High Level Expert Group on AI Ethics and Guidelines for Trustworthy AI (2019); UNESCO ad hoc expert 
group for recommendations on the ethics of artificial intelligence; GDPR legislation in Europe has even included this 
as an explicit condition when validating and testing AI.  
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that, for example, produced a list of the top three indicators of an alert or a top 20 of the 
most suspicious transactions. Indicators like unusually large cash withdrawals or money 
exchange transactions of a noteworthy large amount were used by the broker analysts to 
put fraud predictions in context and to support their colleagues in trusting and using these 
predictions for their fraud investigations.  
While the role of an algorithmic broker seems to be the ideal solution at first, creating 
new roles for algorithmic brokerage has important implications for the nature of AI. One 
of the general assumptions regarding AI systems is that, because they generate their own 
rules and connections based on large amounts of data, they can produce more objective 
insights compared to human analyses (Davenport & Kirby, 2016; Mayer-Schönberger & 
Cukier, 2013). However, a consequence of algorithmic brokerage is that AI-based insights 
are almost never directly transferred to users but first interpreted or translated. As any 
human decision-making involves subjective influences – such as short-term memory, 
personal preferences, and cultural backgrounds – when algorithmic brokerage activities 
are used to close the gap between AI systems and their users, objectivity of results cannot 
be taken for granted (e.g., Waardenburg et al., 2018). When the Dutch police started using 
an AI system for predicting crime, they also appointed algorithmic brokers to translate 
the predictions towards the police. To make the predictions more relevant, the brokers 
added information such as pictures of potential suspects of the predicted crimes, even 
though this was not included in the AI system. Algorithmic brokers therefore do not 
perform a neutral “translator” role (Henke et al., 2018), maintaining the supposed 
objectivity of algorithmic predictions, but they can actively shape insights by including 
their own interpretations.  
To keep grip on how predictions are transformed in practice, organizing for 
explainability means ensuring transparency in brokerage work by creating feedback loops 
between algorithmic brokers, AI developers, and users (see Figure 4.2). In the case of the 
recruitment AI system at MultiCo, the organization designated a so-called “people 
analytics” (PA) team to perform the work of algorithmic brokers. This team made sure 
that predictions about applicants were usable for managers who handled the applications 
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by, for example, helping managers visualize the scores of applicants compared to high and 
low performing employees. In addition, the team was also responsible for providing 
feedback to the AI developers regarding the usability of predictions in practice and 
potential areas of improvement. One of the results of this feedback was that the AI 
developers integrated a spider chart function into how the output of the AI system was 
presented. By including feedback loops, algorithmic brokers not only translate and 
interpret the AI system’s outputs toward users, they can also translate the user domain 
towards AI developers.  
Figure 4.2 Feedback loops in algorithmic brokerage 
 
In sum, the self-learning nature of AI systems requires organizing for explainability. 
This means that new roles for algorithmic brokering emerge, in which maintaining 
transparency and interaction between users, brokers, and developers is of central 
importance. Organizing for explainability also has socio-technical consequences for 
developers, as this means that they should go beyond finding technical solutions to explain 
AI systems and require deeper knowledge about how AI-based insights resonate in the 
workplace.  
4.4.4 Organizing for alternative insights 
The third unique feature of AI systems is their ability to offer alternative pattern-based 
insights. One of the central aims of implementing AI systems is to automate or augment 
knowledge work but the alternative insights are not an automatic recipe for success, as 
they are sometimes regarded with distrust which might even lead to disuse of the system 
(e.g., Bader & Kaiser, 2019; Christin, 2017; Christin & Brayne, 2020; Glikson & Woolley, 
2020; Jussupow, et al., 2021; Pachidi et al., 2020). To go beyond distrust and disuse to 
automate and augment knowledge work (Raisch & Krakowski, 2021) requires organizing for 
alternative insights, which involves anticipating wider impacts and ripple effects, balancing 
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automation and augmentation of work, and organizing for reflection to trigger the ability 
for organizational learning from these insights.  
AI systems are implemented not only at the level of “factory workers,” as the alternative 
insights are specifically targeted at knowledge workers. This means that the consequences 
of these systems for work will be different than what we have seen with previous 
technologies. Prior research on knowledge work has shown that knowledge consists of 
more than just knowing how to perform individual tasks and includes collaboration 
between experts who collectively contribute to and share it (e.g., Brown & Duguid, 2001; 
Carlile, 2004; Wasko & Faraj, 2005). This means that the expertise included in, for example, 
making a decision is usually derived from a network or “community” of actors (Brown & 
Duguid, 2001). For example, to write a headline piece, journalists not just depend on their 
own knowledge of writing articles, but also on the expertise of others on the topic they 
have selected. Developing and implementing AI-based insights is therefore likely to have 
consequences that go beyond the targeted professionals and create so-called “ripple 
effects” in work processes with often unexpected consequences (Baptista et al., 2020; 
Orlikowski & Scott, 2016). For example, as discussed above, generating AI-based insights 
about the growth-rate of ear tumors had consequences beyond the day-to-day work of 
radiologists and included the emergence of a new “Imaging Services Department” with 
expertise in tagging tumor scans (Kim et al., 2021). Similarly, the introduction of an AI 
system for predicting crime at the Dutch police was aimed to support police managers in 
their decisions about the allocation of work and resources, but it also impacted the work 
of patrol officers in unanticipated ways. Since the learning algorithm largely depended on 
new data for learning, data production became a key task for patrol officers who, as a 
consequence, spent an increasing amount of time behind their computers to report crime 
instead of “catching thieves” (Waardenburg, Sergeeva, & Huysman, 2021).   
There is also a lot of debate about how workers may or may not fall victim to AI systems’ 
ability to take over repetitive and routine tasks (e.g., Jussupow et al., 2021; Manyika et al., 
2017). For example, in the case of radiology, some computer scientists argue that we should 
“stop training radiologists now” (Mukherjee, 2017, p. 12) because learning algorithms are 
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starting to recognize malignancies with greater accuracy than human radiologists. Yet, 
practice shows that radiologists embed AI systems in their work practices in such a way 
that they are able to spend more of their valuable time on complex diagnoses (Kim et al., 
2021). Work can be augmented by automating routine processes, leaving room for more 
meaningful work, such as personal contact with clients or more intellectually challenging 
and knowledge-intensive tasks (Huysman, 2020; Raisch & Krakowski, 2021). Effectively 
organizing for alternative insights is therefore not a matter of choosing between 
automating or augmenting work (e.g., Daugherty & Wilson, 2018; Davenport & Kirby, 
2016), but requires finding a healthy balance between the two (Raisch & Krakowski, 2021). 
However, there is also a downside to this. For example, in the case of the implementation 
of the helpdesk chatbot, the chatbot covered simple, straightforward questions which were 
normally taken up by human helpdesk workers. At first, automating the simple tasks 
seemed to give helpdesk workers more agency and to result in more challenging and 
fulfilling tasks. However, the helpdesk workers were required to constantly take on 
emotionally heavy cases with no possibility to ‘breathe’ in-between (e.g., by taking up one 
of the simpler requests). While emphasis is placed on collaboration between workers and 
AI systems in new forms of “hybrid intelligence” (Ebel et al., 2021; Gal et al., 2020; Glaser 
et al., 2020; Graef et al., 2020; Mirbabaie, Stieglitz, & Frick, 2021) and between AI 
developers and organizations for automation to contribute to the augmentation of work 
(Pasquale, 2020; Raisch & Krakowski, 2021), understanding the unintended consequences 
of AI implementation with the aim to augment work requires deep involvement in the 
targeted work processes. 
Finally, to make use of the potentially increased objectivity, efficiency, and novelty of 
AI-based insights means for organizations to reflect on and learn from them. This links to 
what has been widely discussed in organization literature as “double loop learning” 
(Argyris & Schön, 1997). By reflecting on the insights generated through machine learning, 
organizations can uncover (and thus change) existing assumptions or prejudices about 
which aspects of work could or should be automated (see Figure 4.3). For example, at 
MultiCo, in the development of an AI system for recruitment, the first tests of the learning 
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algorithm made visible that the organization almost always recruited “extraverted” people 
(Van den Broek et al., 2021). This form of double loop learning requires organizational 
actors and AI developers to collaborate closely to progress in both machine learning and 
organizational learning, as reflecting on underlying biases in human decision-making and 
assumptions about work can lead to changes in existing work practices and forms of 
organizing.  
Figure 4.3 Single and double loop learning in the case of AI systems 
 
In sum, the alternative, pattern-based insights that AI systems can offer requires 
organizing for these insights in practice. For organizations, this means anticipating the 
wider impacts and ripple effects that implementing alternative insights can have, 
balancing automation and augmentation of existing work practices, and organizing for 
reflection to learn from these alternative insights. For developers, this means that “keeping 
the human in the loop” remains of central importance across the development and 
implementation of AI systems. Moreover, developers are also required to have a deeper 
understanding of how machine learning and organizational learning relate, to arrive at 
new forms of “hybrid intelligence” (see Table 4.2 for an overview of the three AI 
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Table 4.2 Features of AI systems and new implementation practices 
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In this study, we addressed the question of how technology developers and organizational 
actors can “cross the implementation line” (Leonardi, 2009) in the case of AI systems by 
unpacking the relationship between the specific features of the technology and organizing. 
We discussed how crossing the implementation line in the case of AI systems means 
enacting AI implementation practices to organize for data, explainability, and alternative 
insights, in which both technology developers and organizational actors have to be 
involved for successful AI implementation. As such, crossing the AI system 
implementation line means technology developers stepping out of the “design mode” and 
organizational actors leaving the “use mode” to meet each other in the middle, which we 
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call the “collaborative learning mode,” where actions have socio-technical consequences 
for both technology development and organizing (see Figure 4.4).   
Figure 4.4 Crossing the implementation line re-interpreted 
 
Bringing to the fore the relationship between technological change and organizational 
change offers contributions to existing scholarship on technology and organizing and calls 
for new methods for future research, which we discuss below. 
4.5.1 Technology and organizing 
The role of technology and its features has for a long time been downplayed in studies on 
changing work and organizing (e.g., Leonardi & Barley, 2010; Orlikowski, 2007). 
Organizational scholars have often feared falling back to “technological determinism” and 
have given premacy to the social over the material (or technological) in understanding 
organizational change (Leonardi, 2009; Faraj & Pachidi, 2021; Zammuto et al., 2007). Yet, 
organizational scholars increasingly emphasize the need “to pay attention to what a 
technology lets users do, to what it does not let them do, and to the workarounds that 
users develop to address the latter” (Leonardi & Barley, 2010, p. 35). This paper offers a 
contribution to this urgent call by paying specific attention to the features that are 
involved in organizing for AI implementation, which we substantiate with empirical 
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of data, it is self-learning, and it offers alternative, pattern-based insights – and emphasize 
the AI implementation practices that can be enacted to cope with the features of AI 
systems.  
This paper also offers an alternative perspective to the divide between technology 
design and use – or the “design mode” and “use mode” (Orlikowski, 1992, p. 408) that 
dominated studies on technology implementation (Bailey & Barley, 2020; Leonardi, 2009; 
Van den Broek et al., 2021). While it has long been acknowledged that social construction 
of technology happens by both developers and users (e.g., Boudreau & Robey, 2005; 
Orlikowski, 1992; Weick, 1990; Zammuto et al., 2007), prior research has generally 
considered the design phase to belong to technology developers and the use phase to 
organizational actors (e.g., Forsythe, 1993; Slota et al., 2020). By asking how organizations 
cope with the unique features of AI systems, this study unpacks the mutual dependence of 
technology developers and organizational actors in the implementation of AI, which we 
call the “collaborative learning mode” (see Figure 4.4). For example, coping with the data-
driven nature of AI systems through organizing for data requires organizational actors to 
acquire new data-related skills to actively gather and construct data sets which aids the 
further development of learning algorithms. However, to develop a system that is useful 
in practice requires developers to understand what the user domain looks like, which 
therefore also requires developers to be invested in the organizational side of the AI 
system. Unpacking the mutual dependence of technology developers and organizational 
actors in the “collaborative learning mode” therefore allows us to see how “crossing the 
implementation line” is performed in the case of AI.  
4.5.2 Studying AI in practice 
The focus on “crossing the implementation line” (Leonardi, 2009) and including the unique 
features of technology as well as the organizing efforts in relation to AI systems also offers 
insights into how to study “intelligent technologies” (Bailey & Barley, 2020; Glaser et al., 
2020). We emphasize the need for organizational scholars to take a holistic perspective 
when studying technology, which involves closely following the activities of key groups in 
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the development, implementation, and use of technology to understand their 
consequences for work and organizing. We relate to recent studies calling for a deeper 
accounting of technology and its role in triggering organizational change, without falling 
prey to technological determinism (Faraj & Pachidi, 2021; Pachidi et al., 2020; Sergeeva et 
al., 2020; Van den Broek et al., 2021) and to “bring technology back in” to organizational 
research (Orlikowski & Scott, 2016; Zammuto et al., 2007).  
This implies the importance of studying both the side of the technology, as well as the 
organizational side and requires the specific inclusion of technology developers and their 
decisions regarding the construction of learning algorithms and to trace how these 
decisions lead to opportunities and challenges in using AI systems in practice. Including 
technology developers will help future studies to unpack the technical reasoning behind, 
and included in, learning algorithms – the “design intentions” (Bailey & Barley, 2020; 
Orlikowski, 1992) – as well as the organizational reasoning regarding their deployment. 
This will support further research on the unexpected organizational changes with regards 
to the use of AI systems.  
Organizational scholars thus need to take the specifics of the development of 
technology into account, which means not only a true socio-technical analysis, but also 
that the researchers themselves need to be socio-technically engaged and trained to have 
the absorptive capacity to understand that decisions in the design process matter for the 
implementation and use of technology. We show that such a holistic, socio-technical 
approach is particularly important in the case of AI systems, with their promise to 
generate more objective, efficient, and new insights. Finally, we also emphasize that paying 
attention to technology development – in addition to organizations implementing and 
using the technology – and unpacking the decisions embedded in and the features of the 
AI system calls for getting comprehensive access to the case at hand. Often, technology 
developers are disconnected from the domain where the AI system is put into use. This 
means that developing a holistic perspective on AI system implementation requires access 
to the network of actors and organizations through which an AI system is developed and 
ultimately deployed.  
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4.5.3 Practical implications 
Our study also offers practical implications to technology developers and organizational 
actors. First, our analysis of the “collaborative learning” mode required for AI 
implementation indicates the need for technology developers and organizations to go 
beyond the traditional “silos” that exist between development and use. This also means 
that buying AI systems “off the shelf” is likely not a recipe for long-term success. Instead, 
successful AI development and implementation requires close collaboration between 
developers and organizational actors already from the start. To achieve this requires new 
responsibilities for all actors involved, which also means that these actors need to acquire 
new skills. For technology developers, these skills are focused on the more “social” domains, 
so that they can successfully interact with organizations. For organizational actors, the 
new skills will be mainly related to data and statistics, to better understand the 
possibilities and limits of implementing and using AI systems in practice. Our story, 
therefore, implies the need for technology developers as well as organizations to engage in 
continuous development of skills related to emerging technologies.  
Second, we have shown that the implementation of AI systems in practice requires 
much interaction and reflection of all the actors involved. Our study therefore calls for a 
new perspective on “slow” technology development and implementation in organizations. 
Especially since technologies such as AI systems have the ability to learn and adjust 
indefinitely, “quick prototyping” and handing over is no longer desired. This perspective, 
at first, seems to be in contrast with the recent trend towards agile methods, in which one 
of the core aspects is a quick turnaround between a technology prototype and its use. 
However, “slow development” can actually be combined with agile methods, if only the 
developers continue to be involved with the technology over time. As such, quick 
turnarounds of prototypes need to be combined with continuous interaction, reflection, 
and adjustment for both developers and organizational actors to stay “in the loop” when 
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5.1 Summary of findings and contributions 
 
In the preceding chapters, I presented the findings of three studies that together offer 
insights to how organizations cope with the production and use of machine learning knowledge in 
practice. In the sections below, I summarize the key findings, main contributions, and 
boundary conditions and directions for future research of each study separately (see also 
Table 5.1). After these summaries, I bring the findings of the studies together to address 
the overarching research question of this dissertation, where I also discuss the broader 
theoretical and practical implications. I end this discussion with a methodological 
reflection.  
Table 5.1 Summary of studies 
 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 
Title The burden of data 
production: How anticipating 
data work shapes police 
practices 
In the land of the blind, the 
one-eyed man is king: 
Knowledge brokerage in the 
age of learning algorithms 
Organizing for AI at work: 
Towards a holistic 
perspective on AI system 
implementation 
RQ How do workers cope with 
data work in their situated 
practices? 
How do knowledge brokers 
translate machine learning 
knowledge when they cannot 
understand how this 
knowledge is generated?  
How can the 
“implementation line” be 
crossed in the case of AI 
systems?  
Findings - Three tensions between the 
experience of data work and 
situated work. 
- Three strategies to cope 
with anticipated data work in 
situated practices. 
- Three different brokerage 
roles with associated 
translation practices.  
- Different knowledge 
boundaries between the 
brokers and the developers 
and users.  
- Three core features of AI 
systems 
- Three different AI 
implementation practices.  
- Socio-technical 
consequences of the AI 
implementation practices for 





Producing machine learning 
knowledge in practice 
requires workers to engage 
more in data work. Yet, data 
work as a practice is often 
different from situated work, 
which can create tensions 
that can be highly 
consequential for situated 
work.   
Using machine learning 
knowledge in practice 
requires translation, which 
can be done by algorithmic 
brokers. However, to 
translate requires brokers to 
understand how machine 
learning knowledge is 
generated. This is 
problematic in the case of AI 
and can trigger brokers to 
become curators instead. 
 
Producing and using machine 
learning knowledge in 
practice requires 
organizations to enact AI 
implementation practices 
that bring together 
developers and organizational 
actors in a “collaborative 





- Provides insights into the 
influences of data work on 
situated work.  
- Argues that data 
construction starts at the 
situated practices, even 
before data work is 
performed. 
- Shows the important role of 
anticipation in how data 
work and situated work is 
performed. 
- Offers an integrative 
perspective on organizational 
theory and emerging 
technologies.  
- Reveals the emergence of a 
new phenomenon: 
algorithmic knowledge 
brokers who can become 
increasingly influential. 
- Emphasizes how knowledge 
brokers can create new 
knowledge boundaries. 
- Stresses the importance of 
unpacking how knowledge is 
translated from its original 
source. 
- Shows the relationship 
between the specific features 
of AI and organizing. 
- Highlights the importance 
of collaborative learning 
between developers and users 
for AI implementation. 
- Stresses the need to unpack 
the specifics of technology 
and take a holistic perspective 
when studying AI in practice. 
Future 
research 
Future research may:  
- Look at contexts where data 
production is largely 
automated. 
- Further explore the role of 
the body and emotions in 
data production. 
- Look at less extreme 
contexts for understanding 
tensions between the 
experience of data work and 
situated work and the 
associated responses.  
Future research may:  
- Look at other occupational 
domains to further 
understand the differences in 
explanations required. 
- Use insights from other 
domains to provide further 
insights into who is 
accountable in the age of 
learning algorithms.  
- Look at settings in which 
relationships exist between 
developers and users.  
- Include even more complex 
and opaque tools, such as 
those based on deep learning.  
Future research may:  
- Examine how the 
“collaborative learning mode” 
changes over time in the 
further development and 
deployment of AI systems.  
- Unpack the design 
intentions of developers and 
how these relate to the 
organizational reasoning for 
implementing AI.  
- Explore other features of 
“intelligent technologies” and 
how these features influence 
technology implementation.  
5.1.1 The burden of data production 
In Chapter 2, I asked how workers cope with data work in their situated practices. To 
answer this question, I built on my ethnographic fieldwork of the Dutch police, specifically 
eight months of full-time research at the emergency response department. I spent over 100 
shifts (day, evening, and night) following how police officers went about their situated 
work and performed the associated data work practices. 
Key findings. In this study, I found that, in contrast to what is generally expected 
regarding data work (Cunha & Carugati, 2018; Pachidi et al., 2020; Pine & Liboiron, 2015), 
police officers are not ‘misrepresenting’ their situated activities in their reports. Instead, 
they adjusted their situated work to fit the practice of data work. To explain this outcome, 
I found three tensions the police officers experienced between data work and their situated 
performances. They experienced the practice of data work as bodily constrained, 
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materially rigid, and ethereal, while their experience of their situated work was deeply 
embodied, contextual, and lived. I discovered that to cope with these tensions, the police 
officers enacted three coping strategies in their situated work: avoiding work, deviating 
from protocol, and capturing experiences. Interestingly, by using these coping strategies, 
they adjusted the situated activities that they subsequently had to record, thereby aligning 
their situated performances to reflect the practice of data work. As a consequence, the 
police officers thus ex-ante enacted data work in their situated activities.  
Theoretical contributions. The findings of this study offer contributions to existing 
research on data production and specifically data work (Bossen et al., 2016; Cunha & 
Carugati, 2018; Pachidi et al., 2020; Pine & Bossen, 2020; Pine & Liboiron, 2015; Truelove, 
2019) by emphasizing that, in contrast to how data work has previously been understood, 
data construction is not a stand-alone activity but instead is inherently entwined with 
situated work. I argue that data work practices go beyond “impression management” 
(Cunha & Carugati, 2018) and emphasize the importance of including situated work to 
understand how data work is performed and with what intentions and consequences. In 
addition, by taking a more holistic approach to the experience of data work in practice, I 
offer new insights into the role of the body in data work (e.g., by emphasizing the bodily 
exhausting nature of data work). Finally, I also contribute to studies on anticipation and 
anticipatory work (Barley, 2015; Bucher, Schou, & Waldkirch, 2020; Flyverbom & Garsten, 
2021) by showing that anticipation not only builds upon existing data but is highly 
consequential for how data is constructed.  
Boundary conditions and future research. In this study, the data work performed is 
largely ‘manual,’ which means that data production is not yet automated. There are also 
contexts in which datafication is already a largely automated process, which might lead to 
different or new tensions between the situated work and the data that is being produced. 
Future research could therefore look into cases in which “self-reporting” (Cunha & 
Carugati, 2018) is no longer an option to expand our understanding of how situated work 
changes. In addition, while I provide a first attempt at exploring the role of the body in 
data work, future research can further expand this by looking deeper into the specific role 
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of the body in data work, as well as including the part that emotions play in data 
production. Finally, with my research at the emergency response department, I offer an 
extreme case in which the tensions between situated work and data work are particularly 
prevalent. There are other contexts in which the difference between the two practice 
worlds is less severe, such as cases where situated work and data work are performed in 
the same environment. Studying less extreme cases might lead to more nuanced changes 
in situated work, which may be even more difficult to observe yet just as important to 
understand.  
5.1.2 In the land of the blind, the one-eyed man is king 
In Chapter 3, I set out to understand how knowledge brokers translate machine learning 
knowledge when they cannot understand how this knowledge is generated. For this, I again 
built on my ethnographic work of the Dutch police, yet this time I used 2 years of research 
at the intelligence department where I studied the implementation and deployment of a 
learning algorithm to predict where and when crimes were most likely to occur. 
Key findings. I analyzed the implementation process of the learning algorithm over an 
extended period of time and found that a group of so-called “intelligence officers” – who 
were tasked with translating abstract crime predictions for police managers – enacted 
different translation practices that afforded them to perform increasingly influential 
knowledge brokerage roles over time (i.e., messenger, interpreter, and curator). The 
changes in roles are explained by the knowledge differences that emerged when the 
intelligence officers attempted to translate machine learning knowledge into practice. At 
first, the translation practices of the intelligence officers were informed by their 
unfamiliarity with both the learning algorithm and the police occupational world, yet 
their attempts to simply list and transfer the crime predictions towards the police were 
unsuccessful. The intelligence officers realized that to perform knowledge brokerage work, 
they had to better understand the technical details and domain details. Their efforts to 
better understand the police domain were successful, through which the knowledge 
differences between the intelligence officers and the police domain dissolved. However, 
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no matter how much they tried they could not understand the inner workings of the 
learning algorithm which made the intelligence officers realize that the boundary between 
machine learning knowledge and their human interpretations was impassable. While their 
brokerage work increasingly fitted the police requirements, the intelligence officers 
remained unable to open the black-boxed learning algorithm. As a consequence, they 
eventually substituted machine learning knowledge with their own judgments.  
Theoretical contributions. The study offers an integrative perspective on 
organizational theory and emerging technologies, such as AI systems, and reveals the 
emergence of algorithmic knowledge brokers as a new, dynamic, and influential 
organizational phenomenon. I provide new insights into the literature on knowledge 
brokers (e.g., Brown & Duguid, 1998; Burgess & Currie, 2013; Meyer, 2010; Pawlowski & 
Robey, 2004) by taking a process perspective on knowledge brokerage work. I show that 
the translation practices that knowledge brokers enact over time afford them a unique 
position through which they can grow and become increasingly influential. Also, I 
emphasize that knowledge brokerage work is more complex than merely resolving a 
knowledge boundary between groups, as when they attempt to resolve these boundaries, 
knowledge brokers can create new boundaries between themselves and the groups they 
intend to connect. In addition, by showing what happens to translation in the case of 
opaque machine learning knowledge, the findings contribute to translation theory (e.g., 
Czarniawska & Sevón, 2005; Mueller & Whittle, 2011; Nielsen et al., 2014; Røvik, 2016). 
Since these studies mainly focus on how knowledge is translated to specific recipients, I 
show the importance of unraveling how knowledge is translated from its original source in 
the first place.  
Boundary conditions and future research. This study shows that occupational values 
matter for how desirable access to explanations may be for users. Future studies might look 
at other occupational domains to deeper understand the occupational differences 
regarding required explanations. Unpacking the different occupational values also might 
provide further insights into who or what is accountable in the age of learning algorithms. 
Furthermore, the case presented in this study is highly hierarchical, with a largely siloed 
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organizational structure. This prevented the different groups from interacting with each 
other. To further advance our understanding of algorithmic knowledge brokering, it 
would be interesting to include more innovative or “flat” research settings, where 
relationships between developers and users can exist. Finally, the learning algorithm 
presented in this study is relatively basic, with nevertheless fundamental consequences for 
work and organizing. I encourage future research to continue to unpack algorithmic 
brokerage work in relation to increasingly advanced and complex learning algorithms 
(such as those using deep learning) to provide further insights into the organizational 
consequences of increasingly opaque “intelligent technologies.” 
5.1.3 Organizing for AI at work 
In Chapter 4 I aimed to understand how the “implementation line” between technology 
development and organizational change can be crossed in the case of AI systems. To this 
end, I used empirical examples of five large organizations that implemented AI in their 
organizational processes, combined with a review of current organizational and 
information systems literature on AI systems and technology implementation.  
Key findings. In this study, I first unpack the three key features of AI systems: they 
depend on large amounts of data, they are self-learning which limits their explainability, 
and they offer alternative, pattern-based insights. I then unpack how organizations cross 
the implementation line between technology development and organizational change by 
accounting for the unique features of AI in their organizational processes. Specifically, 
organizations engage in three AI implementation practices: organizing for data, 
organizing for explainability, and organizing for alternative insights. By unpacking these 
practices, I uncover the close relationship required between technology developers and 
organizational actors, a process I define as continuous and reflective “collaborative 
learning.” Because of the close connection between developers and organizational actors, 
enacting the AI implementation practices has socio-technical consequences for both 
technology development and organizing.  
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Theoretical contributions. The findings of this study contribute to the literature on the 
relationship between technology and organizing (Faraj & Pachidi, 2021; Leonardi. 2009; 
Leonardi & Barley, 2010; Orlikowski, 1992; Zammuto et al., 2007). First, by paying specific 
attention to the unique features of AI systems, I emphasize the relationship between the 
specific features of AI and organizational change, which I substantiate with specific 
empirical examples. Moreover, by emphasizing the importance of collaborative learning 
between technology developers and organizational actors, this study offers an alternative 
perspective to the divide between technology design and use that has dominated studies 
on technology implementation (Leonardi, 2009; Orlikowski, 1992). Finally, this study 
builds on and expands recent calls for bringing technology into organizational research 
(Bailey & Barley, 2020; Orlikowski & Scott, 2016; Van den Broek, Sergeeva, & Huysman, 
2021; Zammuto et al., 2007) by stressing the need to unpack the specifics of technology and 
take a holistic perspective, including a variety of actors, when studying AI in practice.  
Boundary conditions and future research. This study offers insights into the need to 
better understand the “collaborative learning mode” between technology developers and 
organizational actors. Future research may further expand on this by examining how this 
collaborative learning changes over time, with the further development and deployment 
of (increasingly advanced) AI systems. Moreover, I encourage future research to pay 
specific attention to studying both the side of the technology and the organizational side, 
as this will help to unpack the technical reasoning included in learning algorithms and to 
compare this to the organizational reasoning regarding their deployment. This will 
support further understanding of the unexpected organizational changes with regard to 
the use of AI in practice. Finally, as the current “intelligent technologies” continue to 
develop quickly, over time, new features may emerge that are important to include in our 
understanding of technology and organizing. I encourage future research to keep a close 




5.2 Response to overarching research question and implications 
 
In Chapter 1 of this dissertation, I introduced AI systems as an emerging organizational 
phenomenon. I discussed that organizations increasingly believe in the promise of 
objective, efficient, and new “machine learning knowledge.” I also explained that not all 
scholars agree with this perspective and that it is increasingly argued that augmenting 
work with AI systems requires bringing together machine learning knowledge and human 
knowledge. I discussed that this leads to a problem that is commonly overlooked in 
existing research, namely that the fundamental difference between the procedures used 
for creating machine learning knowledge and how human knowledge is produced creates 
a knowledge boundary between the two. My goal of this dissertation was therefore to 
examine: How do organizations cope with the production and use of machine learning in practice?  
The findings of this dissertation indicate the distributed, effortful, and consequential 
nature of producing and using machine learning knowledge in practice. In Chapters 2 and 
3, I zoomed in on the micro-practices of producing and using machine learning knowledge 
in practice. In Chapter 2, I described the work that is required to make the data to be used 
for developing and training learning algorithms, and thus for producing machine learning 
knowledge that fits the organizational needs. In Chapter 3, I presented the work of 
algorithmic knowledge brokers that is needed to translate machine learning knowledge 
into practice so that it can ultimately be used. I showed how performing translation work 
cannot be taken for granted, but demands one to understand how machine learning 
knowledge is produced, a requirement that is highly problematic in the case of AI systems. 
Finally, in Chapter 4, I took a broader perspective on the organizing practices required to 
implement AI and I discussed that the production and use of machine learning knowledge 
require new ways of collaboration between technology developers and organizational 
actors. 
Based on the findings presented in this dissertation, I argue that organizational hopes 
and dreams about machine learning knowledge being objective and efficient give a 
distorted picture of the reality of organizing for machine learning in practice. Moreover, 
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while AI systems – using large amounts of data and advanced computational techniques – 
might offer organizations new insights, the findings of this dissertation emphasize that 
leveraging this new knowledge in forms of “hybrid intelligence” and thereby augmenting 
work is not merely a matter of bringing together humans and AI systems. Instead, 
producing and using machine learning in practice requires deep involvement and efforts 
from a wide range of actors, understanding of what AI systems can and cannot produce, 
and careful organizing to keep track of unintended consequences.  
With this dissertation, I emphasize the need for organizational and information systems 
scholars to go beyond the “AI hype” to instead look “behind the scenes of AI.” I showed 
that studying AI behind the scenes means taking a holistic perspective on AI development, 
implementation, and use, including a variety of stakeholders, to uncover and understand 
unexpected patterns of action. This holistic perspective means, for example, unpacking the 
technical details of the AI system as well as the domain details of the intended users, and 
understanding the intentions of AI developers as well as the needs of organizations. This 
is specifically important since AI systems and organizations might seem worlds apart, yet 
how AI systems learn is often largely dependent on and intertwined with organizational 
actions. For example, in Chapter 4 I showed the various practices organizations enact that 
influence how AI systems are developed and trained. Taking a holistic perspective has 
large consequences for how to study AI in practice, as unpacking the technical and domain 
details requires the researcher to obtain technical and domain knowledge, uncovering the 
different organizational actors involved in the development and deployment of AI 
requires the researcher to be fully embedded in the context for an extended period. To 
fully uncover both the challenges and the opportunities of using AI systems, I therefore 
call for a more embedded approach to studying technology in practice.  
Building on the insights of this dissertation, I offer three key implications for 
organizational and information systems scholarship on the consequences of “intelligent 
technologies” for work and organizing.  
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5.2.1 The need for organizational scholars to understand technological features  
Scholars may gain from this dissertation, that fully understanding the consequences of 
technology for work and organizing requires a deep comprehension of what makes these 
technologies so unique and consequential in the first place. In all previous chapters of this 
dissertation, I have questioned and unpacked the specific features of AI systems to 
understand their relationship with organizational practices. For example, in Chapter 2, I 
have paid specific attention to the data-driven nature of “intelligent technologies” and the 
associated need to produce large amounts of work-related data. By questioning how such 
data comes about, I have uncovered that this includes many “data work” efforts (Pachidi 
et al., 2020; Pine & Bossen, 2020; Sachs, 2020), and in my case specifically around “self-
reporting” one’s work (Cunha & Carugati, 2018). Moreover, I showed that, due to the 
specific features of data and the tools involved in data production, the practice of data 
work can create tensions with the existing situated work. By digging deeper into how 
workers cope with these tensions, I was able to move beyond the current understanding 
of data work as “impression management” (Cunha & Carugati, 2018; Pachidi et al., 2020), 
which offers new insights into the relationship between data and situated work. 
Similarly, in Chapter 3, I dug into the promise of learning algorithms to produce new 
knowledge and discussed how this comes with the challenge of such technologies being 
increasingly opaque or “black-boxed.” As recently scholars suggested that new occupations 
such as “algorithmic brokers” (Kellogg, Valentine, & Christin, 2020) or “algorithmists” 
(Gal, Jensen, & Stein, 2020) may emerge to translate such new knowledge into practice, I 
asked how these “algorithmic knowledge brokers” are able to translate machine learning 
knowledge when the opacity of the learning algorithm prevents them from understanding 
how such knowledge is generated. This helped me to uncover how algorithmic knowledge 
brokers attempted to unpack the learning algorithm but found that they could never fully 
understand how the system generated its new insights. Closely tracing how the brokers 
struggled with translating knowledge without understanding how it was generated 
allowed me to see how our understanding of translation changes in the case of opaque 
technologies. As it is commonly assumed that translation is facilitated by means of 
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technology (Røvik, 2016), I showed in this study that this is highly dependent on the 
specific features of that technology. In other words, if the technology is opaque, translation 
is hindered instead of facilitated.  
In sum, with this dissertation, I join scholars currently pointing at the potentially large 
consequences of AI systems for work and organizing (e.g., Faraj, Pachidi, & Sayegh, 2018; 
Glaser, Valadao, & Hannigan, 2021; Raisch & Krakowski, 2021; Von Krogh, 2018). Yet, as 
the computational methods become more complex and the number of data points 
increases to generate better insights or new knowledge for organizations (e.g., Kellogg et 
al., 2020; Van den Broek et al., 2021), I emphasize that understanding, for example, what is 
required for AI systems to learn and how these technologies generate new knowledge is 
crucial to gain insights into the reach of their influence on work and organizing. As 
knowledge is never a stand-alone object in organizations but resides in an ecology of actors 
(Brown & Duguid, 2000), we should consider AI systems as one of these actors and unpack 
their specific ‘skills’ accordingly, as well as their relationship to other organizational 
actors. This requires scholars to deeply engage with and question the features of AI 
systems, how these relate to specific organizational practices, and how the features might 
change over time to become more or less salient in the process of generating new 
knowledge.  
 
5.2.2 Let go of the divide between technology and organizing 
Related to the above-mentioned need to unpack the features of technology, scholars may 
also learn from this dissertation that studying technology (and specifically AI systems) in 
practice requires one to let go of the classic divide in organizational scholarship between 
technology development and organizational change (Faraj & Pachidi, 2021; Leonardi, 2009; 
Leonardi & Barley 2010; Orlikowski, 1992). This goes beyond understanding the features 
of technology, to look at technology implementation as a holistic process that includes a 
variety of actors. This means at least developers and users, but often this includes more 
than those two types of actors. For example, in Chapter 4, I provided examples of different 
organizations that implemented AI systems in their work processes. Stepping away from 
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the “design mode” and “use mode” (Orlikowski, 1992) that is common in organizational 
and information systems scholarship helped me to identify how deeply entwined a 
technology such as an AI system is with the work processes in which it is deployed. As 
these technologies learn and adjust over time, there is no more such a thing as an “end” to 
technology development.  
Letting go of the divide between technology and organizing also helps to uncover 
unexpected role changes or the emergence of new roles. In Chapter 4 I discussed some 
examples of this (such as new departments for data production), but Chapter 3 is 
specifically exemplary to this point. In Chapter 3, I traced how a group of algorithmic 
knowledge brokers emerged between the technology developers and the intended users to 
facilitate the implementation and use of a learning algorithm. I found that, as the brokers 
became increasingly familiar with the user domain, they became more influential for 
operational decision-making, even to the point where they were fully trusted and could let 
go of the black-boxed learning algorithm altogether. The findings of this study therefore 
allowed me to go beyond the current understanding of brokers as “neutral intermediaries” 
(Anteby, Chan, & DiBeningo, 2016), towards conceptualizing algorithmic knowledge 
brokers as influential and consequential.  
Thus, this dissertation shows that because of the ability of learning algorithms to learn 
and adjust indefinitely, studying AI systems in practice requires organizational and 
information systems scholars to go beyond a focus on either technology development or 
organizational change (Faraj & Pachidi, 2021). Surpassing this traditional divide gives 
researchers the opportunity to deeper understand the socio-technical relationships 
between AI systems and organizing, and to unpack how machine learning and 
organizational learning are intertwined. Specifically, this allows researchers to see how AI 
systems change and learn through the actions of its users, and to look beyond the roles of 
developers and users to find new emerging occupations, such as algorithmic knowledge 
brokers, to be largely consequential for both the development and use of AI in practice.  
Chapter 5 
 187 
5.2.3 Towards a holistic perspective on technology in practice 
Finally, scholars may gain from this dissertation that taking a practice perspective on 
studying technology goes beyond the role of human and material agency. For this, I link 
to recent calls for a more holistic perspective on how technology is perceived and used, 
specifically taking into account how technology is embedded and interrelated with core 
elements of a practice that are often overlooked, such as bodily strains and emotions 
(Hindmarsh, Hyland, & Banerjee, 2014; Oborn, Barrett, & Davidson, 2011; Sergeeva, Faraj, 
& Huysman, 2020; Vertesi, 2012). In Chapter 2, I described how new data work practices 
can create tensions with existing, more situated work. Beyond human and material agency, 
these tensions are also related to how the body was experienced in doing the work. For 
example, data work was experienced as bodily constrained, which resulted in a tension 
with the deeply embodied and often adrenaline-driven situated work. It was this bodily 
tension that triggered the police officers to avoid some of the more “exciting” work 
altogether. Including the experience of the body in understanding technology in practice 
therefore gave me deeper insights into the how and why the technology was consequential 
for work.  
Finally, scholars may also be inspired to look at the relationship vice versa; the role of 
AI systems for the body at work. As the body is becoming increasingly important in 
organizational scholarship (e.g., Best & Hindmarsh, 2019; Cunliffe & Coupland, 2012; de 
Rond, Holeman, & Howard-Grenville, 2019) it is surprising to notice that not so much is 
written about how the use of technology changes bodily practices (Sergeeva et al., 2020 
provides an exception). Again, in Chapter 2, I described how police officers started to use 
bodycams to enhance their vision and memory and capture their experiences in their data 
work. Yet, this also came with a cost, as this resulted in detailed but one-dimensional 
insights into the situated and lived experiences of police officers. As technologies for 
capturing data and experiences are becoming more prevalent in everyday organizational 
life, one could ask what such increased surveillance means for the body at work.  
In sum, the case of AI systems and the need to capture and produce data for these 
technologies to learn provides an excellent opportunity for taking a more holistic 
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perspective on technology-in-practice to also include, for example, bodily or emotional 
experiences. As this dissertation shows, the body at work can be largely consequential for 
how and what data is produced. Yet, so far studies on data production have focused on 
accounts of the body, analyzing which medical procedures are and are not reported (e.g., 
Mol, 2003; Pine & Liboiron, 2015) and not from the body, exploring what data production 
“feels like” (de Rond et al., 2019; Wacquant, 2005). Taking into account the experience of 
the body in the development and deployment of AI systems will allow researchers to go 
beyond the social and technical consequences of these technologies for work and 
organizing to observe the ramifications that are commonly overlooked or misunderstood. 
5.3 Practical implications 
!
Besides the theoretical implications, the findings presented in this dissertation also 
provide insights for practitioners involved in the development, implementation, and 
deployment of AI in practice.  
5.3.1 Understand what AI can and cannot do 
As AI systems are becoming increasingly prevalent in organizations, with the promise to 
generate more objective, efficient, and new insights, to avoid falling into the trap of the 
“AI hype,” it is important for practitioners to understand what these systems can and 
cannot do. First of all, this means that on the organizational side, managers and the users 
of AI systems need to obtain new skills to understand the potential of AI and to be able 
to critically reflect on the outputs that are presented to them. These could be data-related 
skills, for example, to understand the consequences of certain sampling decisions for how 
a learning algorithm is trained, but it also includes statistical skills, to understand the 
limits of the mathematical reasoning embedded in AI systems.  
To obtain such skills, organizations could facilitate (external) training programs and 
encourage employees to become more knowledgeable about the technologies that will 
become an important part of their organizational life, at least for the near future. Another 
Chapter 5 
 189 
solution could be to facilitate better interactions between the organizational actors 
involved in the implementation and use of the AI system and the technology developers. 
This way, the organization can learn more about the specifics of the learning algorithm, 
while the developers can learn more about the organization, which can also help them to 
better fit the AI system to the organizational requirements. In such cases, this does not 
only require new skills for the organizational actors, it also requires developers to make 
use of their social skills, move out of their comfort zone and into the organizational 
domain.  
A prerequisite for this closer interaction is transparency, both on the side of developers 
and users. All through my research, I have heard technology developers say that they 
usually do not bother sharing details about the technology with organizational users. On 
the other hand, organizations often do not immediately see the added relevance of giving 
developers insights into their organizational processes. Moreover, it also means that 
technology developers have to let go of the veil of “objectivity” that surrounds technologies 
such as AI systems and share how certain decisions are included and excluded. 
Organizations, on the other hand, should be willing to show the (often contradictory) 
actions taken to make AI systems work in practice. The findings of my dissertation show 
that it is only through such mutual understanding of each other’s worlds that fruitful 
interaction can take place in which one can let go of the “magic” that often surrounds AI 
systems and move towards a thought-through and trustworthy implementation of a 
learning algorithm.  
5.3.2 Engage in collaborative learning 
As the divide between technology development and organizational change also persists in 
practice, it is still often assumed that AI systems can be bought “off the shelf,” which means 
that it should be possible to fully outsource the development of AI (Newlands, 2021). The 
findings of this dissertation show that, when AI systems are intended to augment existing 
work processes, such an “off the shelf” idea is a mirage. Instead, every step of the way from 
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development to deployment requires careful consideration and understanding of the 
situated work practices, which cannot be achieved by merely buying in an external tool.  
For producing the data necessary to create and train a learning algorithm, the findings 
of this dissertation emphasize the need to derive at least parts of the dataset from the 
organization itself. This means that data production is not a taken-for-granted activity, 
but requires careful consideration regarding what should and should not be captured and 
requires practitioners to understand the nature of the work that is being datafied. This 
leads to new managerial responsibilities related to monitoring the relationship between 
data work and situated work. At the same time, it also requires new data-related skills for 
those who make the data. This is especially important for understanding the consequences 
of the decisions and actions during the data production process and for the learning 
algorithm that is constructed afterward. 
Understanding that data production is not an automated, simplified procedure but 
requires many efforts and new responsibilities for those involved is also important for 
maintaining a healthy work environment. As data production is becoming an increasingly 
central activity in many different occupations, the problems of performing such work are 
also becoming more visible. Studies are now pointing at the potential of burnouts due to 
overwhelming, data-related activities (e.g., Gardner et al., 2019; Johnson, Neuss, & Detmer, 
2020). Preventing data work from becoming a societal problem thus requires a good 
alignment between data production activities and situated work.  
The findings of this dissertation also emphasize other ways in which one cannot 
outsource AI. Specifically, since scholars increasingly point to the important role of 
algorithmic brokers to translate AI outcomes (e.g., Henke et al., 2018, Kellogg et al., 2020), 
I argue for the importance of both technology developers and users to stay in the loop of 
such translation work. It is not uncommon for developers to consider their niche to be 
technology development, while users often maintain in the organizational domain. Yet, 
this dissertation, and specifically Chapter 3, shows what happens when translation 
practices are fully outsourced to one dedicated group. It is the responsibility of developers 
to remain aware of the fit of their tool with the organizational processes, while it is the 
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responsibility of users to remain reflective of whether what is presented to them could 
even be machine learning knowledge in the first place. While an algorithmic broker can 
thus be a promising solution for dealing with complex machine learning knowledge, it is 
not a “one-size-fits-all” solution.  
As AI thus often requires the close involvement of all parties through “collaborative 
learning,” managers could use the process of AI development as an opportunity to reflect 
on (hidden) assumptions about work and organizing, as the procedures of developing AI 
systems can lead to insights about what has always been taken for granted (Van den Broek 
et al., 2021). These insights might not always be what organizational actors were expecting 
or hoping to see as, for example, biases in human judgments can be brought to the fore, 
yet those insights can help organizations to learn and move forward. This dissertation 
shows that, when the development of AI systems is approached in a collaborative way, this 
can help both machines and organizations to learn.  
5.3.3 Include the work practices in auditing AI 
Finally, the findings of this dissertation also provide new insights into and suggestions for 
the current procedures around auditing and governing AI. Much of the current 
governmental debates about keeping AI under control revolve around the technical and 
legal details of AI. For example, there are many discussions about the transparency and 
responsibility of algorithms. Interestingly, a practice perspective, in which the role of, for 
example, algorithmic brokers or users is largely missing. I encourage auditors and 
governmental organizations involved in these debates to go beyond the technical and legal 
perspectives, as the findings of my dissertation show that much happens to the (outcomes 
of) AI when it is implemented in an organization.  
This is also the case in debates about explainability and so-called “explainable AI.” As 
this is becoming an increasingly important debate in relation to AI development, also in 
this case the work perspective is missing. Yet, to deeply understand the role of 
explanations, one has to ask what explanations mean in practice. For example, what is 
required to make explanations make sense in practice? What kind of explanations are 
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required? And to whom? It is therefore important, even for governments, to step away 
from the divide between development and use and include both in the process of 
determining what should be audited and how.  
5.4 Some methodological reflections 
!
I write this discussion at the end of my four-year Ph.D. trajectory and while the take-aways 
of this dissertation are presented in a structured fashion, I did not arrive at them in a 
structured way. Throughout the dissertation process, I had to learn that theorizing about 
AI and gathering empirics is different than what we have seen before. Moreover, I learned 
that doing ethnography does not stop when you leave the field, especially not when you 
experience matters of life and death. I would therefore like to end this dissertation by 
reflecting on some of my methodological experiences and challenges throughout these four 
years. 
5.4.1 Understanding technology to theorize about its implications 
One of the key messages of this dissertation is the need for organizational scholars to 
understand the features of technology to theorize about its implications. I have spent many 
words in this dissertation to emphasize the importance of unpacking technology, which I 
will not repeat here. Instead, here I would like to reflect on the lessons learned in the 
process of becoming knowledgeable and theorizing about this unique technology. 
There is a problem with using the term “AI” in organizational scholarship, as well as in 
mainstream media, as it is becoming a buzzword or umbrella term, which includes many 
different tools and methods. The term AI has been used in relation to, for example, simple 
computational methods and Excel spreadsheets, robot arms, and complex predictive 
models.  The danger of this is that the concept becomes so broad that we, as scholars, do 
not understand anymore how it is and is not consequential in practice. In addition, the 
term AI evokes associations with “magic,” “mysticism,” and even “hype” that certainly do 
not contribute to our understanding of it. 
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Part of the reasons for the ambiguity regarding what is and is not AI is its long history, 
in which many computational methods and applications have emerged and have also been 
replaced. In this dissertation, I was given the opportunity to look into the historic 
moments of AI development and to unpack how such pivotal points were followed by new 
developments, more advanced computational methods, and new application areas. This 
gave me insights into what is currently part of the unique features of AI (i.e., their data-
driven nature, their ability to self-learn which makes them black-boxed, and their ability 
to generate alternative, pattern-based insights), which helped me to identify some areas in 
which these technologies are currently influential for work and organizing.  
What I also learned from looking deeper into the features of AI systems is that we, as 
organizational and information systems scholars, should not cease to ask “what is AI?” and 
“why is this AI?” As these technologies continue to learn and develop, their features 
continue to change. Defining the unique features of AI is therefore not a one-time activity, 
but an ongoing process of refining and re-defining. Only then will we be able to continue 
to go beyond the “AI hype” and will AI remain a useful term to understand the specific 
consequences of this technology for work and organizing.   
5.4.2 Gaining access, doing ethnography, and experiencing technological reality 
As with any type of empirical research, gaining access can be a challenge. In my case, I was 
lucky enough to meet the right people at the right time who were helpful and 
knowledgeable to get me into the police. Still, after that, it was up to me. As I described 
in Chapter 1, from the moment it became clear that I was allowed to do my dissertation 
research at the police, I knew I wanted to join the emergency response department for an 
extended period to see how a technology such as an AI system, that at first sight seems so 
opposite to police work, was used in practice. However, as I described there, this was not 
an easy thing to get into. It took me multiple years and many negotiations to get what I 
“wanted” (especially since the risk I was facing in the police car was higher than I would 
normally face doing my academic work).  
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Yet, above I described that, as AI systems are aimed to generate knowledge, they are 
likely embedded in a knowledge ecology (Brown & Duguid, 2000) in organizations. As a 
researcher, this gives you the opportunity to look beyond “just” the groups of users and 
developers and also include other organizational actors that are involved in the 
development and transfer of knowledge in organizations. For me, such a group resided at 
the intelligence department. I joined the intelligence officers early on in their transition 
towards “algorithmic brokers” and experienced their highs and lows in relation to the AI 
system, as well as towards their new role. They shared with me their mental breakdowns, 
their personal victories, their individual stories, and the roads they took to become 
“intelligence officers.” Even though the intelligence department might not have appeared 
the most exciting when I entered the police, the access to this department during those 
early years of AI implementation gave me invaluable insights into the process of 
translating machine learning knowledge into practice.  
It was also this department that taught me everything I had to know about the world 
of the police (and its endless abbreviations) and about the AI system. By being part of 
them for two years, I experienced the hopes the intelligence officers had at the start of the 
implementation of the AI system, the struggles and frustration they encountered in-
between when they could not figure out how insights were generated, the energy rush you 
get when you manually find relationships in police databases between a victim and a 
potential suspect, and the intelligence officers’ final lack of trust and care about the AI-
based insights and their increased belief in themselves as knowledgeable actors. 
Experiencing the “technological reality” of AI systems in practice, and how it changes over 
time, eventually helped me to find the story of the algorithmic brokers and their increased 
influence on police occupational decision-making, as I described in Chapter 3.  
During my time at the intelligence department, access continued to be something I had 
to actively seek, not only because I still wanted to join the emergency response department, 
but also because my research was not just about understanding intelligence work, but 
about understanding intelligence work in relation to AI systems. This meant that, during 
those years, I did not only follow the intelligence officers, but I also remained in close 
Chapter 5 
 195 
contact with the developers of the AI system and the police managers responsible for the 
AI implementation. Looking behind the scenes of AI by means of ethnography is thus a 
complex, multi-faceted research project which requires a researcher to maintain 
relationships with a variety of actors.  
Finally, not all data access was as “easy” and unrestricted as my access with the police. 
Chapter 4 is based on the managerial book I co-authored called “Managing AI wisely.” For 
this book, together with my two co-authors, I used existing cases of the KIN Center for 
Digital Innovation, but I also performed new small case studies. Here, I had a whole new 
experience with gaining access to organizations that implemented AI. As organizations 
appeared to be afraid that I would disclose information that they did not want to be “out 
there” (e.g., about their use of AI, their decisions regarding AI development, or the kind 
of data they gathered), many doors remained closed. Other doors were wide open, but 
when I then entered the organization to interview some of the employees, it appeared that 
the so-called “AI system” did not include a learning algorithm at all, was at a pilot stage, 
or, even more extreme, was not even developed yet. Finding a suitable context to study AI 
implementation, for an extended period, and gaining all technical and organizational 
details can be extremely time-consuming and challenging. However, once you get in, there 
is nothing better.  
Thus, studying AI in practice comes with its challenges regarding finding a suitable 
case, gaining access to a wide variety of actors, maintaining these relationships over an 
extended period, and keeping track of changes in work and organizing, as well as in the 
technology itself. To get a full understanding of the technological reality, scholars benefit 
from taking a “traditional” ethnographic approach (e.g., Van Maanen, 1973), spending a 
large amount of time, even years, in the field to fully understand how it changes over time. 
However, what is new in the case of AI is that spending this time with one group of 
organizational actors is not enough. Instead, studying AI in practice requires scholars to 
bridge between technology and humans, to be a computer scientist and an anthropologist 




5.4.3 Going through a “lived analysis” – a personal reflection 
“Ethnography is the experience of taking close to the same shit others take day-in and day-out” 
(Van Maanen, 2011, p. 220) 
As a final point, I would like to reflect on where doing ethnography starts and ends and 
with what consequences for us as researchers. With this reflection, I step away from the 
focus on AI and reflect on what experiencing the field means to us as human beings. With 
the danger of sounding sentimental: doing ethnography has changed me for life. It has 
opened up opportunities to experience the world in different ways that would have 
normally not been accessible to me, but it has also resulted in challenges I did not expect, 
and in a way also was not prepared for when I faced them.  
For this reflection, I build on the second part of my ethnography: the fieldwork at the 
emergency response department. Of course, this experience enhanced my knowledge of 
technology and work, but it also changed my life in many other ways. It gave me insight 
into a world of poverty, sadness, and hopelessness I had never experienced before. It has 
given me a better understanding of the mental health problems our society faces. It has 
taught me that our bodies and minds can handle experiences one could never fathom, and 
even multiple times in a row. I remember vividly how, shortly after leaving the field, I was 
presenting at a conference and received a compliment about my “cool” research context. 
“Thanks,” I said, “but just to nuance this a bit: the shoes that I’m wearing at the moment 
have seen more blood and death than one should actually see in a lifetime.” I was still in 
the process of finding a way to deal with all the things I had seen. Interestingly, one of the 
most surprising aspects of police work, and one that has become a key topic in my 
dissertation research, was the extreme boredom and the bodily aches I experienced in the 
long “data work hours” often in the middle of the night or after a long shift. It was through 
experiencing these long hours that I started to deeply question the consequences of data 
production.  
The experiences I summarized above link to what is generally considered the aim of 
doing ethnography: to get a “lived experience” of working in a specific context, which is 
something that is impossible to obtain through a case study and which provides invaluable 
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insights into everyday work and organizing. Some scholars have reflected on what it is like 
to do fieldwork (e.g., Claus et al., 2019), or the experience of leaving the field (e.g., de Rond, 
2012). Yet, what I did not foresee, and what we do not often describe, is that this “lived 
experience” continues as you analyze your data – the data that reflects what you have seen, 
sensed, smelled, felt, laughed, and cried over – over and over again.  
This is what I would like to call the “lived analysis” and it is something you experience 
only when you have left the field. For me, this was the part of the ethnography that hit me 
the hardest. It was not when I was with the police that I reflected on all that I had seen, it 
was when I had left and I did not have the prospect of a new shift to keep me away from 
my own thoughts and experiences that they started coming. And here is the interesting 
thing: to write a meaningful story, we have to relive those moments. We have to go back 
to those memories and feel again what we felt then. We have to tap into our fear, our 
adrenaline rush, our confusion, and even our boredom, to keep the lived experiences alive. 
But doing that is hard, especially if there are stories you would rather forget the details of.  
It took me a while to learn how to deal with this experience. It can be quite 
overwhelming if, as a young researcher, you start doing your data analysis with a lot of 
enthusiasm, only to feel like someone has hit you with a baseball stick after about an hour. 
I had to learn how to express my struggles with this, as I was not aware that others were 
struggling with this too. It takes time to find the right way to deal with these experiences 
and to learn how to leverage them time and again without falling victim to your own 
thoughts. Every context has its own stories that we, as researchers, bring with us. It is up 






Anteby, M., Chan, C. K., & DiBenigno, J. (2016). Three lenses on occupations and 
professions in organizations: Becoming, doing, and relating. Academy of Management 
Annals, 10(1), 183–244. 
Bailey, D. E., & Barley, S. R. (2020). Beyond design and use: How scholars should study 
intelligent technologies. Information and Organization, 30(2). 
doi:10.1016/j.infoandorg.2019.100286 
Barley, W. C. (2015). Anticipatory work: How the need to represent knowledge across 
boundaries shapes work practices within them. Organization Science, 26(6), 1612-–1628.  
Best, K., & Hindmarsh, J. (2019). Embodied spatial practices and everyday organization: 
The work of tour guides and their audiences. Human Relations, 72(2), 248–271.  
Bossen, C., Pine, K., Ellingsen, G., & Cabitza, F. (2016). Data-work in healthcare: The new 
work ecologies of healthcare infrastructures. Paper presented at the Proceedings of the 
19th ACM Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work and Social 
Computing Companion - CSCW '16 Companion.  
Brown, J. S., & Duguid, P. (1998). Organizing knowledge. California Management Review, 
40(3), 90–111. 
Brown, J. S., & Duguid, P. (2000). The social life of information. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
Business School Press.  
Bucher, E. L., Schou, P. K., & Waldkirch, M. (2020). Pacifying the algorithm – 
Anticipatory compliance in the face of algorithmic management in the gig economy. 
Organization. doi:10.1177/1350508420961531 
Burgess, N., & Currie, G. (2013). The knowledge brokering role of the hybrid middle level 
manager: The case of healthcare. British Journal of Management, 24, S132–S142. 
Claus, L., de Rond, M., Howard-Grenville, J., & Lodge, J. (2019). When fieldwork hurts: 
On the lived experience of conducting research in unsettling contexts. In The 
production of managerial knowledge and organizational theory: New approaches to writing, 
producing and consuming theory. Emerald Publishing Limited. 
Cunha, J., & Carugati, A. (2018). Transfiguration work and the system of transfiguration: 
How employees represent and misrepresent their work. MIS Quarterly, 42(3), 873–894.  
Cunliffe, A., & Coupland, C. (2012). From hero to villain to hero: Making experience 
sensible through embodied narrative sensemaking. Human Relations, 65(1), 63–88.  
Czarniawska, B., & Sevón, G. (2005). Translation is a vehicle, imitation its motor, and 
fashion sits at the wheel. In Czarniawska B, Sevón G (eds) Global Ideas: How Ideas, 
Objects and Practices Travel in the Global Economy. Malmø: Liber & Copenhagen 
Business School Press. 
Chapter 5 
 199 
Faraj, S., & Pachidi, S. (2021). Beyond Uberization: The co-constitution of technology and 
organizing. Organization Theory, 2(1). doi:10.1177/2631787721995205 
Faraj, S., Pachidi, S., & Sayegh, K. (2018). Working and organizing in the age of the 
learning algorithm. Information and Organization, 28(1), 62–70.  
Flyverbom, M., & Garsten, C. (2021). Anticipation and organization: Seeing, knowing 
and governing futures. Organization Theory, 2(3). doi:10.1177/26317877211020325 
Gal, U., Jensen, T. B., & Stein, M.-K. (2020). Breaking the vicious cycle of algorithmic 
management: A virtue ethics approach to people analytics. Information and 
Organization, 30(2). doi:10.1016/j.infoandorg.2020.100301 
Gardner, R. L., Cooper, E., Haskell, J., Harris, D. A., Poplau, S., Kroth, P. J., & Linzer, M. 
(2019). Physician stress and burnout: The impact of health information technology. 
Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association, 26(2), 106–114. 
Glaser, V. L., Valadao, R., & Hannigan, T. R. (2021). Algorithms and routine dynamics. In 
M. S. Feldman, B. T. Pentland, L. D’Adderio, K. Dittrich, C. Rerup, & D. Seidl (Eds.), 
Cambridge Handbook of Routine Dynamics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Henke, N., Levine, K., & McInerney, P. (2018). You don’t have to be a data scientist to fill 
this must-have analytics role. Harvard Business Review. 
Hindmarsh, J., Hyland, L., & Banerjee, A. (2014). Work to make simulation work: 
‘Realism’, instructional correction and the body in training. Discourse Studies, 16(2), 
247–269.  
Johnson, K. B., Neuss, M. J., & Detmer, D. E. (2020). Electronic health records and clinical 
burnout: A story of three eras. Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association. 
doi:10.1093/jamia/ocaa274 
Kellogg, K. C., Valentine, M. A., & Christin, A. (2020). Algorithms at work: The new 
contested terrain of control. Academy of Management Annals, 14(1), 366–410.  
Leonardi, P. M. (2009). Crossing the implementation line: The mutual constitution of 
technology and organizing across development and use activities. Communication 
Theory, 19(3), 278–310.  
Leonardi, P. M., & Barley, S. R. (2010). What’s under construction here? Social action, 
materiality, and power in constructivist studies of technology and organizing. The 
Academy of Management Annals, 4(1), 1–51.  
Meyer, M. (2010). The rise of the knowledge broker. Science Communication, 32(1), 118–127. 
Mol, A. (2003). The body multiple. Duke University Press. 
Mueller, F., & Whittle, A. (2011). Translating management ideas: A discursive devices 
analysis. Organization Studies, 32(2), 187–210. 
Newlands, G. (2021). Lifting the curtain: Strategic visibility of human labour in AI-as-a-
Service. Big Data & Society, 8(1). doi: 10.1177/20539517211016026 
Discussion 
 200 
Nielsen, J. A., Mathiassen, L., & Newell, S. (2014). Theorization and translation in 
information technology institutionalization: Evidence from Danish home care. MIS 
Quarterly, 38(1), 165–186. 
Oborn, E., Barrett, M., & Davidson, E. (2011). Unity in diversity: Electronic patient 
record use in multidisciplinary practice. Information Systems Research, 22(3), 547–564. 
Orlikowski, W. J. (1992). The duality of technology: Rethinking the concept of 
technology in organizations. Organization Science, 3(3), 398–427.  
Orlikowski, W. J., & Scott, S. V. (2016). Digital work: A research agenda. In A Research 
Agenda for Management and Organization Studies. Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Pachidi, S., Berends, H., Faraj, S., & Huysman, M. (2020). Make way for the algorithms: 
Symbolic actions and change in a regime of knowing. Organization Science. 
doi:10.1287/orsc.2020.1377 
Pawlowski, S. D., & Robey, D. (2004). Bridging user organizations: Knowledge brokering 
and the work of information technology professionals. MIS Quarterly, 28(4), 645–672. 
Pine, K. H., & Bossen, C. (2020). Good organizational reasons for better medical records: 
The data work of clinical documentation integrity specialists. Big Data & Society, 7(2). 
doi:10.1177/2053951720965616 
Pine, K. H., & Liboiron, M. (2015). The politics of measurement and action. Paper presented 
at the Proceedings of the 33rd Annual ACM Conference on Human Factors in 
Computing Systems. 
Raisch, S., & Krakowski, S. (2021). Artificial intelligence and management: The 
automation–augmentation paradox. Academy of Management Review, 46(1), 192–210. 
de Rond, M. (2012). Soldier, surgeon, photographer, fly: Fieldwork beyond the comfort 
zone. Strategic Organization, 10(3), 256-262. 
de Rond, M., Holeman, I., & Howard-Grenville, J. (2019). Sensemaking from the body: 
An enactive ethnography of rowing the amazon. Academy of Management Journal, 62(6), 
1961–1988.  
Røvik, K. A. (2016). Knowledge transfer as translation: Review and elements of an 
instrumental theory. International Journal of Management Reviews, 18(3), 290–310. 
Sachs, S. E. (2020). The algorithm at work? Explanation and repair in the enactment of 
similarity in art data. Information, Communication & Society, 23(11), 1689–1705. 
Sergeeva, A., Faraj, S., & Huysman, M. (2020). Losing touch: An embodiment perspective 
on coordination in robotic surgery. Organization Science, 31(5), 1248–1271. 
Truelove, E. (2019). The changing nature of professional work inside an incumbent firm in the 
age of social media: examining the challenge of coproduction (Doctoral dissertation, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology). 
Van den Broek, E., Sergeeva, A., & Huysman, M. (2021). When the machine meets the 
expert: An ethnography of developing AI for hiring. MIS Quarterly, Forthcoming 
Chapter 5 
 201 
Van Maanen, J. (1973). Observations on the making of policemen. Human Organization, 
32(4), 407–418. 
Van Maanen, J. (2011). Ethnography as work: Some rules of engagement. Journal of 
management studies, 48(1), 218–234. 
Vertesi, J. (2012). Seeing like a Rover: Visualization, embodiment, and interaction on the 
Mars exploration Rover mission. Social Studies of Science, 42(3), 393–414. 
Von Krogh, G. (2018). Artificial intelligence in organizations: New opportunities for 
phenomenon-based theorizing. Academy of Management Discoveries, 4(4), 404–409. 
Wacquant, L. (2005). Carnal connections: On embodiment, apprenticeship, and 
membership. Qualitative Sociology, 28(4), 445–474.  
Zammuto, R. F., Griffith, T. L., Majchrzak, A., Dougherty, D. J., & Faraj, S. (2007). 
Information technology and the changing fabric of organization. Organization Science, 

















From recruitment to health care and from law enforcement to education, artificial 
intelligence (AI) is increasingly implemented in organizations. Using machine learning, 
these systems produce insights – referred to as “machine learning knowledge” – that 
potentially go beyond what is humanly possible. Therefore, organizational and 
information systems scholars increasingly argue that, beyond automation, AI systems can 
actually augment existing work practices. Such augmentation is said to work in two ways, 
for when organizational actors work closely with AI systems, they can complement the 
insights with their unique human capabilities, such as intuition and common-sense 
reasoning, and AI systems can also complement these actors’ domain knowledge by 
offering previously unknown insights. However, what is commonly overlooked in existing 
research is that there is a fundamental difference between the procedures used for machine 
learning and how human knowledge is produced. This difference makes it challenging to 
find common ground for sharing and collectively producing knowledge in the first place. 
Even though the expectations about the possibilities of AI systems for organizing are high, 
organizations thus face new yet unknown challenges when implementing machine learning 
in practice. Therefore, this dissertation sets out to answer the following research question: 
How do organizations cope with the production and use of machine learning in practice?  
The core of this thesis includes three self-contained chapters to answer this question. 
Chapter 2 relates to the core feature of AI systems: data. As the making of data is becoming 
increasingly important for organizations in developing and training AI systems, I ask what 
happens when workers are facing the need to embed “data work” practices in their existing, 
situated work. In this Chapter, I build on the final year of my ethnographic research at the 
Dutch police, where I joined the emergency response department full time “in the streets.” 
By comparing the police officers’ experience of data work and the characteristics of their 
situated work, three data work tensions emerge. I show that police officers cope with these 
tensions by anticipating the data work and adopting three coping strategies in their 
situated work: avoiding work, deviating from protocol, and capturing experiences. While 
these strategies help the police officers to alleviate the burden of data production they 
experience on a daily basis; they have a large influence on how police officers perform their 
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situated work. As a consequence, what and how crimes are reported and data is produced 
is significantly influenced by their coping strategies. 
Chapter 3 builds on my two years of fieldwork at the intelligence department of the 
Dutch police. In this Chapter, I focus on two more features of AI systems, namely the 
opaque nature of machine learning and the ability to produce new insights, and offer one 
of the first empirical accounts of algorithmic brokers. I ask how such brokers can translate 
machine learning knowledge when they cannot understand how knowledge is generated. I 
find that as the algorithmic brokers need to translate predictions to the users, they realize 
that they need to understand how these predictions are generated. By trying to become 
more familiar with machine learning, the brokers perform different translation practices 
over time and enact increasingly influential brokerage roles, i.e., messenger, interpreter, 
and curator. When, finally, the algorithmic brokers come to the conclusion that they can 
never understand how machine learning knowledge is generated, they act like “kings in 
the land of the blind” and substitute the algorithmic predictions with their own 
judgments.  
In Chapter 4, I build on the three unique features of AI systems that I unpacked in 
Chapters 2 and 3 – i.e., their dependence on large amounts of data, the opaque nature of 
machine learning, and the to generate new insights – and use unique insights from five 
different cases across various industries to ask how the “implementation line” can be 
crossed in the case of AI, in which technology development and organizational 
deployment are often worlds apart. I identify three different AI implementation practices 
– i.e., organizing for data, organizing for explainability, and organizing for new insights – 
and show how, through these implementation practices, developers and organizational 
actors are required to engage in continuous and reflective “collaborative learning.”  
This dissertation contributes to the discussion on the production and use of knowledge 
that has been core to the field of organization theory for decades. By taking a practice 
perspective, I unpack how new, machine-based knowledge is developed, implemented, and 
used in practice and with what consequences for work and organizing. Moreover, by 
including and theorizing the specific features of AI systems and their relation to 
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organizing, this dissertation responds to the call to bridge the divide between technology 
development and organizational change. Also, this dissertation links to the field of 
information systems by going beyond the “AI hype” to unpack the challenges that emerge 
when organizing for machine learning knowledge in practice.  
Finally, this dissertation also has practical implications. I urge managers to let go of the 
“AI hype” and instead consider AI implementation as effortful, skillful, and requiring 
long-term involvement. AI systems can therefore not be considered as a quick and easy 
solution to large amounts of data, nor as crystal balls that will magically lead organizations 
to new insights. Instead, long-term and direct involvement will provide managers with 
behind-the-scenes knowledge about the skills and efforts required for producing and using 


















“When the order to move on comes, the Warrior looks at all the friends he has made during the 
time that he followed the path. He taught some to hear the bells of a drowned temple, he told 
others stories around the fire. His heart is sad, but he knows that his sword is sacred and that he 
must obey the orders of the one to whom he offered up his struggle. Then the Warrior thanks his 
traveling companions, takes a deep breath and continues on, laden with memories of an 
unforgettable journey.” Paulo Coelho - Warrior of the light 
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